







Edited by ALEX MORRISON

The New Peacekeeping Partnership

Associate Editors: JAMES KIRAS STEPHANIE A. BLAIR

"Serving the
New Peacekeeping
Partnership"

Canadian Internatio

Le centre canadian

The Lester B. Pearson
Canadian International Peacekeeping
Training Centre
Le centre canadien international
Lester B. Pearson
pour la formation en maintien de la paix

Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2023 with funding from University of Toronto

Government Publications

THE NEW PEACEKEEPING PARTNERSHIP

The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre

President, Alex Morrison, MSC, CD, MA

The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre supports and enhances the Canadian contribution to international peace, security, and stability. The Centre conducts research and provides advanced training and educational programs, and is a division of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. The Canadian Peacekeeping Press is the publishing division of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.

The Centre, established by the Government of Canada in 1994, is funded, in part, by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence of Canada.

Le centre à été établi par le Gouvernement du Canada en 1994. Le soutien financier de Centre provient, en partie, des ministères des affaires extérieures et du commerce extérieur et de la défense nationale de Canada.

Canadian Peacekeeping Press publications include:

The Persian Excursion: The Canadian Navy in the Gulf War
UN Peace Operations and the Role of Japan (forthcoming)
Peacekeeping and International Relations (bi-monthly)
The Canadian and International Peacekeeping Review (forthcoming)
The Peacekeeping Profile (bi-monthly)
The Pearson Papers (forthcoming)

For publications or course information, please contact:

The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre Cornwallis Park, PO Box 100 Clementsport, NS B0S 1E0 Tel: (902) 638-8808 / 8611 Fax: (902) 638-8888

AXY-8625



The New Peacekeeping Partnership

Associate Editors: JAMES KIRAS, STEPHANIE A. BLAIR

The Lester B. Pearson
Canadian International Peacekeeping
Training Centre
Le centre canadien international
Lester B. Pearson
pour la formation en maintien de la paix

Copyright The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre

Cornwallis Park, PO Box 100, Clementsport, NS B0S 1E0

Modern international stability operations frequently involve several warring factions, an unstable or non-existent truce, and a national theatre of operations. To deal with these operations, there is a "New Peacekeeping Partnership," the term applied to the military, government and non-governmental organizations dealing with humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons; election monitors and the media; and the civil police personnel as they work together to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre serves the "New Peacekeeping Partnership" by offering national and international groups the opportunity to examine specific peacekeeping issues, and to update their knowledge of the latest peacekeeping practices.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

The National Library of Canada has catalogued this publication as follows: Main entry under title: The New Peacekeeping Partnership

Proceedings of Peacekeeping '94: An Exhibition and Seminar held in Washington, D.C., November 14-16, 1994

ISBN 1-896551-00-9

1. United Nations -- Armed Forces -- Congresses. 2. International Police -- Congresses. I. Morrison, Alex, 1941- II. Kiras, James. III. Blair, Stephanie A. IV. Peacekeeping '94: An Exhibition and Seminar (1994: Washington, D.C.) V. Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre.

JX1981.P7N48 1994

355.3'57

C95-950153-3

This volume printed and bound in Canada by "The Printer," Halifax, Nova Scotia.


Contents

1	Introductory Remarks Jean-Jacques Blais, Al Geddry and Joseph Jockel
3	Opening Address The Hon. David Collenette
	NATO and Peacekeeping Robin Beard
14	The Rwandan Experience Romeo Dallaire
26	Peacekeeping Procurement & Financing: Challenges & Opportunities Richard Foran
30	unctions of the Field Administration & Logistics Division Denis Beissel
43	Preamble to the Keynote Address Elliot Richardson
47	Keynote Address Roderick Cordy-Simpson
56	Some Reflections on the Nature of Conflict Resolution

	The Changing Nature of Civil-Military Operations in Peacekeeping Andrew Bair
	The United Nations and Civil Wars Thomas Weiss
80	The International Politics of Peacekeeping Alan James
94	The Role of Police Forces in International Peacekeeping Herman Beaulac
99	The Role of the Media in Peacekeeping Sally Armstrong
105	Naval Peacekeeping: Multinational Considerations Peter Haydon
125	The USA Peacekeeping Experience: An Assessment Isebill Gruhn
	The Role of the United States in Peacekeeping Sarah Sewall
	Canada and International Peacekeeping: An American View Joseph Jockel
159	Humanitarian Peacekeeping: Ethical Considerations Stephen Collett
165	Management of Future UN Peacekeeping Operations Ralph Cwerman
169	Command and Control of International Forces

Clive Milner

Lessons from UNPROFOR: Peacekeeping from a Force Commander's Perspective John Archibald MacInnis	178
Canada and International Peacekeeping Tim Sparling	189
Glossary	199
Peacekeeping '94: The Exhibitors	201



Jean-Jacques Blais Al Geddry Joseph T. Jockel

Introductory Remarks

Mr. Jean-Jacques Blais, Chairman of the Board **Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies**

On behalf of the three sponsors of this event, the CISS, Baxter Publications, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies here in Washington, I would like to welcome all of you to this seminar and exhibition. I am particularly pleased to welcome Canada's Minister of National Defence, Mr. David Collenette, who will deliver the opening address

As you all acknowledge by your presence, peacekeeping is indeed the focus of international attention at this very important time. In Canada, specifically, there has been a national focus on peacekeeping; the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Canada's Defence Policy is about to table a report which places a very strong focus on peacekeeping. Meanwhile, the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, under commission from the Government of Canada, is developing the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia.

I am sure that our deliberations over the next few days will do much to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, present and future.

Brigadier-General (retd) Al Geddry Baxter Publishing

I extend a welcome on behalf of Baxter Publishing. Peacekeeping '94 is a hybrid show. We are attempting to bring together the suppliers of peacekeeping products on the one hand and the strategists and developers of the peacekeeping concept on the other, so that suppliers can know what is going to be needed in the field, and so that strategists can know what peacekeeping products there are. It is our hope that the relationships which will be established at this seminar will prove to be long, fruitful and mutually beneficial.

Dr. Joseph T. Jockel, Senior Fellow Center for Strategic and International Studies

I have two happy tasks to execute this morning. The first is to welcome all of you from out of town to Washington. Having attended Peacekeeping '93 in Ottawa, I was nothing short of delighted when Baxter Publishing decided to hold Peacekeeping '94 here in Washington. And having attended the seminar last year, I was even more delighted when the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies asked the CSIS to co-host this seminar. I wish you all a very productive session.

Second, I would like to remark on the presence here on the platform of Alex Morrison -- a practitioner and a scholar of peacekeeping. He is also someone who encourages scholars: no one has done more to provide the intellectual underpinnings of the "New Peacekeeping Partnership" concept than Alex Morrison. He has long served as Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies and was recently appointed President of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre.

Opening Address by The Honourable David Collenette Minister of National Defence

It is a great pleasure to be here for the official opening of your seminar and exhibition.

This year's theme, "The New Peacekeeping Partnership", besides sounding attractive and up-to-date, suggests two concepts that we in Canada can identify with very, very closely: peacekeeping and partnership. After all, peacekeeping is about partnership. Some 100,000 Canadians have served over the last 50 years in UN peacekeeping missions, and that, I think, is a measure of Canada's commitment to the United Nations, to peacekeeping, and to the world's stability.

Peacekeeping '94 brings together not only an impressive group of academics and business people, but also many practitioners and policy makers, both military and civilian. I am pleased to notice, by the uniforms and familiar faces, that there are many Canadians here today.

Over the next few days, you will be discussing many of the issues and challenges that face the United Nations and those countries participating in peacekeeping and related missions. Canada has always been a prominent player in UN missions, with Canadians serving in the first mission back in 1947. Then in 1956 came the Suez intervention force. This was the first time the term "peacekeeping" was used, and it resulted from an idea developed by the Honourable Lester B. Pearson, who later became Prime Minister of Canada.

It is, therefore, fitting that the Canadian government last February announced the creation of a peacekeeping institute at the former military base at Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, to be called the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre. I must congratulate Alex Morrison: you were the driving force behind turning that concept into reality and I know that you will work very hard to achieve great success. We are with you, the Government of Canada is with you, all the way.

We have a very interesting process going in Canada right now. For the first time since the end of the Cold War we are looking closely at our foreign and defence policies, in a comprehensive review involving thousands of Canadians, including many experts in various fields, and, of course, parliamentarians.

In fact there have been three reviews going on simultaneously at the Department of National Defence. One, the public component, is the product of a parliamentary committee that has travelled across the country, seeking the views of Canadians and receiving public input. Second, the Department, of course, is continually carrying out studies and reviews, and is planning well into the next century. Third, I have been conducting my own personal reviewing process. Some of the people I have met with privately are here at Peacekeeping '94; this has afforded me an opportunity to talk off-the-record, without any officials or members of the Canadian Forces present, to get to the real nub of the concerns of many people with expertise in military and foreign policies.

All of this is now coming together. In the last election the Liberal Party called for a new defence policy to be enunciated within a year of the government's taking office. On 31 October the Defence Review Committee reported to the House of Commons, and the Foreign Affairs Committee will table its report soon. So our review has been all-embracing and comprehensive.

The conclusions of the Special Joint Committee have been especially worthy of note. The Committee's report notes that the world is still a dangerous place and that, the ending of the Cold War notwithstanding, we still do have to remain "on guard." There have been changes to the types of threats that we face: we have instability through regional, ethnic, and cultural disputes; we have states that are somewhat unstable, some with access to

nuclear technology. All of this is a reminder to the world community that we cannot let down our guard and we must be ready and able to meet a number of threats.

The Canadian defence context involves three concentric spheres of action. The first of these, the purely domestic sphere, has to do with civilian aid, search and rescue, all the normal things a national armed force does. The second is the North American sphere, our collective defence through NORAD, the great cooperation with our best friend and partner, the United States. The third is the global sphere which encompasses such multilateral organizations as NATO, but, most importantly in the context of this conference, involves the United Nations.

The founders of the United Nations were labelled idealists when they met n San Francisco in 1945. The League of Nations had failed; was it really possible to have a multilateral security body that could actually achieve anything? Today the world has seen the emergence of the United Nations as a major player, taking on a role that its founders could only have dreamed of 50 years ago.

We have seen in the last few years a multiplicity of UN peacekeeping missions; the United Nations is becoming the real locus of world stability and even something of an enforcer. This has meant a change in roles, a change of perceptions, a shift in focus from traditional countries that have always shouldered the burden, such as the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia. The world powers are now cooperating. In the former republics of Yugoslavia, for example, we see for the first time in this century the United States, the European Community, and Russia working together in an attempt to resolve those very difficult disputes. At the same time, troops under United Nations auspices are trying to achieve peace, to bring humanitarian aid, and to ensure that conflicting parties are at least kept from all-out war while negotiations go on.

The UN now is faced with several challenges as a result of this greater thrust in the discharging of its mandate, and this has led to a certain amount of critical questioning. Is the UN overly bureaucratic? Is there an effective command and control system? How can countries determine the level and nature of peacekeeping engagements? None of this soul-searching is, I submit, out of place, as the UN emerges from being an organization of

"idealists" and becomes instead, some 50 years later, a kind of day-to-day world peace and enforcement organization. There will be growing pains and problems along the way.

My colleague, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, André Ouellet, came to the United Nations in September of this year, and laid down Canada's thoughts on UN reform and ensuring the most efficient and forthright conduct of peacekeeping missions.

I believe that Canada's commitment to peacekeeping will be reflected ir the Canadian Government's White Paper on Defence. But it must be kept ir mind that peacekeeping encompasses more than just the "hard edge" that we see in Croatia and Bosnia, which requires combat-capable troops ready to defend people in the areas that we are protecting. It is also about humanitarian measures, such as those we have seen most recently as the world responded, through the UN, to the situation in Rwanda. In his presentation, Major-General Romeo Dallaire will bring us up to date on some of the problems that the UN has experienced in carrying out its humanitariar mandate.

Whether it be the mission in Rwanda, or whether it be the 600 air force personnel we are now training in St-Jean, Quebec for the UN force that will go into Haiti; whether it be mine clearance in Cambodia, or logistics and administrative work such as Canadians are performing in the Golan Heights in support of the Poles and Austrians on the front line; we see that there are many dimensions to peacekeeping. As a result, we have to have prepared a number of different responses, so that our troops may be ready for all eventualities. We also need to achieve a certain level of sophistication in terms of equipment. Not all missions require armoured personnel carriers; I do not believe armoured personnel carriers will be going into Haiti, for example. But even those people who go into Haiti, like those people who were with General Dallaire in Rwanda, need some kind of protection, some amount of sophisticated equipment.

I believe that this conference and the discussions that will take place here today will help governments such as ours to reshape and rethink such matters as defence policies, equipment, and procurement policies to meet the changing needs of the United Nations. Canada is committed to making the United Nations an organization that is able to help resolve disputes

throughout the world. We are determined to address the concerns expressed in the Secretary-General's report, *Agenda for Peace*. In fact, it was he who said that peacekeeping should not be considered solely in isolation; it must be seen as one of the many options, ranging from preventive diplomacy to peacebuilding, that are available to the UN in support of peace.

We believe the Secretary-General is on the right track. We believe that the UN can be reformed -- indeed, must be reformed -- and that only through all nations working together towards this goal can we carry out the original mandate set out by its founders 50 years ago.

Of course, the world has changed enormously in 50 years and in the next five decades it will change more yet. As the report of the Defence Review Committee states, the world is still a somewhat dangerous place. For those of us who are shaping public policy in our own countries, whether it be here in the United States, in Canada, or anywhere else, we have to decide whether our foreign policies and our defence policies are to be based on the world as we would like it to be or the world as it is.

The five years since 1989, since the end of the Cold War, have been unique in this century. Are we to base our foreign policy and defence policy going into the 21st century on the events of these five years? Or should we look at the previous 80 or 90 years, back to before the First World War? During that time, we have suffered two major world wars, the Korean War, and a multiplicity of smaller conflicts involving nations either individually or jointly, as in the context of multilateral operations with the United Nations.

As we in Canada try to craft our policy we have to keep in mind the problems of the past -- we do not want them to be repeated in the future. But if we let our guard down too much, we may not be ensuring justice either for future generations, nor for those people in our own countries now who serve in the armed forces and who are expected to help keep the world peace.

These are the kinds of things I am wrestling with, even as this conference continues. There will be meetings when I get back to Ottawa, as we continue to refine our defence and foreign policies, for, of course, the two are intermeshed.

I am extremely pleased to have been able to join you here today. The organizers are to be commended for bringing so many people from so many countries to look at the realities of today's world, and to see how the equipment and training needs of peacekeeping may be met. Only by having meetings like this will we heighten the awareness of the public to the radical changes in world security policy, as we move closer and closer to the determination and the resolution of disputes by the United Nations.

I am delighted to declare this exhibition and seminar officially open.

Robin Beard

NATO and Peacekeeping

I welcome this opportunity to speak at this conference which deals with a very timely and difficult subject. My own situation is quite unique in that I served at NATO during the Cold War, from 1984-1987. Some people now efer to those days as the "good old days," because life seemed so much nore straightforward. Then I had the unique experience of having NATO Secretary-General Wörner ask me if I would come back during this period of transition. Being a glutton for punishment, I said yes. I must say it has been a challenge, and it has been fascinating, but a lot more difficult. My area has to do with armaments cooperation, involving army, navy and air orce equipment, air defence, command and control, communications, and defence research.

It is quite a challenge ... and the keynote of this challenge lies in the words "interoperability" and "standardization". This is absolutely imperative, and the more complex the peacekeeping operation the greater the need for standardization and interoperability.

Let me take the opportunity to make a number of observations which nay be of a somewhat broader nature, although they certainly have a great mpact on our peacekeeping capabilities. In today's environment, one nessage from the past remains true. Some of the defence industrialists in his room are experiencing the tremendous draw-down in defence budgets with which we have had to live. Collective defence continues to be a primary

Mr. Beard served as Assistant Secretary-General of NATO from lanuary 1984 to March 1987 and is now Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Support.

role of NATO and it truly remains a much better investment for its members than purely national defence.

The draw-down for defence industries is undeniable. From the mid-1980s to 1993, the US defence budget in real terms went down between 15 and 18 percent. Since 1990, over 170,000 troops stationed overseas have been brought back home, and we are not alone in cutting back.

But collective defence means sharing the burden of defence. We tend to forget this when our politicians ask why we are over there involved in different activities when "they" should be doing it all for themselves. I have heard many of my former colleagues make this type of statement.

Let me put on a US hat for the moment. We Americans need to remind ourselves of an often overlooked fact: the US allies in Europe and in Asia provide massive support to the United States. I know that the Department of Defense estimates are that the US receives between seven and 10 billion dollars annually in cost-sharing from its allies. For example, America pays only a percentage of the cost of the Suda Bay facility in Crete, Greece, which is used mainly by the USA Sixth Fleet. During the Gulf War we were able to use many different infrastructure installations on the basis of our contributions to the Alliance. Believe me, without NATO infrastructure Operation Desert Storm would not have been nearly as simple a process. I just note in passing that, based on agreements reached in 1992, our allies have agreed to common-fund US operations and maintenance costs of facilities in Europe that support the reinforcement of NATO by US-based forces. This offers tremendous savings.

The benefits of this sort of collectivity are not simply economic; they are military as well. In my particular area at NATO HQ, I work with over 200 committees of experts dealing with everything from short-range air defence weapons to chemical warfare clothing standards. The Gulf War showed the importance of this cooperation. Our helicopters were able to land on allied ships. We had inter-operable chemical warfare suits. Allied minesweeping forces were being guided by NATO satellites. I think it is important that our politicians be reminded of these capabilities which probably would not have been there if the US had not been involved in this important alliance.

Most peacekeeping operations today will be multinational or coalition operations, such as those in the Former Yugoslavia. NATO has performed fully and successfully every mission that it has been authorized to undertake. Now, I say that with some emotional stress, because this is something of an over-simplification, and it ignores the problems arising from the relationship between the United Nations and NATO. This leads directly to a political issue that NATO is going to have to address one of these days: are we going to become a sub-contractor to the United Nations? On a personal basis, I have been extremely concerned, and I know that many of the politicians who have troops serving over in Bosnia have been concerned when they ask for support. Their troops are being shelled, yet effective military protection is being denied to them. But this is an issue that demonstrates the kind of difficulty that has become "normal." Things are not as bad in some cases as the press have reported, but it is a challenge to try to find ways to resolve these problems. Multinational operations such as the ones in Bosnia require higher degrees of interoperability. We need interoperability from the brigade level down.

This fine conference is being organized by the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, and I have our Canadian colleagues very much in mind when making these observations. appreciate that Canada is currently engaged in a review of foreign policy and defence, and, in this review, I note that it is being recommended that Canada's peacekeeping capability be improved, with specific proposals for a larger army and new armoured personnel carriers and helicopters. In the context of this review, it is important that Canada maintain its commitment to collective defence, including the common infrastructure program. If anyone appreciates the vital need for interoperability in NATO, it should be the Canadian soldiers, sailors, and airforce personnel, not to mention the politicians who are now making the decisions on the future of peacekeeping, and who are pleased to benefit from these various alliances. Canadian sailors know the value of the Italian naval base at Brindisi. Nationally, in the area of mine counter-measures, Canada is basing its work on NATO experience and studies. In fact, NATO naval cooperation is so tight that the Canadian mine counter-measure program is being run by a seconded British Naval Officer as a result of NATO cooperation.

None of these things make headlines, but they are important for future peacekeeping activities, and I would hope that the Canadian Minister of

National Defence and the politicians place this kind of activity in the overal equation when making decisions on their participation and their contribution to NATO's infrastructure activities. I was in Seville, Spain for the meeting o NATO Defence Ministers several weeks ago, where I heard the Canadiar Minister of National Defence state that the Canadians were rethinking their contribution to the NATO Infrastructure Program because they were only receiving 4.8 percent return on their investment -- and I hear that othe countries are making the same sort of observation. I do not think that is a fair equation; it takes no account of the men and women of the army, the navy, and the air force who are benefitting because we have been working together as an alliance, training together, communicating together. Jus looking at it in terms of dollars and cents could be a very, very serious mistake, and I would hope that those who are in the position of being able to do so will point this out to the Canadian parliamentarians conducting the review. The bottom line is that this sort of NATO cooperation cannot be measured in a financial profit-or-loss statement.

It is important that peacekeeping forces be well trained and equipped with interoperable equipment. It is also important that we constantly examine what the equipment requirements will be in the future, given the peacekeeping operations will remain essentially coalition in composition.

This means that we need a much closer dialogue between the equipment procurers and the equipment users. With this in mind, I aske Admiral Smith, CINCSOUTH, to come to NATO and give a briefing of lessons learned from the operations in the Former Yugoslavia. We had fascinating meeting. Sitting around the same table were the National Armaments Directors of the NATO countries who meet on a biannual basingeniar senior officials such as Paul Kaminsta of the United States and General Bob Fisher from Canada -- and the top Military Representatives to NATO (MILREPS). It is extraordinary to note that this meeting was the first time that National Armaments Directors and MILREPS have sat together at NATO meeting, yet in today's environment, these two communities ar going to have to work much closer together.

Admiral Smith pointed out the need to address the difficulty of dealin with a civilian population that is being used as protection for snipers. W obviously need maximum sensitivity to the question of civilian casualtie while dealing with military problems and terrorist problems, so one of the

areas that Admiral Smith said we must start looking at is that of non-lethal echnology, to see if we can control a local military situation with minimum isks to civilians. Another problem, and this is an area where the technology hat we have today is an absolute embarrassment, is the difficulty of the positive identification of friend or foe (IFF). As we discovered in Operation Desert Storm and also within our own community, it is a problem that we have not been able to resolve. And now with the coalition force concept being even more prominent, the matter of IFF has to be addressed.

The most pressing requirement we have is in the area of interoperability. No individual nation can afford to go it alone; we must find a way to cooperate together, and I feel confident that because of budget restraints, because of new challenges and requirements, we will be able to find a way to address this. By the way, we are also working with our new North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) partners from Central and Eastern Europe, because we see them as being able to form a pool of new peacekeeping roops for future activities.

The western countries worked for all these years together to see the fall of the Warsaw Pact and the Berlin Wall. My greatest plea is, now that we have achieved this success, do not turn around and walk away from it. JATO has been the most successful alliance in the history of the world. It would be terribly short-sighted to use the "peace dividend" phrase as a 30-second sound bite to justify a move away from NATO, and to stop providing eadership to explain to our constituencies why it is imperative that all of the allies continue to participate in this most successful alliance that the world has ever seen.

The Rwandan Experience

As a soldier who for 30 years trained for war as a member of the military arm of NATO, I was one of those who was optimistic and challenged by the end of the Cold War. The entry into the so-called "New World Order" and its often associated peace dividend including peace, disarmament and economic prosperity were all factors contributing to my optimism. Yet, in the space of only a few years, I and many others throughout the world have had a lot of my excitement and optimism diluted by the continued and increasing number of conflicts and human catastrophes that have plagued our world. This assertion was never so clear to me as when I was sent on a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, only to find myself obliged to watch a modern-day holocaust unfold while my hands remained both politically and militarily tied for several months.

The International Community

The apathy and impotence of the international community to deal with the catastrophe burgeoning in Rwanda in late 1993 and early 1994, in my view, was both shocking and immoral. So much so, in fact, that even today I wonder whether the international community would have reacted more rapidly and even more forcibly if it had been the Great Mountain Gorillas of Rwanda -- an endangered species -- that were being slaughtered instead of human beings.

Major-General Dallaire is the Deputy Commander of the Canadian Army and the former Commander of the UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and of the UN Observer Mission Mozambique-Rwanda (UNOMOR).

In hindsight, I consider it ironic that Diane Fossey -- who paid the ultimate price of her life for caring for the Rwandan gorillas -- succeeded in drawing the international community's attention to the plight of the gorillas. Yet, the United Nations -- an institutional embodiment of the international community -- was unable to achieve similar results regardless of the fact hat hundreds of thousands of lives were being systematically slaughtered n that very same country. Based on my experience in Rwanda, with JNOMOR and later UNAMIR, I would posit that there is a requirement and a moral obligation by the international community to reform the UN. These reforms would transform the UN into a proactive vice a reactive organization egarding crises and, should the situation require, one which would be in a position to manage conflict and respond to the increasing number of humanitarian disasters much more effectively.

I stress the point that it is the responsibility of the international community to reform the UN. The UN, created in the aftermath of the horror of Second World War, was founded on the hope of establishing a more peaceful and humane world. However, the UN quickly became a pattleground for major powers engaged in ideological sparring which consequently stultified any potential capability it might have had to act apidly to any burgeoning interstate or intrastate crisis -- even if the security of the region was threatened.

Now that the Cold War has ended, we have seen an unprecedented evel of consensus among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (commonly referred to as the "P-5"). Yet, the UN has still been unable to equate the end of the Cold War with any commensurate level of apid reaction capability. This leads me to conclude that the problems affecting the UN require institutional reform of the UN itself. Yet, any reform of the UN must start with its members, that is to say, the international community which makes up the UN.

After all, the UN is not a sovereign country with superpower status or organic military capabilities. It is an institution which reflects and acts on the collegial will and the means made available to it by the international community. Quite frankly, as with Rwanda, the UN is too often used as the scapegoat to cover the apathy, self-interest and collective impotence of the

international community. So, when the finger is pointed at the UN, it should, in fact, be pointed at oneself. As Pogo, the comic strip character once observed: "We have met the enemy and he is us." I believe that the UN is a reflection of everyone of us and vice versa. Thus, in my opinion, it is the international community that is at fault for denying the UN the means to react effectively to crises all over the world in this so-called new era.

The UN and, more importantly, the international community, failed in Rwanda. The international community failed because it denied the UN both the means and the support needed for it to manage this terrible crisis which is still on-going and is waiting to explode once again. The cost of failure in Rwanda thus far has totalled nearly one million people killed, half a million injured, one million displaced, and some two million refugees in neighbouring countries, sowing the seeds for the next conflict and human disaster in the region. This is a high price to pay in human life for the international community's inaction and apathy.

I am mindful of the fact that no one wants this horrid onslaught to happen again. By the same token, if the international community should do anything, it must learn from the Rwandan genocide, and take the necessary steps to mandate and to equip the UN to become the crisis manager in a world where conflict and humanitarian disasters appear to be a growing trend

UN Peace Support Operation: UNAMIR

The UNAMIR mission, which I commanded from its inception in August 1993, was supposed to be a classic peacekeeping success story for the UN. Yet, in the period of less than one year, we saw a peace agreement go from optimism, to stagnation, to degeneration, to war, to political and human genocide, to mass exodus, to overwhelming disease and death, and to humanitarian insecurity and stagnation once again.

This vicious cycle began with the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement on 4 August 1993 which called for the deployment of a neutral international force in five weeks. At the same time. I was told that Rwanda was not really of strategic interest to any nation so the mission was to be conducted on the "cheap." In fact, in the UN the Secretary-General was ordered to seek economies in personnel and funding. Given the international

community's frame of mind, several problems quickly manifested themselves almost from the very inception of the operation, causing several delays. So, it was not until 5 October 1993 -- two months later -- that we received our mandate. Then, it took another five months before we had a force that was properly equipped to carry out the mandate.

One argument often used to explain these delays was that those states that had the necessary equipment for the UNAMIR operation would not give some of it to those states that could provide the troops but had no equipment. Another reason why UNAMIR was unable to carry out its mandate was that it lacked a trained and experienced political staff that could map out a political strategy for the mission. As a result, UNAMIR unfolded in a political vacuum. Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative worked hard, but separate agendae among relief agencies were in evidence before and even during the war. In addition, there was no humanitarian coordinator to bring together the dozens of humanitarian agencies and NGOs and coordinate their activities with those of the UN military.

The fourth and final reason which helps explain why the UN peace support operation was unable to fulfil its mandate properly was that it had no administrative nor logistics system which could rapidly deploy and sustain a peacekeeping force. As a result, it could not react to a crisis situation within an acceptable timeframe. It is as if UN peace support operations always seem to start from scratch. In sum, the UNAMIR operation lacked properly equipped military personnel, it had no contracts, and it had virtually no budget after more than six months into the mission.

Even after 17 May, with the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 918, action was still slow. Indeed, on 17 May there were 471 UNAMIR croops in the field, two months later there were 550 troops, then on 10 August, there were still only 1,257 troops on the ground. It was not until September, some four months after the UN Security Council passed its resolution, that the UNAMIR contingent was fully deployed.

Reaction by the International Community

On 6 April 1994, the civil war resumed in Rwanda. But it took nearly three months before the international community took action. This

procrastination continued in spite of repeated pleas from the Secretary-General for action and the material means to do so. Instead, the international community chose to observe from a distance as one of the greatest genocides and holocausts since the Second World War unfolded on their television screens.

Finally, in July 1994, in Goma, Zaire, due to the guilt brought on by the CNN coverage, the international community was embarrassed into action. Soon thereafter, it began to try to stabilize the crisis caused by approximately one million refugees and thus satisfy the agendae of the international media. Corroboration may be seen in the fact that, while relief was being forwarded to Goma, a greater human tragedy was unfolding with one and a half million displaced persons only 100 km south. A second Goma was taking place but, because of the absence of the media, no action was taken.

The Need to Reform the UN

Shakespeare tells us in *Hamlet*: "We know what we are, but not what we could be." I believe that the aforementioned UN shortcomings can be addressed provided that one keeps an open mind and depending on how one responds to the following questions. First, do we want the UN to be the world's crisis manager and to be able to react rapidly and effectively to conflicts and humanitarian catastrophes? Or do we want coalitions of powers or even pseudo-coalitions of one power with "hangers-on" to be the crisis managers responding to conflicts or humanitarian catastrophes? Or, finally, do we want to do nothing?

Let me address the third question first by stating that washing our hands of such situations in far-off lands will only lead to this situation ending up in our backyards, be it in the form of refugees, economic problems, environmental strains, or social and political unrest, etc. Moreover, these crises, if left unattended, will eventually become national security threats.

In addition, recent technological advances concomitant with an accrued presence of the media have made it very difficult for the international community to remain oblivious to these developments, regardless of what continent on which they may be occurring. Canada, for example, is feeling pressure to intervene in conflicts even where there is no apparent national

security threat. Security issues are no longer just national in scope. This harks back to what some people have called Pearsonian internationalism, whereby Canadians not only endorse purposeful Canadian multilateralism, but also want to pull their weight when it comes to collective action in the field of international security. In short, we will have to react sooner or later.

With this thought in mind, I believe that it would benefit all of us if the UN was able to take action in the short term as opposed to the long term. Aside from the moral legitimacy incurred from saving lives -- which has proven to be an unreliable barometer for assessing UN intervention -- it also makes good economic sense. For example, in Rwanda, we estimated the 22 month mission required about US\$200 million in August 1993. We received only a fraction of that amount. Compare those costs with the billions which have been and continue to be spent on military and humanitarian actions in support of the millions of displaced persons and refugees from Rwanda, and in support of rebuilding the country. Bluntly stated, a peace support operation, mandated, equipped, sustained and manned in a timely fashion is in fact much more cost effective in the mid- to long-term. I would also add that I reject the notion of doing nothing as morally unacceptable to us all.

With regard to the second question I posed earlier, there have been several recent examples of coalitions. One coalition was created during the Gulf War against Iraq and then there was the French-led Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, to name but two. However, in my opinion the five permanent members of the Security Council are, and must be, a force of last resort. In Canada, for example, when there is a civil disturbance or a riot, we deploy the police first to deal with the situation and restore law and order. If that force fails and the disturbance continues, the Canadian government may choose to deploy the Canadian military. Similarly, I see the P-5 as the armed forces, the so-called strategic reserve, while a coalition of other members of the international community, operating under the auspices of the UN, acts as the police force.

Often, due to their colonial, neo-colonial and even Cold War legacy, the five permanent members lack the transparency needed to go into a crisis situation with the necessary level of acceptance by the belligerents. Quite often, they are viewed with suspicion if not outright hostility. Nevertheless, if a UN coalition excluding the permanent members cannot control the situation, then their capabilities are essential and, as was the case in the Gulf War, they should come in with their overwhelming power. In summary, I feel that the first response to a crisis should be the police or a coalition excluding the permanent members of the Security Council. At the same time, the P-5 would make up the strategic reserve to be used if and when the initial coalition fails. In this manner, the UN could continue to enjoy a sense of moral legitimacy in accordance with which the international community acknowledges that the UN should give priority to conflict management issues and the maintenance of intrastate as well as interstate peace based on international law and great power cooperation. In due course, potential belligerents would also begin to sense this *overwatch*, and over the longer term, they would begin to react accordingly and thus more sensibly.

Against this background, one must therefore ask the following: Is the UN -- in its present form -- capable of managing all of the world's conflicts through peace support operations and/or coordinating humanitarian relief? The short answer is no. I would posit that the UN, in its present form, cannot execute this mandate because it has neither the human or the material resources, nor the decision making process to provide a rapid response capability.

To that end, the international community must give the UN the necessary crisis management capabilities. But this requires several important reforms. Interestingly, some of these reforms are being studied by the Canadian government, among others, in an attempt to increase UN peacekeeping rapid response capability. This study also coincides nicely with the government's decision to create, fund and send faculty and students to the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre at Cornwallis, Nova Scotia. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, for its part, is conducting analyses and making recommendations with respect to the effect of various peacekeeping policy proposals and decisions of various governments and organizations.

Based on my observations relating to my experience in Rwanda as the UNAMIR Force Commander, I believe that the following options should be studied in greater detail if the UN is to become the world's consummate conflict manager and provider of humanitarian assistance:

UN Reform Options

(a) A UN Multi-disciplinary Senior Crisis Management Cell

The UN needs a multi-disciplinary team of senior crisis managers. The resolution of any conflict or human catastrophe, in my view, requires that this team develop and execute an integrated and mutually supporting plan of action. For too long, these elements within the UN have operated in isolation and the result has been political theory with no capability, military operation with no political aim, a humanitarian desire without the necessary means, and logistics systems not responsive to the commanders in the field because they are not quite sure who is the real boss and where they can find the resources to mount and sustain the operation.

Perhaps what is needed is the creation of a multi-disciplinary Plans and Policy Branch along with a mandate to implement forward planning, intelligence gathering/early warning and provide staff for contingency planning and developing training standards and standard operating procedures (SOPs). Currently, there is an embryonic cell in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) with similar features and it could fit the bill although it would need to be expanded and given a mandate and the equipment equal to the task. I would also give serious consideration to the proposal that the head of this HQ would have direct access to the Secretary-General

In addition, for a multi-disciplinary approach to be successful it must have a team of political, military, humanitarian and logistics personnel, each of whom is an expert in a specialized area but armed with a good appreciation and sensitivity of the other disciplines. This can only be achieved by the UN developing and conducting senior crisis management courses (a higher Command and Staff College -- such a course is now available at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre), to train senior and aspiring political, military, humanitarian and logistics personnel who will be the crisis managers both at Headquarters in New York and in the field. This course would bring together the political, military, humanitarian and logistics personnel, educate them in other specialities, conduct exercises in crisis management, and produce research papers and plans on crisis action and the development of multi-disciplinary responses to those crises. This would go a long way in rectifying the ad hoc nature of current UN peace support

operations. It would also help create a corporate brotherhood wherein loyalty and dedication would be channeled to the same aim, in an atmosphere of confidence and trust.

(b) Reform of the UN Administration / Logistics System

The UN, at present, has a very capable garrison-type, steady state administrative and logistics system for managing steady missions and operations throughout the world. The UN does not have an emergency, rapid and dynamic support system for responding immediately to a security crisis situation or for an emerging operation. The garrison steady state system takes about six to eight months to set up a mission. Obviously, this is too long for the UN to prevent the burgeoning of a crisis situation, but satisfactory once the crisis has passed and the mission is deployed and operating at a normal level. For crisis situations then, the UN must develop an emergency, rapid, and dynamic administrative and logistics system with the minimum bureaucratic encumbrances and accountability to respond rapidly in a few weeks anywhere around the world to support an operation.

(c) A UN Contingency Fund

This fund would be used at the discretion of the Secretary-General. Its main purpose would be to help fund emergency activities such as reconnaissance and/or technical missions, pre-mandate expenses for maintenance and pre-positioning of equipment, and early deployment costs without reference to the slow normal budgetary process. Once the budget is approved in the UN those funds can support an operation. The contingency fund would provide the UN Secretariat with the means of supporting a rapid and timely reaction to a conflict or humanitarian crisis.

(d) UN Standby Military Forces and Equipment

To respond rapidly to a conflict and/or humanitarian crisis, the UN must have available to it on immediate notice, totally equipped, self-contained and self-supporting military forces capable of being deployed in weeks anywhere in the world. The UN must get away from being an *ad hoc* operation resembling that of an old western posse. National contingents, trained and equipped in their home stations, committed to a rapid reaction force with a skeleton military headquarters in the field, is possible with the support of the

international community. The Security Council P-5 could aid in transporting and sustaining these forces in theatre until follow-on forces arrive. In fact, the Canadian Department of National Defence is currently looking into this matter of strategic transportation in greater detail. The navy, for example, is studying the concept of deploying forces overseas via sea transport -- more commonly known as the multi-role support vessel (MRSV). Follow-on forces should be made up of the normal troop contributing nations who are prepared to send troops for longer/normal tours.

Often today, these troops arrive in theatre without the proper equipment. As a result, they cannot perform their assigned tasks, are a burden to the force and put the mission at risk. They should be equipped, trained and deployed by donor nations only when they are operationally and logistically ready to conduct operations. At that point, the standby force would be withdrawn and would wait for its next mission. This deployment doctrine would serve to develop common staff and operating procedures. The UN, with this new capability to react rapidly to deter or contain conflict, should be used to provide security and assistance to an emergency humanitarian crisis.

If I had had such a force available to me while I was the UNAMIR Force Commander sometime in mid-April 94, we could have saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. As evidence, with the 450 men under my command during this interim, we saved and directly protected over 25,000 people and moved tens of thousands between the contact lines. What could a force of 5,000 personnel have prevented? Perhaps the most obvious answer is that it would have prevented the massacres which took place in the southern and western parts of the country because they did not start until early May -- nearly a month after the war had started.

(e) A UN Umbrella Humanitarian Agency

In Rwanda and more specifically during the Goma catastrophe, dozens upon dozens of humanitarian NGOs swarmed into the area reacting to the "CNN factor" or what Jeff Sallot of the Globe and Mail calls the "CNN phenomenon." Some "Mom and Pop" NGOs had a lot of heart but not very much capability. Others had considerable capability but not very much heart. Generally speaking, however, I would say that most had a lot of heart and some capability and wanted to do something useful. This UN umbrella

organization could play a central role in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and controlling the implementation of the humanitarian assistance plan. It could then integrate the plan with that of the military security plan where possible. Goma was a perfect example of overkill, especially when it is compared with the rest of the country which did not receive any supplies for months after the Goma crisis had emerged. This was due, at least in part, to the lack of a recognized UN umbrella organization. Better integration between both groups would have been much more effective and thus may have helped rectify the crisis at hand throughout Rwanda.

(f) A UN International Media Element

The UN needs, quite literally a TV UN, Radio UN, a UN Newspaper and a UN News agency. It must have the ability to tap into the international media and present the facts on a situation and not be reacting to false reports, propaganda, hype or deliberate disinformation. Since most of the international community's political, military, humanitarian and therefore international policy and reactions seem to be based on the media interest, the UN requires the means to provide accurate, overt and timely information. UN radio and newspapers could have been used to counter the propaganda of the Rwanda media that created and managed the hysteria that directly influenced the genocide and at times targeted members of the UNAMIR force itself.

(g) A UN Information (Intelligence) Capability

During my tour of duty in UNAMIR, I found that we took several casualties, and even many of those we were supposed to be helping died, because we were literally blind and deaf in the field. One solution which could reduce the number of casualties suffered by UN military personnel would be to have access to real time information on which to base correct and informed decisions. The P-5 possess high tech information capabilities. Yet, the UN is expected to operate in an information void. How can timely, informed, and correct decisions be made in this manner? The answer quite simply is that they cannot. Timely decision making requires an effective information centre in New York, supported by some of the major information agencies of the world, with trained information officers who can deploy to the field to provide that information.

(h) UN Intervention for Humanitarian Reasons

Essentially, the UN has the human, legal and moral obligation to prevent murder, crimes against humanity and genocide once a UN peace support operation has begun. To that end, the UN military force in the field needs better rules of engagement, not just for self-defence actions, but if necessary, for deterrence and locally overwhelming actions. This is more than just a debate on Chapter Six, Chapter Six robust, or Chapter Seven mandates. It is the will, courage, and the force strength needed to be proactive.

Let me state that I saw too many corpses, too much human suffering and destruction in Rwanda. I also sent too many of the brave young blue beret soldiers home either in body bags or on stretchers to accept that we, the international community, can continue to conduct business as usual. It is my sincere hope that the UN will eventually be given the mandate and the support of the international community so that it may prevent and manage crises effectively.

Peacekeeping Procurement and Financing: Challenges and Opportunities

This is the first time I have spoken in public since retiring from the United Nations two years ago.

I have been asked to talk on the financing challenge and opportunities of UN procurement. I think it is generally known that UN peacekeeping expenses are shared between all member states of the United Nations on an agreed formula basis as approved by the General Assembly. The formula is slightly different from the formula for sharing the regular budget expenses of the organization: the developed countries pay a larger share of the peacekeeping budget than they do of the regular UN budget.

The UN's activities are financed by two means. One is through assessed contributions, and the other is through voluntary contributions. The voluntary contributions apply primarily to the development programs and to many of the programs of the specialized agencies. The UN's regular budget is through assessed contributions, and, as I mentioned, so are the peacekeeping expenses.

This method of financing has created, and tends to continue to create, serious problems for the United Nations in its work of delivering peacekeeping and other services, in that there is a large lapse of time

From 1987 to 1993, Mr. Foran served at the UN as the Assistant Secretary-General in the office of General Services and also acted as Under Secretary-General for Administration and Management.

between the authorization by the Security Council for the peacekeeping operation and the subsequent approval by the General Assembly of the budget for the particular activity. In addition, there is an even longer time lag between that approval and the payment of the assessment. This creates a serious cash-flow problem for the UN.

This is something the governments are going to have to face if they continue to call upon the organization to undertake these expensive activities. There is at this moment considerable talk going on in a number of quarters on this subject. It is a problem governments are simply going to have to settle among themselves, but that is much easier said than done. As far as the procurement activities are concerned, the challenge, particularly for business people, is to get to know the system so that they can effectively participate in it.

I would like to make something of a disclaimer with regard to the figures I give. Many of them come from different financial years, and all have been rounded. They are not from audit reports, but will give a general indication of finances without listing the chapter, verse and total background on every figure.

In terms of the challenge that procurement presents, I think that any business people not already working within the UN system, and who are looking for business opportunities, would be short-sighted to confine their focus exclusively to peacekeeping. It is well worth the effort to get to know the whole of the UN and its various centres of procurement throughout the world.

Peacekeeping represents about 30 per cent of the total expenditure of the UN, so there are other opportunities. In many cases, the same items are being purchased for development and humanitarian activities as for peacekeeping.

There are approximately 30 organizations in the system, each having its own procurement activities. Recently, the peacekeeping procurement people themselves have been delegating a fair amount of their purchasing activities to the field, to the actual missions. While a great deal is still being supervised, orchestrated, and coordinated from New York, there is a considerable amount of procurement activity taking place at the various peacekeeping missions around the world.

That certainly does not make it any easier for a vendor to do business, but it is still worthwhile to take the time and effort to try to find out exactly where the action is. The system is basically the same for every UN organization. The first thing a prospective vendor should do is register with the organization in question. Once that registration procedure is completed, which is quite easy (just filling out a form, and ensuring that it gets properly put into the computer) then you are on the list with that organization.

Procurement under US\$70,000 is handled locally through those vendors whose speciality has been registered with the organization. How this happens varies according to the organization. For smaller amounts, telephoned bids may be required, whereas for larger amounts vendors might be asked to submit written proposals.

Anything over US\$70,000 must go to international, and I emphasize that, *international*, competitive bidding. So for larger amounts, the prospective vendor would require some type of contracting set-up within the business.

On the "opportunity" side, the UN system as a whole in 1993 purchased approximately US\$3.5 billion worth of procurement -- specifically, US\$2.35 billion worth of goods and US\$1.15 billion worth of services. Goods make up about two-thirds of the total purchases, and services about one-third. Peacekeeping accounted for about 30 per cent of the total spent.

On the peacekeeping side, it is interesting to note that from eight active missions in mid-1990 with total budgets of US\$600 million, activity has expanded to 25 missions with total budgets of over US\$3 billion. That does not necessarily mean that this type of expansion is going to continue, but it does give you some idea of the size. On personnel, in 1990 there were approximately 10,000 military and 5,000 civilians involved in peacekeeping. Today there are over 75,000 military and 13,000 civilians.

I would like to conclude by recommending two publications to you. The first is *The General Business Guide for Potential Suppliers of Goods and Services to the United Nations System.* This is published by the Inter-Agency Procurement Service, IAPSO, which is headquartered in Copenhagen. The address is PO Box 2530 DK-2100, Copenhagen, Denmark. The other publication is put out by the Economic and Social Information Services and it is called *Development Business*. This publication

comes out 24 times a year, and it lists all the contracts that are being put out to international competitive bidding, not only for the UN system but also for the World Bank and the regional development banks. The value of the notices published annually exceeds US\$23 billion. The annual subscription fee is somewhere between US\$300 and US\$400 a year, and it is available from Development Business, PO Box 5850, Grand Central Station, New York, NY 10163 USA.

Functions of the UN Field Administration and Logistics Division

It has been my privilege to be involved in the growth of peacekeeping administration and logistics in the last three years, probably the most exciting and challenging three years of my career. This work has provided me with the opportunity not only to select a great many very determined people who want this operation to succeed, but also to devise and implement various innovations in peacekeeping management. This is my chief area of interest, and that is what I intend to concentrate on a little later in this talk.

I shall begin by talking briefly about my organization and its place in the United Nations. My boss is the Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations. He reports directly to the Secretary-General. For most of the former Field Operations Division's history, it was part of the Division Administration and Management of the UN, but in September of 1993 we were moved into the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. We number about 200 people; there are 160 authorized positions, and the remaining 40 are military personnel donated by governments that have troops in United Nations operations. (If I had to work with 160, I think I would be working on about 66 percent of my requirement, but with these extra 40 I am able to meet 75 percent of my requirement. Those of you in the military will know that this is inadequate staffing for work in the field.)

Mr. Beissel, a veteran of 26 years of UN service, is Acting Director of the Field Administration and Logistics Division of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

In any event, we are a group in which many specialties are represented. We have budgeting and finance and accounting specialists; we have personnel recruitment and administration specialists. We have specialists on the pure logistics side; we have long-haul communications and short-haul communications specialists -- all of these specialists doing things in a hurry. We have engineers; we can create military camps, we can provide water, we can look after sewage, we can make kitchens, ablution units, etc. We can create observation posts; we can maintain vehicles -- we have over 30,000 vehicles on our inventory right now. We have a number of aircraft specialists; we have safety and operational specialists. This year we will transport about 200,000 soldiers on rotation in and out of various missions, and we will spend about \$400 million on aircraft in the mission areas. Right now, our fleet comprises 152 aircraft, with 118 of those being helicopters and the rest being fixed-wing. We also have a group of people who are specialists in military supply issues: fuel, movements, accoutrements, and food.

One of the things we are getting good at is providing food for peacekeeping troops. Give us any army and we can feed it. We know about how the Nepalese need live goats. Scandinavians need gravlox, and their trained mine-sniffing dogs need Scandinavian dog food. The Ghanaians need the taro root and so forth. We can even provide long-life food for Muslim troops, halal food. On the average right now we are doing it for about \$7.00 per person per day -- compare that to the American MRE at about \$25.00 per person per day!

The peacekeeping business depends on parties to a conflict being either exhausted or nearly so, and having agreed to let the United Nations come in and monitor an agreement they have reached to stop fighting, or monitor a separation of forces. That is the classic concept of peacekeeping, and it is a concept that depends utterly on the perceived impartiality of the UN -- in other words, you have to watch what you shoot, or what you are about to shoot, or are capable of shooting at, because that could possibly change the impression of the party that got shot at -- then you will no longer be seen as impartial.

Another important point: in order to operate effectively, we must continually publicize what is happening in the conflict -- not amongst ourselves, in reports to headquarters and so on, but to the media and the dissenting parties. This is a significant part of our role -- observing, and telling everyone what we have seen. For example, you know when a conflict ends, it often happens that people still do not trust each other and they will test the quality of each other's agreement, so there will be a little shooting and a little manoeuvring and possibly some digging, and so on. We have to be able to document all this in an impartial way. To do this, we need troops that are trained to back off instead of to attack.

In peacekeeping, normally the heaviest weapon used against us is a .50 calibre machine gun. If somebody shoots at you with that, you shoot back with your assault rifle and you fire back fewer shots, by the way. If you are shot at with an assault rifle, you shoot back with your pistol, or you do not shoot at all. Back off! -- that is the basic rule of peacekeeping. We are not there to solve the problem, we are only there at the behest of the parties, to report impartially -- basically, to show the world's interest in some kind of a resolution.

Now, functionally, what do we do in my office? Mainly, we create temporary organizational units. In so doing, we operate under a few extreme constraints; I call them "The Four No's." The first of these is "No warning." You will recall when the US decided to seek UN approval to form a coalition and go into Iraq, there was an announcement made in August of the previous year and then there were some fireworks in January and February of the following year. It is unusual to have that much advance notice. You can be sure that all the participating armies, the minute the announcement was made, vigorously started their planning, pre-positioning, buying, and other preparatory action. However, what happens to us more typically is when the international community gets excited about something and decides finally to do something about it, that decision is typically delivered to us with little advance warning. Maybe a week, maybe two weeks, then the expectation is that we should be there.

This leads directly to my second "No," which is "No stockpiles." In Pisa, Italy, the United Nations has a small helicopter repair warehouse -- 3,200 square metres in which to warehouse its items. Basically, all you can stick in there these days is some military accourrements and a few computers.

We also have "No money," which makes it next to impossible to get started efficiently. Typically, we will get some seed money, maybe \$10

million -- for a large operation, that is next to nothing -- within two weeks following a Security Council decision. Then three to four months will pass while we create a budget and go through the legislative process to get it approved. Then we will start to commit money to deal with the large purchases. Under the current United Nations procurement system, it takes, on average, 22 weeks to obtain financing approval. After that, three to four months will pass while we create a budget and go through the legislative process to have it approved. Only then will we start to be able to commit money to deal with the large purchases. Even if you do it through one of our locally-delegated-authority mission procurements, it still takes 19 weeks. So delegation is only part of the problem. At present, by the way, we have a team of five experts from various countries who are reviewing the system. and we also have a number of proposals for accommodating ourselves to this problem.

The fourth "No" is: "No trained people." If you are running an army, you expect to have trained people that will know pretty well what to do. Beyond this, there will usually be some kind of reserve group of trained people. We simply do not have any. Nevertheless, we do what we can, though it can be pretty grim at times.

As for our humanitarian work, we are starting to support some humanrights monitors in Rwanda and we have some election operations going on that my office also supports. This is a worldwide operation, with a budget of nearly \$3.8 billion this year. Projections for next year are about the same. With the ending of the Somalia and Mozambigue operations, we expect to see a downward trend, but that will be offset by the beginning or expansion of our presence in Haiti and Angola. There will probably also be increased activity in Tajikistan and Georgia. Since 1948 we have had over 650,000 people serving in peacekeeping. This year alone we are going to have 100,000 military and civilian people serving. So you can see that we form a substantial proportion, actually about 60 percent, of all UN financial activity.

The number of operations has been growing in recent years, and this means that about every three or four months we begin a new operation, while we finish only one per year.

In terms of personnel numbers, in 1990 peacekeeping operations entailed approximately 9,900 military personnel. Then we got into the

aftermath of the Gulf War in early 1991, the Kuwait-Iraq border operation. the observer mission in El Salvador, and then in September of that year the Western Sahara election monitoring operation that started but never finished. In early 1992, the Cambodia operation started. Then came the operation in the Former Yugoslavia, which began with 50 military observers and now numbers 45,000 troops, with almost 10,000 staff members. I think now we have about 82,000 soldiers in the field, and we project, depending on when we take over in Haiti, that this will go up to nearly 100,000.

You will note that it is difficult to secure trained personnel, which means that most of the people out there are new. They may have a professional skill or a technical skill, but they have had no UN experience. So, it is not surprising that problems occur once in a while. This is the price one has to pay for such rapid growth.

I would like to speak just a little bit about some of the things we have underway to improve our ability to perform. To any UN mavens in the crowd who know about the intricacies of our working, let me just say that this year we presented to the Assembly three papers in which we listed all of the management improvements we could identify. We have just finished hearings of our "Board of Directors" equivalent, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. They have gone very well. I have some information on what they are likely to recommend, and in the next few weeks we shall be discussing with the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the Assembly, the implementation of some ideas I want to mention briefly now.

In the recent past, we had asked certain governments to set aside military units with particular capabilities for UN purposes; some 28 countries had said that they would be willing to do this, with a total of around 37,000 troops. Most offered infantry units and some offered logistics units. We put this to the test in Rwanda, when we asked all of them last April to activate these stand-by arrangements. The answer to this request was a resounding NO

You may call this what you like, but it certainly represents a failure of member states to perceive a national interest in contributing those troops. The evidence I have for the truth of this observation is that when CNN finally did energize them, a great number of governments sent troops on their own: the US, France, UK, and Senegal -- with France's assistance. This is something that needs work. We must have stand-by forces available; this idea needs to be discussed so that member states will commit themselves to specifying conditions under which they might be willing to give these

forces.

In addition, what we have found, and certainly this is not new to the Rwanda operation, is that countries willing to contribute are not necessarily very well equipped. We have given inoculations to troops, bought them uniforms, boots, 4x4 vehicles, and communications equipment, and trained them to operate armoured personnel carriers. That is not a professional way to start an army. You cannot wait until a problem arises before starting to do all this basic work. These things should all be done beforehand. However, when no other country was willing to contribute troops, the United Nations has been forced to beg and we have had to do these very, very strenuous things.

Next I want to touch on funding. What we are recommending here is an attempt to agree on funding before the necessity for intervention has arisen. We have started to put together something we call the Standard Cost Manual. Why should we have to go out to Angola to find it costs 13 cents a litre for gasoline, and put that in our budget, then go over to Georgia to find out it costs \$4.17? Why not just budget for \$1.00 a litre, and use that figure for any start-up mission? In this way, we project that the ups and downs will balance each other. By the time of our first budget performance report, we would know what the actual numbers were and would be able to use these from that time onwards.

In addition, it should be possible to take standard organizational designs for standard kinds of organizational problems, and standard military designs for standard military problems, then create some templates for small, medium or large missions. Certain of these could be for simple peace observation, with others for missions that have a humanitarian component or involve monitoring an election or the return of refugees, or even, as in Cambodia, running government departments. The Cambodian mission, where we ran four such departments, was not typical, but it may turn out to be more commonplace in the future.

Following the creation of these templates, some standard ratios could be laid down. For example, two and a half military observers with one 4x4 painted white and a radio -- a simple ratio -- will work most of the time. You can do the same thing with handy-talkies; you can do the same thing with tents and beds. With these three tools, standard costs, organizational templates, and ratios, the whole thing could be computerized, so that instead of discovering at 3 o'clock in the morning that the Security Council does not want to spend that much money, or that they will not do it for six months but might for five, I could then spend a few minutes with the computer and show them the financial difference. Up to now we have had to do these things by hand, with great difficulty. Even though my staff are extremely devoted and they actually do produce these sorts of figures quickly, there are better, easier ways to do it. This would then create more trust between the executive and the legislative body over what assumptions you are using when you create a flash budget estimate. This idea has been accepted by our legislative group and there will be a decision on it in a few weeks.

Another problem is that it takes the legislative process too long to get these budgets approved. In the case of the Rwanda budget, we asked for \$37 million back in August, and the Assembly did not meet on that until sometime in September. By then the requirements had grown to \$100 million and the period had lengthened. We then did another budget, which is still being argued over. This sort of legislative delay means that troops out in the field are not getting things that we have to have legal authority to buy or to authorize, and there is nothing we can do about it. It is very hard to deal with that.

Another proposal -- one that I think is about to be accepted -- is that the Assembly should examine the growth over the last two years, assume that this will either stay the same, go down or go up, and then put a ceiling -- like a contingency fund -- detailing how much its Board of Directors should be authorized to let us spend between sessions. That way, many of the legislative delays could be avoided.

This year we are producing 84 peacekeeping budgets. If we had the kind of templates I have suggested, together with these other mechanisms, we would have to prepare only 23. This reduces the legislative workload

dramatically, while at the same time giving the Council confidence that there is some financial rationale for what we are doing.

We have also done some administrative restructuring. We have put my office in the Peacekeeping Department and we have been given the authority to manage our own personnel and to recruit them, as of January 1995. We believe there is more to be done here, but we have actually done some things and are starting to see some benefits from them.

One thing we have found, as I have already mentioned, is that if we are starting over missions with no history, no doctrine, and we lack sufficient personnel, the only recourse is to bring in a large number of people that are new. Of course, they will have the necessary functional skills, but will they know how to set up a UN mission? We are preparing a Survey Mission Handbook which addresses this need. In the military, Standard Operating Procedures, or SOPs, are always made available to provide general instructions for conduct in a mission area. If an SOP is lacking, then one is written. This handbook gives us the opportunity to try to enumerate the main recurring problems of supporting military operations under UN auspices, and to codify what we do. It covers 440 topics, and I hope it will be available for discussion in December. The Survey Mission Handbook tells people, who have not previously worked with the UN, what sorts of things to look for when they are part of a team going to some horrible place embroiled in a conflict, and how to design some sort of a UN solution. It deals with mandates, when the mission should start, how to close it, what sorts of support requirements there would be, what sort of administrative arrangements, and so forth.

Now we reach the matter of standard equipment specifications. We have many detailed specifications for equipment that are commonly used in peacekeeping operations. By the way, some governments do not care for them; they think that they are a way to exclude them from bidding. Give yourself a standard specification and they think, "Well, we have a great toy that we would like them to buy, but it does not fit the spec." But we have to make purchasing decisions and as long as we are in a crisis mode, we are going to buy standard equipment. If we ever get to the point where we have a few more minutes, we may be able to consider other possibilities. The only exceptions we have made is when we have to make an enormous purchase. For example, in Cambodia we needed 10,000 vehicles. You

cannot just buy 10,000 vehicles of the same kind, because for such a large order manufacturers have to change their plans and there will inevitably be delays. In the case of the vehicles for Cambodia, it took us six to eight months to get them, using three or four manufacturers. Generally speaking, we have been making more and more progress towards standardizing equipment buys.

Some of the countries which have participated in peacekeeping for a long time, the Scandinavians and the Canadians for example, have training programs as part of their national military work. On the other hand, we now have 79 countries contributing troops, most of whom are new to this kind of exercise. These countries lack the methodology of training their own troops on how to participate in UN operations. Some of them have gone to courses offered in Scandinavia, but others have been looking to the UN to provide the training materials. This is a project that is well advanced; I am not sure when it will be finished, but there is a significant amount of training documentation under preparation.

As I have said, we lack any stock-pile of equipment or even a place where we can store any sizeable quantity of goods. We have been told by the General Assembly to conserve anything we can reuse, to keep it in good condition and then reuse it. When Cambodia ended, we had no place to put this stuff, so the only place I could put it where it could be supervised was in the conflict zones where we have ongoing missions. So you can be sure that everything I put in Somalia just sat there -- the containers unopened, the vehicles unrepaired all year -- because every time we went out into the yard, bullets started landing and we were unable to do any work. By the way, I have since quietly removed all this equipment to Brindisi in Italy, where the UN is opening a logistics base to store and refurbish such equipment. Similarly, when Mozambique ends in December or January, we shall be taking everything that we have there as quickly as possible and shipping it to Brindisi. There, it will be inventoried and its condition assessed. Some of it will be scrapped, some repaired, and the rest stored in "start-up kit" form.

This "start-up kit" concept is useful, I think. I would like to have, say, five such kits; each would enable me to set up a 100-person mission anywhere in the world in 48 hours. Each kit would contain, say, 40 or 50 4x4 vehicles painted white, with radios installed, as well as tents, cots, long-life military

food, handy-talkies, office supplies, computers, diesel generators to run our communications equipment, and some collapsible hard cover accommodation for offices and troops. It is a mistake, I think, to have to rely on a local army for any of this; it leaves the other side puzzled as to which "side" you are on. The best thing to do is go straight in there in your white vehicle with the flags flying, just to calm everybody down.

The implementation of this plan would mean that as soon as we got the authorization to do something, we would send an aircraft to Brindisi, pick up the kit, and fly it to the scene of conflict. At the same time, we would start the buying for the specs. If we had a medium size mission, we would send two or three kits, and start the buying.

This whole concept is already well advanced and requires no appropriation for implementation. It can be done with already available surplus. In fact, we are signing agreements with the Italian government that will give us cost-free use of an air base with two C5A Galaxy-capable runways that is adjacent to a deep-water port on a main railroad. This is cost-free, so all the UN will have to pay for is the utilities and maintenance.

We are also doing work on requirements or stand-by contracts in connection with procurement. There are a lot of names for these: systems contracts or indefinite quantity, indefinite delivery contracts. NATO uses these when they go to Europe every summer on their Reforger exercises. Instead of getting locked into a 22-week procurement process when we have a problem, we could do it before the problem arises, by making an estimate of what we might need, getting a roster of vendors that can provide guaranteed delivery dates for certain quantities and pre-approved unit prices. When the problem does arise, we simply fax the orders. We get deliveries of computers in the thousands in two weeks this way, we get military long-life food in two weeks this way, we get some communications equipment, handy-talkies, and earth stations this way in less than a month.

As regards shipping, we are finalizing an agreement with the Baltic Exchange in London -- this is an organization of half the world's ship owners -- by which they will find the ships for us and give us access to them guickly. It has been estimated that if we leave Somalia under duress, we will need 69 ships in a period of two weeks, to handle 320 loads of troop carriers and aircraft. So we have to have fast ways of getting these things.

As to surge capacity, Brown & Root, an American company, has worked with the US Army during invasions. We would like to have something similar for our logistics services contracts so that we can immediately start hauling water, digging wells, handling sewage, providing cooked food, and generally handling these logistics services. Similarly, for air support, the US Bureau of the Interior has 300 aircraft under requirements contracts that it gets whenever it has a need. If they have a forest fire in Washington State, it simply sends a facsimile request for a particular kind of aircraft. The Bureau knows the price, it knows it has a signed contract already, it knows the availability requirement. If one vendor says he cannot do it, it goes to the next one. This is a way to bypass delays in the legislative process, delays in creating budgets, and delays caused by not having a complete logistics stockpile.

We now have 15,000 people in the Former Yugoslavia provided by six international service agencies from all over the world. We have refrigeration mechanics, guards, drivers, mechanics for fixing vehicles, radio operators, and even some administrators -- yes, I get a lot of criticism for that, but we do have them. The UN recruitment system is designed for a stable organization; in other words, it will take from nine to eighteen months to hire somebody, and there are lots of reviews, lots of committees, and lots of analytical work.

You cannot wait that long if troops have to be fed and protected. So in this case, we went to a number of commercial companies -- by the way, we had to argue with them to do this; they were not all that eager, though that attitude is starting to change -- and asked them to provide us with their own rosters. These are international companies in the oil-field service and construction services industries around the world. We asked them to give us individuals or teams of individuals to come and take care of these technical matters.

We have 614 technical people in the UN and we used them up for various field operations. By 1991 they were all deployed, so we had none left. How do we get these people trained within four weeks -- the average time we are given -- show them what to do and get them used to each other so that 28 days later they are standing in front of us and we are able to put them to work? Many member states are a little nervous about this because they see it as a way to disrupt the UN's roles for a balance in geographic

distribution, but we tell them if you want to apply those rules to this arrangement, just inform us and we can still do it faster than if they were staff members.

I also want to say something about our divided procurement system. The procurement office in New York, which by the way, does not report to me, is part of the UN administration. It is probably the world's most efficient procurement operation, in terms of the resources they put into it. Some of you who are vendors may not agree with me, but with only 23 people, to go from less than \$100 million a year in procurement up to \$500 million, with the same number of people, is incredible. That is part of the \$1.5 billion cost of peacekeeping procurement that was done in New York last year.

About half of the procurement that was done in peacekeeping was distributed by means of delegated authority to the various missions, the two main ones being the protection forces in the Former Yugoslavia and Somalia. A problem here is that those operations are only authorized to procure in neighbouring countries. There are no peacekeeping operations in North or South America, Southeast Asia, Japan, China, Australia, New Zealand, or India, so people whose companies are headquartered in these places are getting a little sensitive about this. I believe we are going to have to take a more international approach to procurement in future. For example, there is no good reason to buy a car in South Africa if you can get it a lot cheaper in, say, Europe, even taking transportation costs into account.

My office is authorized to do procurement with governments for military lists and for military supplies that are not generally available on the market -for example, restricted-export items such as some night-vision devices, ammunition, Cobra helicopters, M113 armoured personnel carriers, and the French Drone -- which we tried to buy for a while in the Former Yugoslavia -- which is a crowd-control vehicle. Much of this business has to do with various armies wanting to transport their troops using their own transport capabilities. If it were up to me, we might put them in an Aleutian or maybe a Boeing 707, although not everyone would be happy with either of these. We will certify that these things are safe, because we now have a safety group with that responsibility, but some armies also want the experience and the practice. What we do in these cases is ask for solicited offers, and without telling the country what we have, ask them how much it will cost if we use their military. If the amount is lower than what we would have paid

commercially, we agree to it. Otherwise, we tell them the price is too high and then wait until they come down to my best price. That way we protect ourselves from the charge that we are surreptitiously rewarding particular member states.

While we face many problems and enormous challenges, we are engaged in working out ways to deal with these. I have some of the most determined people you can imagine working for me. My office will be busy on weekends and holidays, early and late. We work to the requirement not to the hours, but with only another 100 staff members, we would probably be much more effective than we are now.

Elliot Richardson

Preamble to the Keynote Address

Having served for a long time on the board of the United Nations Association of the United States of America, and having worked closely on many matters with our colleagues and friends in Canada, I regard it as a great privilege and honour to serve as chairman of this dinner. There are a lot of reasons for that, but one strikes me with particular force. It is that this is a gathering of people dedicated to peacekeeping, including representatives of a large number of organizations that fill various important peacekeeping roles.

We commonly speak of optimists as people who see a glass as being half-full rather than half-empty. I suggest to you that there should be created a new class of super-optimists. These are the people who make it possible for the peacekeeping glass to be half-full. The people here, you, should regard yourselves as people in that class. The fact that there exists a convention, a conference, an exhibition, a dinner such as this, the second of its kind, held by and among people who are actively engaged in support of the peacekeeping process, is something that has never before even been imagined. This is something that needs to be made known more widely.

There have been, of course, false starts, errors, overblown statements, retreats, qualifications, and a whole series of negative events following the remarkably successful large-scale intervention in the Gulf War.Much nonsense has been talked by people who cited the events of the Gulf War.

The Honourable Elliot Richardson has held four US Cabinet posts, including those of Attorney-General and Secretary of Defense. He is currently Co-Chairman of the National Council of the UN Association of the USA. He was the Chairman of the Gala Dinner held during the seminar.

as if they had been presidents dealing with far more complex situations in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and even places that do not satisfy the criteria, whatever they are, employed by CNN in determining where to send its cameras.

There are currently 32 conflicts underway in the world, with annual death tolls of 5,000 or more. I cannot think of any of these currently underway in which major powers have a vital national interest at stake. And yet, at least as to some of them, the major powers have exhibited a sense of concern and responsibility and have become to varying degrees, in various ways, involved. Not only the major powers, but many other countries around the world represented in the Security Council of the United Nations are now represented in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and even peaceenforcement units, all declaring their individual commitments to a new idea.

Perhaps I should say just a word more about why this concept seems so novel. To do that, I should recall a sentence I used to use again and again as Chairman of the United Nations Association of the United States of America. It went like this: "With the end of the Cold War, the world community was suddenly awakened to the anomaly inherent in the fact that for 40 years it had been bleeding with compassion for the victims of famine, floods, earthquakes, and tornados while turning its back on vastly greater death and destruction wrought by small wars." One may find some measure of super-power or major power, certainly Western European, concern with the situation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But as to these other situations, the unique and unprecedented thing is that in the Security Council of the United Nations, many countries are engaged in the question of what their responsibilities are towards those situations.

This is inevitably a hard question. There is certainly general unanimity on humanitarian concerns. But what about the "other side" -- the absence of any vital national interest on the part of any potential participant? How should peacekeeping responsibility be divided? As long as we are dealing with the traditional function of peacekeeping, rather than unarmed units not expected to engage in combat, the kind that the UN has traditionally employed, one need not address the question of sacrifice. But that is part of the continuum that begins with the effort to prevent conflict from erupting, and works towards some sort of accommodation, ceasefire, or negotiated peace, which can then be the subject of peacekeeping. These are all

considerations leading to the questions that have agonized the world, questions that make us ask ourselves how deeply we should intervene and with what degree of force. To go back to what I said earlier about the optimist that believes there is significant water in the glass, we should look at the various tasks of peacekeeping as matters that can and should involve the world for a long time -- indeed, for as long as it takes to build a global equivalent to the kind of peace, law, and mutual respect we enjoy within our own borders

I cannot resist in this Canadian-American company, and as a former USA Ambassador to Great Britain, citing what I think is a useful analogy that is both encouraging and, at the same time, sobering. It is the example of the gradual extension under the Norman Plantagenet kings of what came to be known as the "King's peace." When William the Conqueror became the ruler of England, he had major interests in France and needed English men-atarms to help him defend these. He was concerned with the productivity of the island. Whether he was dismayed by the violence among the warring feudal barons or not, we do not know, but certainly we do know that he and his successors established a system of King's courts, courts of the King's Bench, and it was said of all his succeeding years that the extent of the "King's peace" was measured by the reach of the King's writ. And so, by the end of the reign of Henry II, if a man was hauled before the Court of the King's Bench and charged with arson, if he pleaded as extenuation of this offence that the barn he burned down belonged to the grandson of the man who had raped his grandmother's sister, the Court would not hear that plea. Burning the barn down was a violation of the law, it was a breach of the "King's peace."

Today, centuries later, the world may be on the way to achieving some counterpart to the "King's peace" with what is being done in many places through the establishment of peacekeeping forces, through the introduction of UN mediators, through the development of the intelligence needed to try to forestall conflict. Little by little we shall, hopefully, establish a global writ of peace.

We should not let ourselves be discouraged because the task is difficult; of course it will be difficult. We should not let ourselves be discouraged because it will be slow; we should assume it will be slow.(Indeed, the interval between the conquest by William and the reign of Henry II was of about 100 years.) A very important beginning has been made. As I said at the outset, I cannot think of a more exciting symbol of this than Peacekeeping '94 and the presence here of so many people that in so many ways are contributing to the peacekeeping role.

Roderick Cordy-Simpson

Keynote Address

I was the Chief of Staff to the French General Philippe Morillon, the UN Commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I am going to concentrate on the way we set up the Former Yugoslavia operation, how we put the force together, and the difficulties we faced with the mandate we were given.

The mandate that we were given in Bosnia-Herzegovina was quite different from the one that the UN had in Croatia, where the UN troops were deployed to protect the Serbs in the UN-protected areas; hence, the word UNPROFOR. We were tasked with assisting the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Jose-Maria Mandaluce, in his efforts to distribute 1,500 tonnes of humanitarian aid every day in that war-torn country. The High Commissioner told me when I arrived that he considered we were likely to face up to 400,000 deaths from starvation and hypothermia in the winter of 1992.

Although we did not actually ever quite achieve our aid distribution target of 1,500 tonnes a day, we came very close to it, from the moment we got our troops on the ground. It says something for the operation that only the smallest fraction of the population died from hypothermia and starvation in that winter. But I have to say also that it was a close-run thing, with

Major-General Cordy-Simpson was, from October 1992 to September 1993, the First Chief of Staff -- United Nations Forces, to be deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He now commands the 25,000 person 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division.

several aspects in our favour, not least of all that winter that year did not really arrive until about February.

It was clear almost from the very outset to General Morillon and myself that we were going to have to negotiate with the highest political and military levels, because unless we were able to achieve some form of peace, we would be unable to move the tonnages of humanitarian aid required of us. We were, therefore, thrown into peacemaking whether we liked it or not.

In addition, we had to try to harness the strengths of the hundreds of different United Nations operations going on at the same time. Let me just touch on them. There was the United Nations civil organization in Zagreb, then there was the UN military command, also in Zagreb, with a subordinate commander, General Morillon, in Sarajevo. There were the UN military observers, with their headquarters in Zagreb; fortunately, they had put their operation in Bosnia under our command. Then there was the United Nations Civilian Police, UNCIVPOL -- though we had only 13 civilian police in Sarajevo guarding the airport for us, the reason for that being that our operation was not funded by the United Nations, but by the contributing nations.

Most importantly of all, there was the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees himself with his main headquarters in Zagreb, in a different country to the main operation, and with only liaison officers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with whom I had to deal.

This did not lead to a tidy operation. However, I would say here that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, for the first time ever, went on operating once we were there, even though war was still raging. This was the first time they had done that, and I give them huge credit for it -- civilian drivers and operators continuing with their work in the midst of a thoroughly evil three-sided civil war.

In addition, of course, we had the many, many other different agencies operating. I dealt with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on an almost weekly basis for prisoner and body exchanges. The ICRC is a Swiss-based organization, by definition a secretive operation, and it can never be under the UN umbrella of command, quite rightly, because of the nature of the work its personnel do. The European Commission's monitoring

mission, the people in the white suits, was a completely different organization, responsible to Brussels and not to the UN. Then there was the International Rescue Commission and the European Commission Task Force, responsible for rebuilding that area if and when peace finally comes, and also the World Health Organization, there to advise us as to how and where humanitarian medical aid was urgently needed. Of course, there were the many charities that had to be coordinated, some of these very good and very efficient -- Caritas, Mahamit, the Red Cross, *Médecins sans frontieres*, Save the Children, Feed the Children -- I have nothing but admiration for most of them, and we worked with them in comparative ease. Much more difficult to manage were the many one-man-band organizations that, through their misguided operations, often upset some of the carefully negotiated plans we had made with the warring factions.

We had been in-theatre for over four and a half months as a purely military organization before the UN appointed its first civil-affairs coordinator, a Russian, Viktor Andrev, for whom I have nothing but admiration, and who has become a good, and, I hope, life-long friend. Until that moment, General Morillon had had to undertake all the high-level political negotiations himself. As a result, he was unable to devote the time to commanding the military operation that I know he, as a soldier, would have wished. That meant that he had to delegate to me, as his Chief of Staff, all day to day military operations.

In addition, General Morillon made me the chairman of the Mixed Military Working Group. This group met often as much as twice a week, and each of these meetings brought together the three warring-faction commanders. They came with their political commissars and their own interpreters to each of these meetings. Each meeting had to have an agenda worked out, each meeting had to then have an agreement with all three sides that they would attend, and, finally, we had to bring them together to Sarajevo Airport under a flag of truce. I would just add, at this stage, that we did not achieve a great deal, but we did keep them talking. In fact, none of them dared pull out of the talks for fear I would stand up in front of the television cameras and say they had failed to show up, and were not sincere in wanting peace. Therefore I think we actually did achieve quite a lot, especially in terms of a number of agreements with all three sides, which we had discussed at these meetings. That meant when the Sarejevo massacre happened in February 1994, General Michael Rose was able to

implement at very short notice the demilitarization of the area around Saraievo. The plan existed and was put into operation quickly. As an aside, being put into a tiny room as the chairman of a mixed military working group with three warring-party generals with their political commissars, all chainsmoking, for six hours at a time, all three hating each other's guts in a way that I can hardly describe, was to me, a soldier, one of life's richer experiences!

I want quickly to touch on the Bosnia-Herzegovina command itself, because it was unique in the way it was put together. NATO was changing its direction guite rapidly as a result of the end of the Cold War, and the NATO Headquarters of the Northern Army Group was clearly going to fold up within about a year's time, when Bosnia-Herzegovina appeared on the scene. As a result, I was able to pick up and move my headquarters to Bosnia -- except for the Germans who for political reasons could not go -but including my Dutch, my Belgian, and my British officers. I might add that five American officers had been working with me. I do not think that Uncle Sam knew they were in Bosnia until I had already got them there. I took all my office equipment, all my clerks, and my NORTHAG vehicles and drivers.

This gave me major advantages. First of all, we all spoke English to a very high standard. Secondly, we had common procedures. Thirdly, we all knew each other. As a result, I had the whole of my headquarters on the ground within three weeks of the Security Council resolution. I would suggest to you that no other UN operation has ever achieved that before. I did not have to depend on a bureaucratic UN logistic system to try and catch up with me. When I heard about the Rwandan experience today from General Dallaire, I realized how very lucky I had been.

What lessons did we learn from this? There will not be another "spare" headquarters next time, of that I am quite sure. The way ahead, surely, is for those nations that really are committed to peacekeeping to send highgrade staff officers to New York. There they would integrate into the New York system, they would learn how the UN operated, they could work up contingency plans, and then they would bring them to fruition. When an operation was put into action, they could form the core of the new headquarters to deploy to wherever the new Bosnia-Herzegovina or the new Rwanda is. That, I believe, is the way ahead.

Let me talk quickly about command and control. We were a unique operation, in that we were not funded by the United Nations. Our contributing nations paid for us. This led to two things. First of all, logistically, each nation hit the ground strong enough to be self-supporting, unlike any other UN operation I have heard of before. Secondly it had a negative effect: because the politicians were paying directly for their battalions on the ground, they felt, and quite rightly, that they should keep a firm hand on how General Morillon and I, as his Chief of Staff, used those battalions. In other words, national links were stronger, I suggest to you, than they should have been. I believe that is acceptable and understandable in modern "wider" peacekeeping, but what is not acceptable is for a battalion commander to wave the "yellow card" at a force commander once the latter has given an order to the soldiers under his command. It did not happen, but we had some fairly lengthy "discussions" about it on one or two occasions.

How can we overcome this? I believe that in the future a force commander probably will need some form of national cell attached to his headquarters. This would link him to his national representative as plans are being developed. However, once a force commander gives an order to battalion commanders, no one can be allowed to change that order. An order is an order, and must be obeyed.

Rules of engagement caused a great deal of concern initially. I would immediately say that I thought that the rules of engagement that we were given by the United Nations were very easy to implement. But certain nations, of which my own was the probably the strongest in their arguments, found them too loose. I suggest to you that it was probably as a direct reflection on our years of experience in Northern Ireland where we have had to work very, very closely within the letter of the law, and wanted every last "i" dotted and "t" crossed in the rules of engagement. For my part, as Chief of Staff, I did not delegate the right to use the heavier weaponry to the battalion commanders. In other words, permission to use the heavy mortars and the anti-tank weapons was retained by the force commander, despite constant pleas from the battalion commanders to be allowed to deploy them. My reasons were quite straightforward. They were doctrinal. I made it quite clear to the battalion commanders that we were geared for a peacekeeping mission whose function was to ensure that humanitarian aid was delivered, and that our forces had been structured for that task. We were not structured for war fighting, and had we used mortars against any side we would have been moving towards war fighting and away from peacekeeping.

There is a fundamental doctrinal principle here, a line that can be drawn absolutely clearly. On the one side you have "wider" peacekeeping, and on the other you have war fighting. And if you cross that line, from "wider" peacekeeping to war fighting, you will never get back again, and the force will therefore have to be withdrawn. There is no gradual escalation: cross the line of impartiality doctrinally, and you are into war fighting.

So, therefore, I give you this thought: in my opinion, peacekeeping and war fighting are separated only by the clear line of impartiality.

Communications were a disgrace. Having carried out my reconnaissance, I discovered there were no telephones working anywhere in Bosnia- Herzegovina. I made it clear to New York that it would be possible for me to operate only if I had a satellite system. Unfortunately, because there was a lack of military advice readily available to the UN in New York, I ended up with a total mismatch of an organization that rarely allowed us to exercise effective command and control. In addition, you must remember that General Morillon, for sound symbolic and political reasons, had established himself in a small tactical headquarters alongside the legitimate presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the middle of Sarajevo. My main headquarters was 20 kilometres away, which meant that on an almost-daily basis I had to drive to Sarejevo, which meant crossing the front lines three or four times, in order to ensure that I was always in my commander's mind. Clear military advice in New York, at the time, could have overcome the communication problem. In fact, I was in Bosnia recently, and this problem has been largely overcome.

The UN has got to come to grips with the intelligence aspect of the "wider" peacekeeping. The days when intelligence gathering was "not done," rather as gentlemen do not read other people's mail, are long gone. We are dealing with highly sophisticated warring parties. We are peacekeeping in areas where they have highly geared-up intelligence organizations, and probably, if they are former Marxist countries, a highly sophisticated secret police as well. We faced all those in Bosnia, where we had no intelligence whatsoever. I had come from a NATO organization. The day I took off my NATO hat and put on my blue beret, the intelligence sources world was

closed to me. There was no access to NATO intelligence once we hit Bosnia. There was absolutely no interface between NATO and the UN at that stage.

We are, surely, all in the same game, and we must share our intelligence. This is already starting to happen, but it is a process that must continue into the future.

Now, to the media: we cannot ever win the peace until we can overcome the propaganda that is being pushed out. Bosnia-Herzegovina has, I think, 43 different radio stations, and they are 100 per cent pure propaganda. We have got to overcome this, and the only way to do so is to set up a Radio United Nations, or something like it. That is an essential step. If we do not, we shall never win the peace.

A second point has to do with the media representatives. I have total faith and confidence in the media. Their representatives are incredibly brave, they are incredibly honest, and, if you take them into your confidence, they never let you down. But the CNN factor is there: an atrocity today has to be seen on the world's television cameras tonight. The real danger of this is that it may lead to the UN Security Council's reacting before the politicians of our home countries, or we, the military on the ground, have had time to investigate something that appeared on the television screens. That is a dangerous situation, leading (as it has already done) to a number of Security Council resolutions that, frankly, we were unable to implement on the ground.

The establishment of the Mission in Bosnia was a unique operation. It was unique in the way that it was funded, and in the way that we brought it together. But I think there is some danger in the way that we did it, that we may have sent a signal that this is a "rich man's club," so that in the future the UN would only get involved if the national interests of the "club" were perceived to be at risk. That is not what the UN stands for.

A second point: the UN civil administration personnel failed to get themselves involved in our operation -- initially because they were not funded, but that is no excuse. As a result, we had to go in there, General Morillon and myself, with no political advice, no political goal, and no overall strategic aim of where we were trying to end up. We needed that help -- we

went in on a humanitarian mandate, but where was it taking us? I suggest that in future this problem might be overcome if we were to have a military staff working alongside the civil staff in New York.

There has been a most dramatic change in Bosnia since February 1994. Central Bosnia is now calm, and I mean calm. Areas that I would have never dreamed of driving through without a large armoured escort, I was able to drive through freely in August 1994. Roads along which I used regularly to get shot at, are now calm.

But I have some abiding memories. The first is of a huge population of fit, well-fed young men all saying the same thing: "It is half-time in our war" — in other words, the second half is about to begin. Reading my newspapers, I fear it may not be far wrong. Another is a frustration with the United Nations' seeming inability to take the next step in peacekeeping operations, to take us one more step towards peace. I do not blame the UN: it is a complicated situation. And a third is the impression of a United Nations administration that could not cope with an operation of the size and the fluidity with which we were dealing. Again, I do not blame the UN; its peacekeeping approach was developed in the Cold War era, though it now has 70,000 troops deployed on current operations around the world.

No one in Bosnia-Herzegovina has the right to the moral high ground. All three sides have been guilty of the most appalling atrocities. Things that we take as articles of faith in codes of warfare enshrined in the Geneva Convention mean nothing to any of them. The Bosnian Serbs are the "bad guys" in most people's minds, but we should be clear as to how they see themselves: they are proud, they are brave. The battle of Kosovo in 1389 and the actions of the Ustasha only 50 years ago are indelibly etched in every Serb's mind. Do not push him too far into a corner, because if you do, he will fight. Give him a way out and I believe that he will sign -- that is my opinion. In their hearts, they want peace.

Next, the Bosnian Croats, who some believe to be moderates -- believe you me they are not all moderates. I have seen with my own eyes what they have done to Bosnian Serb prisoners whose bodies we have subsequently found. I have seen with my own eyes what they did to their Muslim allies in Central Bosnia as they torched villages left, right and centre. And finally the

Bosnia-Herzegovinians, the so-called Muslims. They are Bosnian, and they believe in it.

The majority of the army, of course, are Muslim. They are also Slavs, just like the Serbs, and just like the Croats. We must understand that. The important thing to understand about the Bosnian Muslims is that they are the town-dwellers; they live in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Travnik, and Mostar. They are educated lawyers, doctors, and traders, the people that effectively make the country work. The infrastructure of their country has been totally destroyed, and any peace that we bring must offer them a chance to rebuild their country and then trade.

I regret that there are plans for the withdrawal of the United Nations should the arms embargo be lifted, and, should it be lifted, the French, the British, the Canadians, and the Spanish will almost certainly pull out. I shall be deeply sorry for that, in the light of the calm that exists today in Central Bosnia. I wonder who will protect the forces in those Muslim enclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa, or Gorazde -- at present protected by the United Nations. If we go, who will protect them? Please do not say to me that air power will do it, because it will not. The road to peace is going to be very hard and extremely tortuous, and there are no short cuts to it. This is a three-sided, thoroughly evil civil war. There are not just simply "bad guys" and "good guys"; it is not as simple as that. It is highly complicated. Nor is it a case of war fighting, but a slow and very painful process that will eventually, I hope, persuade all three sides that peace is preferable to war. That can only, I suggest to you, be achieved by an organization that has both a military and a civil wing, and is perceived by all to be impartial.

I would suggest to you therefore that failure of the United Nations mission in the Former Yugoslavia can only lead, I suspect, to a spillover. Kosovo will be next. If Kosovo, then Albania will be pulled in, and if Albania comes in, Macedonia will, and if Macedonia comes in, Greece will, and if Greece comes in, Turkey will, and if Turkey comes in, Bulgaria will. Of course it will not happen; we all say it cannot happen. Our grandfathers said the same thing. Then at three o'clock in the afternoon on 28th of June 1914, a 17-year-old Serb by the name of Princip closed his eyes and fired his revolver twice. In so doing, he started the most devastating World War that history had seen.

Some Reflections on the Nature of Conflict Resolution

I want to start by making some comments about conflict resolution, because it seems to me that the assumption our discussion is based on is that the UN's peacekeeping is excellent, it is one of the main tools for conflict resolution. At the risk of being booted out of here at this moment, let me disagree with this view. Peacekeeping is indeed a useful tool to be used as an instrument which allows the conflict resolution machine to shift into high gear. The tool for conflict resolution that I would like to talk about is the office of Secretary-General.

The best way to make my point is by way of examples, and I will therefore use what I know best, which is my own experience based on 20 years with the United Nations. You have to know where I come from before you see why I am going to say what I will.

I come from the position that the United Nations is more than the sum of its members. If it was only the sum of its members, it would be very interesting by itself, but there would be nothing particularly new about that. We had that in 1815, at the Congress of Vienna. It was very fine for 44 years, until 1859, when its system of a structure that was the sum of its

From 1973 to 1992, Mr. Picco was an official with the United Nations. His last position was Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, with, inter alia, responsibilities for the efforts which led to the release of the Western hostages in Lebanon and others that were missing or had been detained without due process.

members cracked completely. (It is curious to note that between 1945 and 1989 there were also 44 years. And I wonder if what was evident in 1859 was also evident in 1989.)

Now, my reflections on conflict resolution will bring you back to a particular year, 1988, which is very close to my heart, because that was the year when the Iran-Iraq war came to an end -- a war in which we had been involved very deeply, not on the side of the belligerents, but on the side of those who were trying to help. Let me briefly bring you back to that year. You may remember that Resolution 598 was adopted by the Security Council in 1987, and a year later war was still raging. In July 1988, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran finally accepted the resolution, and almost the day after, the foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq came to New York for what was supposed to be an intensive negotiation to end the war. The negotiation was indeed intensive, 12 or 14 hours a day, basically, every day. By the end of the month -- and here is the point I wanted to make -- I was approached by an envoy of a particular country, a major country that was involved. He had a message for me, to be given to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The message was: "Please tell the Secretary-General to stop negotiating the end of this war." This was at the end of July 1988. It was kind of a rough message, but, as I was a good soldier, I did transmit the message. It was an unexpected one, but nevertheless a real one, a profoundly real one. Not a theoretical comment, not a political conversation, a very real political message. Strong, precise, and coming from a very authoritative source. Very unexpected indeed!

A few days later, the foreign minister of Iraq, in another unexpected move, left New York without giving notice to the others at the negotiating table and went back home. We learned of his departure as his plane was taking off from New York. I have to say, this second unexpected development in one week was enough to convince anybody to give up. Well, that day, for your information, was 6 August. We now know that two days later, on 8 August, the agreement was completed.

I tell this story not only because this story actually happened, though it is not generally known, but also for the following reasons. First of all, it proves that you can negotiate even if you are not dealing directly with high-level individuals or one of the combatants, which is quite interesting, for -- as I said -- no Iraqi high official was in New York at the time that the

agreement was reached. The second is that we managed to secure this agreement in spite of the non-agreement of a major player in the international scene, the one who conveyed the message to us at the end of July. Number three, the agreement was achieved with the tremendous assistance of a regional power, Saudi Arabia, which had moved dramatically in those last two days to bring an end to an eight year-long conflict. As you know, by pure accident, the agreement was struck on 8/8/88. Was there anything ironic in this? I do not know, but I do know that 8 is my lucky number.

The main reason I tell this story here is just to explain why I am perplexed at times when I hear people say that the United Nations cannot do things because it is hampered by what major powers seem to want. The will of major powers seems to be used as a justification and an excuse for total immobility or lack of success. This reminds me, of course, of the darkest days of the Cold War, when the paralysis of the Security Council, in some areas, was interpreted by some as a necessary paralysis for the Secretary-General as well.

Another important aspect of this event was that there had been no discussion whatever in the Iran-Iraq negotiations of any particular use of force, or of any particular coalition to be set up. This was significant in that it showed a way of working in conflict resolution between the Security Council and the Secretary-General, a complementarity, a partnership. There was no discussion, as I said, about the use of force when we discussed the ways of ending that conflict. I do remember equally wondering about the use of bombing raids when, and it happened a few times, as some of you may know, I was locked up in the trunk of a car at night -- this was when I was going about trying to free the Western hostages in Lebanon. I never complained to the Security Council that they had not intervened in this matter. I knew that the Secretary-General had no possibility of using force because the UN had no force to use; I did not think that anyone had ever made plans for such an eventuality. Nevertheless, as you know, results were achieved.

My point is not that I am against the use of force. I am very much in favour of the use of force. If I were against it, I would also have to be against the Charter. The Charter calls for the use of force in particular cases.

I am, however, against the management of the use of force by the Secretary-General. According to Chapter VII, the only manager for the use of force should be the Security Council. But the argument that force cannot be used by the Security Council because there is no management structure is not valid. After all, there was no structure there to invent the special role of Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, who is in charge of the UN commission to supervise the disarmament of Iraq. You may not have reflected on the fact that Ambassador Ekeus was not appointed by the Secretary-General, but by the Security Council, and he reports directly to that body. It is the first and only case in the history of the United Nations where this has happened. With so many creations possible without changing the Charter, I feel sure that the management of use of force by the Security Council could also be handled. After all, the coalition against Iraq is an example.

Now, "Conflict Resolution and the United Nations," in my view, refers primarily to the Security Council and to the Secretary-General. I would like to focus on the office of the Secretary-General, because that is the institution I know best. The first thing I want to say is that I do not see the office of Secretary-General as equivalent to a State; I discount the argument that says it cannot be effective until it has that equivalence. How would you feel about the idea of the office of the Secretary-General being given any of the tools of a State? Could you ever believe that, even if it were to be given the tools of States, those tools of States would be as effective as they are when used by one of the States themselves? The answer to both questions is very likely, no.

So what is the best option for an institution such as the Secretary-Generalship? If it were to become equivalent to a State, I feel it would be a poor copy, at best. Why in the world would anybody want a poor copy when the original is available? In my view, that is what went wrong in Somalia and in Bosnia. In the desperate, or perhaps misleading attempt to increase the power of an institution by trying to make its own tools which are not its own, the office of the Secretary-General, far from improving its position in the resolution of conflict, has ended up as a poor copy of a State. This, besides being a kind of institutional suicide, has not helped the UN's other office, the Security Council, to do its job well.

The Secretary-General has to work in a complementary way with the different states, in a mutually helpful way. If I were a State government, I

would never allow the Secretary-General to compete with me and I would have the means and the tools for doing that. But if the Secretary-General behaves as an institution which is complementary, then we both gain.

That is why, in the case I mentioned to you, it was possible to reach some resolution of conflict, because the difference of roles was clear and precise. The two institutions, Secretary-General and State, in my view, are like a fork and a knife. Each is extremely useful, but try to use a fork as a knife, and vice versa. Even worse, try to melt the two tools into one. In each case, the results will not be positive.

From the past I think there is much to be done in terms of conflict resolution for the institution of the Secretary-General to be not only effective but also to achieve the role of complementarity. That is the only way for it to grow, and not to be pushed aside and basically disregarded by the member states. The institution of the Secretary-General must create its own role, a complementary role, in conflict resolution, in addition to undertaking a function that states either can or will not perform.

I mentioned the matter of the Western hostages in Beirut for one reason. I believe that the Security Council and member states could not have performed their role with such success. If they could, they would have done it much earlier. As you know, at the end, there was a question as to why the institution of the Secretary-General had been so effective.

By the same token, I do not believe for a second that the office of the Secretary-General could have convinced President Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. The option chosen was the only one available at that time. The last meeting I attended with the Iraqi president was two days before the war began, and I was convinced then, and I remain convinced now, that war was the only option. So you see, the question is *what* to use *when*. In the short term, the office of the Secretary-General's contribution to conflict resolution may well come from keeping its role separate from that of the Security Council, and for making its role a complementary one.

Let me give you an example of the sort of complementarity I have in mind. When I speak of a State's tools, I mean such things as a real military and a central bank. A real military and a central bank are the very tools underlying the State's vested interests. On the other hand, a UN official

should not be perceived as having vested interests. You know, if you go to another country as the representative of a State, as soon as you open your mouth, people there will automatically question your motives, searching for a hidden agenda. This does not imply that you are dishonest, you may be very honest, what it implies is that if you represent a State, you carry with you inherently vested interests.

Conversely, when you work for the office of UN Secretary-General, which does not possess the tools of the State and therefore does not have those vested interests, you do not run the risk of being accused of having them. That is why I am able to be here speaking to you today. Had that not been the case, I would have been killed in Lebanon by the Islamic Jihad. So you see, it is not just a theoretical situation, but a matter of life and death.

So, the first goal, the short-term one, is to keep the complementarity, to keep the roles separated. It is particularly interesting, in view of dramatic international changes over the last 50 years, to ask what is the most important change for the Secretary-General's office. In my view, the players of the international arena today are not only the member states, but as you know very well, a number of other institutions, groups, and individuals, who for better or for worse, play their hands at the international table.

Now, if we have actors on the international scene that are not the governments of member states, would it not be useful to have an institution such as that of the Secretary-General to deal with them? Especially, as it would not seem appropriate for them to deal with member states as though they were equivalent.

A medium-term goal for improvement in the Secretary-General's ability to handle conflict resolution is the factor of personal credibility of the people working for him. Credibility takes time to be built; there is no shortcut. But, if you keep changing individuals every 12 months, for whatever reason, you will never build this credibility. If you lack credibility, you might as well stay home. After all, without cards to play, without weapons, without money, all you have left is credibility. If you lack even that, then you have really put yourself out of business.

I would like to introduce here a dangerous observation about credibility that is linked to the matter of vested interests and the representatives of

these interests. The credibility of the UN Secretary-General's staff is directly linked to their image as being different from representatives of the member states. A government operative today cannot become a representative of the UN Secretariat tomorrow -- you cannot recreate your virginity in 24 hours. Generally speaking, if you walk in the streets of Teheran, Baghdad, or Kabul, make no mistake, if until yesterday you were working for the Italian government, and tomorrow you put on a blue helmet, you will not be believed. Credibility is the main medium-term option that the office of the Secretary-General must pursue in order to be useful to States in the matter of conflict resolution.

In the long-term, perhaps the most important contribution for the office of the Secretary-General to make would be a redefinition of the concept of the "enemy." This is something that no State could easily do. In a sense, the disappearance of the Soviet Union has made us all orphans, orphans of the "Enemy" with a capital "E".

For millennia, the concept of the "enemy" has been a necessary tool for the management of the international system. It may be difficult, in the short span of a few decades, to find world leaders that can lead without an enemy to oppose. Just a bit difficult. Since we cannot invent them, an option would be to find a different definition of the "enemy." One that would be in line with the United Nations Charter if you like, but also very handy for managerial purposes: why not define as the new enemy the very concept of intolerance? I would submit that the office of Secretary-General is much better placed than other institutions to redefine the concept of the enemy.

The conflict-resolving ability of the Secretary-General is not based on the perception that he operates on the basis of *Realpolitik*. You see, the problem with this view is that, if we do really believe in *Realpolitik*, we might as well stay home and do nothing, because nothing we can do will make any difference. I rather take the position of Winston Churchill when he said, "There is no history; there are only biographies."

If that is the case, then perhaps the most serious danger that the UN faces today is for the Secretary-General's office to remain politically silent before the military and conceptual destruction of the multiethnic State. The multiethnic State is not something outside the UN, it is part of the UN. If you allow a multiethnic State to die, you allow part of the UN to die.

Then you reach a stage where the interests of States, as in the case of the Balkans and others, are to a large extent dictated by major strategic interests. That is understandable, it is to some degree justifiable. But should the Secretary-General's office take the position that its interest is the same as those of the member states? The answer, of course, is, no. This is because silence in the face of destruction of a multiethnic State implies a belief that the United Nations is nothing more than the Congress of Vienna was. And if that is the case, I will submit, we do not have a United Nations, we simply have gone back almost two centuries.

I do not believe that this is the lesson we have learned from the experience of peacekeeping. I think the great contribution of UN peacekeeping has not been only on the technical and logistic side, it has also been in our ability to redefine ways of working together with people from different countries. Most of all, the UN has awakened to the realization that it is possible for a soldier to be very useful and effective even though he may not have an enemy before him.

The Changing Nature Of Civil-Military Operations In Peacekeeping

International Trends

In the rapidly changing international security environment, United Nations peacekeeping operations will continue to be of use as an instrument of international security policy and multilateral action. In the future, however, UN peacekeepers will face a much more challenging operational environment than they have in many previous missions.

First, more and more missions will be conducted in non-cooperative environments, such as those in Somalia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and the Former Yugoslavia, where local belligerents remain armed and aggressive. Second, peacekeepers will have to contend with increased humanitarian requirements and with the needs of local civilian populations. Third, the capability of the UN to meet the military personnel requirements necessary to support new and existing missions will decrease as national governments continue to downsize their defence establishments. Fourth, some UN member nations, such as the United States, will demand more efficient use of current assets, rather than provide additional resources to improve existing capabilities. Finally, the cost of UN peacekeeping operations will continue to rise as more operations are initiated or expanded while current missions continue. As a consequence, there will be greater demands placed

Mr. Bair served as the Political Affairs Officer with the UN Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia. He currently manages the Special Projects Division for Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).

on the civilian and humanitarian functions associated with UN operations because of the growing complexity and multi-faceted nature of future missions.

It follows, therefore, that the civilian and humanitarian components of peacekeeping will become more important to the success of future peace operations. There will be a need to blend the responsibilities of military and civilian personnel more effectively in order to increase overall mission performance on the ground. Inability to adapt to the rapidly changing environment in which military and civilian personnel have to operate will reduce chances of success in the mission and increase exposure to risk and casualties.

My presentation will use the UN Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) experience as a model for identifying emerging demands for increased civilian and humanitarian participation in future UN beacekeeping operations. I will also examine the changing nature of the civil-military interface in those operations, in order to suggest methods for mproving the performance and effectiveness of civilian and military operations in peacekeeping.

Changing Requirements

The new international environment will require new and different approaches to peacekeeping, or at least significant improvements in the way that peace operations are planned and conducted. The creation of effective mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between civilian and military organizations will support this approach.

For many years, UN national troop contributors have operated alongside civilian and humanitarian agencies. In fact, the UN has regularly deployed civil administration units in the field to support the UN's logistic and administrative needs. However, with the rapid increase in humanitarian emergencies and a distinct shift away from traditional peacekeeping to missions characterized by multiple mandates and functions, it is important that military forces understand not only the mission they must accomplish, but also the functions, roles, and responsibilities of international civilian and numanitarian organizations.

For example, UNPROFOR is charged with simultaneously conducting peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance operations in the Former Yugoslavia. Currently, there are over 40,000 military and 6,000 international civilian personnel working to fulfill these mandates. As expected, it has been important to try to coordinate the responsibilities of the military and civilian components of this multi-faceted operation.

UNPROFOR military and civilian personnel share many tasks, including the protection of local populations, the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid, the management of refugees and displaced persons, the monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses, the monitoring and supervising of cease-fires, the negotiation of confidence-building measures, the restoration of civilian infrastructure, and the conducting of media relations. These shared tasks and responsibilities must be conducted at all levels, from Force Headquarters in Zagreb to the field battalion level.

Examples of international civilian organizations working with UNPROFOR's military forces include the humanitarian assistance agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), non-governmental and private voluntary organizations (numbering over 200 in the mission area), human rights organizations, UN political representatives (including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General), UN civil-affairs officers, UN civil police, officials from regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) Administrator in Mostar, and international support contractors such as Brown & Root and Dyncorp.

Emerging Operational Realities

Before 1988, most UN field operations were set up as either observer missions (usually unarmed) or peacekeeping missions (armed). Historically, these missions were tasked to supervise a cease-fire, monitor troop withdrawals, or provide a buffer between opposing local forces. The non-military functions in these missions were, in general, dedicated to international mediation and administrative functions. Although these "traditional" peacekeeping operations were manned by both military and civilian personnel, the military and civilian components performed their functions and tasks separately.

In recent years, however, the scope of the tasks and functions associated with UN peace operations has increased dramatically. Now, large numbers of military personnel are expected to work in concert with civilians to achieve the mandates set forth by the UN Security Council.

This expansion has led to a reversal of the role of military forces in three important ways. First, in the past, military personnel relied on the host nation and its infrastructure for support. Today, the opposite is true. Host countries such as Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Cambodia rely on UN troop contributors for engineering support, infrastructure restoration, medical services, temporary housing, and fuel. Second, military forces had traditionally viewed the "area of operations" as their near-exclusive domain. in which local civilians were more a hindrance than a help. In the new peacekeeping environment, local civilians are not only ever-present, they are the raison d'etre for humanitarian missions.

A third important aspect has to do with the performance of peacekeeping tasks and functions. Historically, military forces performed their mission separately from the international civilian components assigned to a UN operation. UN military forces monitored ceasefires, patrolled buffer zones, manned checkpoints, and supervised the withdrawal of local forces from the confrontation line. These were strictly military tasks. In today's environment, military personnel are compelled by the nature of their mission to work with international civil servants in the performance of their tasks. Some of the tasks now commonly shared by military and civilian personnel in peace operations are:

- conflict management and prevention
- security and protection of local populations
- delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid
- management of refugees and displaced persons
- reconstitution of local justice systems
- human rights monitoring and reporting
- election monitoring and supervision
- logistics support and restoration of civilian infrastructure
- public information and media relations.

These new functions and the new environment in which they are performed have been variously described by the British as "wider peacekeeping,"¹ and by the United Nations as "second generation peacekeeping."² The Canadians, however, have gone a step further and have taken an integrated approach to their concept of operations, which is called the "New Peacekeeping Partnership."³ This concept brings together the collective efforts of the military, governmental, and international components of peacekeeping to help improve the performance and effectiveness of UN operations.

In the past, civil-military coordination in the field was conducted almost entirely on an *ad hoc* basis. National military troop contributors and UN authorities did not practise, plan, or mount peace operations in conjunction with international civilian or humanitarian agencies. In most cases, joint coordination procedures and working relationships were developed "on the ground," in the theater of operations after the mission had commenced.

The lack of a systematic and coordinated planning mechanism often resulted in inefficiencies and duplication of effort in the field. For instance, national military troop contributors to the original UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia failed to coordinate their work with international agencies such as UNHCR and ICRC to determine the most effective division of labour for humanitarian assistance in the UN Protected Areas. As a result, both UNHCR and ICRC were severely lacking in engineering services and logistics support. It took senior UN military officials and international aid workers more than one year to reach a mutual understanding on what role each agency would serve in supporting the humanitarian assistance mission.

In another example, UNPROFOR military and civilian officials in the initial stages of the operation developed their "campaign strategies" separately and without any significant effort to coordinate mission critical activities. Tasks such as the protection of local populations were made even more difficult, because military and civilian organizations often took different, and sometimes conflicting, approaches to addressing the problems raised by "ethnic cleansing."

Beyond the planning and execution of tasks, duplication of effort was also frequent in the areas of public information and media relations, communications, transportation, administration, and field services.

Improving Operational Performance

Improving the performance and effectiveness of the civilian and military functions in UN peace operations must start with the recognition that all UN peacekeeping personnel, humanitarian agencies, regional organizations, and other international participants are working towards the same objective: successful fulfillment of a mandate prescribed by the UN Security Council. UN mandates are always political in nature and are contrary in many ways to the traditional military objectives assigned to military forces; that is, the ultimate goal in peace operations is the achievement of a political outcome such as the institution of a new democratic government, the restoration of law and order, or the reinstatement of popularly elected civil authorities—not a military defeat.

To be successful in the new international environment, future UN peace operations will require a systematic and rigorous approach to the planning, preparation, and execution of civilian and military functions and tasks, in the same way that several national defence establishments have attempted to integrate the land, air, and sea components of their military forces.

UN planners and national military troop contributors will never have enough lead time to plan a new mission in full detail. That is the reality of peacekeeping. However, this does not preclude UN planners from improving preparations for future peacekeeping missions by designing non-specific but detailed plans to integrate civilian and military operations more effectively. The following paragraphs outline actions to support this goal.

Joint Planning - Peace operations should be planned in an integrated fashion in an effort to improve the effectiveness of field activities. Since it is not usually possible to conduct mission specific contingency planning much n advance of an operation, general plans should be developed to ncorporate joint civilian-military functions and tasks. This approach requires an established system of procedures for detailed coordination among military planners, civilian authorities, humanitarian agencies, and national troop contributors. This planning capability could be attained with the establishment of a Civil-Military Planning Cell in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at UN Headquarters in New York. This cell would support mission-planning for those functions and tasks likely to be undertaken jointly by the civilian, humanitarian, and military components

of an operation. Further, the cell could serve as a planning and coordination conduit for organizations external to DPKO such as UNHCR, ICRC, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private voluntary organizations (PVOs).

<u>Doctrine</u> - Military field operations have long relied on doctrine and standard operating procedures. There is no comparable set of field-tested guidelines for most international civilian or humanitarian organizations. UNHCR and the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs have recently issued basic doctrinal procedures for humanitarian operations, but neither these organizations nor the vast majority of national military contributors address in sufficient detail the potential for shared roles and missions of the civilian and military components in peacekeeping.

The primary civilian, humanitarian, and military organs within the UN peacekeeping community should draft a *Civil-Military Doctrine* that details the modalities and procedures associated with the performance of all aspects of civilian and military functions and tasks.

<u>Training</u> - Training is integral to effective performance in the field. Recently, several national and multinational peacekeeping exercises have focused on humanitarian assistance missions and have practised the skills required to perform these missions. For example, NATO conducted its first joint-training exercise on allied territory with the new Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations in October 1994. Its purpose was to share peacekeeping experiences, enhance individual peacekeeping skills, develop a common understanding of operational procedures, and improve the joint capabilities of NATO and PfP military forces. However, there was no real, active participation by UN civilian officials. It is unrealistic to conduct a peacekeeping exercise which incorporates non-military missions without civilian participation.

To prepare for a realistic peacekeeping environment, training activities should incorporate the roles of UN and international civilian personnel. The UN should take the initiative in allowing UN civilian personnel involved in peacekeeping to participate in national and multinational training programs and exercises. This would help expose UN civilian officials and national military officers to each other's practices and procedures in peace operations.

<u>Civilian Reserve Corps</u> - There is no integrated civilian officer corps available to staff UN peace operations. All civil affairs officers, lawyers, humanitarian-affairs officers, election supervisors, and civilian administration officials must be drawn from the UN system on an individual basis, seconded from national ministries, or recruited "off the street." There are two key problems associated with this process. First, there is very little quality control: this directly affects mission performance and effectiveness. Second, there is always a shortage of trained staff, regardless of quality.

Creation of a *Civilian Reserve Corps* could alleviate these difficulties by providing the UN Secretariat with a pool of available well-trained civilian personnel with identified capabilities and wide-ranging skills. A key feature of this concept is a civilian peacekeeping-training program. International civil servants require training in civilian tasks for peacekeeping, just as military forces require training for military tasks. A civilian training program would develop and build skills in political negotiations and mediation, information analysis, humanitarian assistance, election monitoring, logistics, crisis response, civil-military planning and coordination, and civil administration.

Information and Analysis - Currently, there is a large cultural gap between UN concepts of "information" functions on the one hand and the concept of national intelligence on the other. This disparity will not be reconciled easily, but ways may be found to improve the ability of UN decision-makers, both in the field and at UN headquarters in New York, to use information and analysis more effectively. The improvement of integrated information management systems, of information and reporting standards between UN Headquarters in New York and missions in the field, of analyses of information gathered in the field, and of field collection and reporting techniques would all support this process.

A problem cited by many UN officials is the lack of regularized, standardized, and timely information on the intentions, activities, and capabilities of the local parties in the mission area. Since most contemporary peace operations have at their core the dual missions of establishing the conditions for peace and security (peacekeeping) and engaging in conflict resolution (peacemaking), it is important that UN civilian officials and military commanders have a clear picture of the local scene. The UN should work to improve its information analysis capabilities within

DPKO and in the field to help provide more timely analysis to civilian officials and military commanders.

<u>Civil-Military Interfaces</u> - Civil-military operations centers (C-MOCs) and joint-commission structures are being used increasingly in UN peace operations. However, peacekeeping planners and operators need to expand the concept of C-MOCs and joint commissions beyond the focus on structural composition, and should place more emphasis on the *process* of civil-military relations.

C-MOCs provide a useful forum for civilian, humanitarian, and military officials to work together in planning and coordinating their activities in the field on a regularized basis. In fact, the C-MOC is a good base on which to create an integrated staff that would support the chief of mission or force commander and serve as a focal point for integrated planning, analysis, and implementation of mission tasks and functions. Joint Commissions provide a systematic way for peacekeepers to interact with local military and civilian officials in resolving disputes and disagreements. In addition, joint commissions support the process of implementation of the operational provisions of negotiated agreements. Bringing these concepts into the doctrine, training, and planning stages of peace operations will improve the potential effectiveness of the civilian and military organizations involved in peacekeeping.

Concluding Observations

There will always be obstacles to overcome in improving any large organization such as the United Nations. Many of these obstacles have substantial political ramifications within UN member-states that will never be completely resolved. Some of the more significant ones that will affect efforts to implement the ideas outlined in this paper are related to national command and control of personnel and resources, conflicting organizational mission mandates, the sheer multitude of international and regional actors now engaged in peace operations, the relentless pursuit of scarcer and scarcer resources, and competing bureaucratic goals and objectives.

These are major hurdles. However, they should not be allowed to stand in the way of necessary enhancements and improvements in how the United Nations Secretariat and the UN's member-nations prepare for, mount, and

conduct peace operations. Integrating the planning, coordination, and execution of civilian and military functions and tasks in peace operations will improve the performance and effectiveness of these organizations in the field. In the end, this approach will support the UN's efforts to find new ways for meeting the requirements of the new peacekeeping environment.

Notes

- Wider Peacekeeping, British Army Field Manual. (Fourth Draft), (Wilts, England: Headquarters Doctrine and Training, 1994), pp. 1-7 to 1-9.
- United Nations Peace-keeping, DPI/1399, (New York: UN Department of Public Information, August 1993), p. 8.
- Program Brochure, The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, (Clementsport, NS: The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 1994).

The United Nations in Civil Wars

My remarks today will reflect the reality of the new political climate in the USA.

I would like to try to share some recent thoughts, thoughts ranging in two directions. One is the result of research that I have conducted over the last five years with a colleague, Larry Minear, in which we interviewed some 1,500 practitioners in war zones -- peacekeepers, military officials, and UN and non-governmental humanitarians. The other derives from a research project that I had the opportunity to direct, in which we attempted to analyze four recent UN experiences -- in Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and El Salvador. We tried to take apart the multi-functional fabric of these undertakings, looking first at the separate military, the civil elements, and then the humanitarian components with their overlay of political negotiations. Then we tried to bring them all together in casestudies in a book published by Lynne Reinner. From this research emerged what I call nine conceptual signposts. It is difficult to generalize about cases. We are too close to them. What is worse, they are obviously very different, from small to large, from massive military to virtually no military, and from huge to minor humanitarian problems. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile, I think, to try to generalize to the extent possible, and I would like to do so in nine different areas.

Dr. Weiss is the Associate Director of the Brown University's Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies and the Executive Director of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS).

The first arises from the difference between the "third" and the former "second" worlds. Many of us actually made part of a career analyzing differences between these two, but, it seemed, there were virtually no operational differences. We used to have the idea that somehow conflict was the monopoly of the "third" world; that, clearly, is no longer the case. The one difference was, of course, when Russia was involved as a partner. The necessity of enabling Russia to veto certain decisions in the Former Yugoslavia disturbed some of us. But, nonetheless, it was and is a reality. The second part of the Russian equation ties in with a new trend; namely, the willingness or the necessity to hand over operations to be conducted by major powers. In some ways, this goes against the very reasons that the UN was founded in the first place. Bill Maynes has called this "benign Realpolitik." In any case, between the end of June and July 1994, the Security Council made three decisions that probably signal a direction for the future, approving Russian military help in Georgia, the French in Rwanda, and the Americans in Haiti.

The second big area is reflected by the question: Does it make a difference whether it is a civil or an international war? Basically, for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), it does. For virtually no one else is there a very significant difference at all, in terms of making the decision to go in. The reason that it is important for the ICRC is that, if you look at the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, there are something like 530 articles that apply to international war and about 29 to civil wars. In fact, the sense of the research group was that too much time spent trying to split judicial hairs actually slowed down decisions in a place like the Former Yugoslavia.

The main operational difference, of course, arises from the fact that in civil wars, once you get involved, there are myriad partners, and sometimes they are at war with one another. The obvious extreme is in Somalia, but in all of the other cases, with the exception of El Salvador, there really are multiple parties. This means two things: first, it is harder to get them to agree; second, they are far less disciplined than are governments, and, therefore, they do not necessarily respect the letter or even the spirit of their agreements. Those of us who are political scientists have increasing difficulty talking about rational actors or models in these situations.

The third signpost, analytically, that emerged from this research is about the nature of fragmentation and the fact that two principal beliefs that emerged in the last 50 years, which people took as articles of faith, seem to have disappeared; one, that borders are sacrosanct, and two, that secession is impossible. As we look at failed states, increasingly we find an emerging theme, spoken under one's breath because it is hard to say in polite company. It is sometimes called "recolonization"; at a minimum it is called a "new form of trusteeship." Here, certain experiences in the recent past, in Cambodia maybe and also the UN experience in Palestine over the last 45 years, are significant. This obviously raises a number of questions with the various partners. I gave this talk to a group of Somalis, who did not exactly like this idea. They claimed that they had "graduated" as trustees, they had diplomas, and therefore international trusteeship was out of the question. I tried to argue that maybe the time had not yet come for such an approach. But if the Boston school system can turn itself over to Boston University, then perhaps failed states, for an interim period, could also turn themselves over to an international group of some kind.

The fourth signpost that arose from our research concerns the impossibility of judging the success or failure of a UN mission. Rarely are time frames or durability of results specified, either in the mandate, or any memo, or anywhere else. So analysts could actually look at the same bits of information, partial as they were, and argue the opposite sides of the case. Was Yugoslavia successful because we do not have a larger Balkan war? Or was it was an absolute flop, as we failed miserably to thwart aggression, various sorts of war crimes, and the forced movement of people? Was Somalia successful because we lowered death rates in 1993? Or was it an absolute long-term failure because we have now gone back to square one? Was Cambodia a success because the Prince was elected? Or was it a failure because we left, and because the Khmer Rouge now control exactly the same territory as it controlled before elections and has the same number of arms? El Salvador is an especially difficult case because, while a page seems to have been turned, absolutely none of the roots of the crisis have been successfully addressed.

The next, the fifth issue that emerges from this research, concerns the use of force and the nature of intervention. Every single one of these recent cases is in fact far more intrusive than anything we have observed in the past, and this creates problems for a number of people. Not everyone is

enthusiastic about intervention, inevitable as it may be. The military, of course, tends to think that these small wars are not where it wants to get bogged down. The military is aligned, rather amazingly, with a group that I suppose one would call in certain circles, "progressive" -- critics who do not think that the US military can do anything good, and their dominance of the multilateral machinery means that we should exclude this eventuality.

There are two other groups whose arguments are increasingly heard. One is the developing countries -- rather more in Asia and the Middle East than in Africa and Latin America -- who argue that non-intervention is their only protection against bullies. A fourth group, actually including many of the humanitarians whom I have interviewed in the field, see "humanitarian intervention" or "humanitarian war" as self-contradictory terms. For them, humanitarian action has to be consensual. Two people that could hardly be accused of being soft on outside military forces, Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar from African Rights, have argued that some earlier experiences in colonial wars need to be studied. Thus, we are likely to learn more from the British experience in Malaysia than we are from Operation Desert Storm for future humanitarian operations of this type.

The sixth big problem area relates to the United Nations as an intergovernmental institution, and the fact that obviously it focuses its attention on states. This introduces a number of operational complications. First, the United Nations typically is preoccupied with the capital of a country at war; this explains why Mogadishu became an obsession. Another complication has to do with maintaining the impartiality of the Secretariat leadership. Giandomenico Picco has written on this recently. The United Nations is supposed to be able to remain around afterwards and continue as the interlocutor for whatever regime that may follow. In terms of human rights, these UN operations are not the "eyes and ears" that they could be. Human Rights Watch has called this the "lost agenda"; in any case, better advantage could be taken of these operations if a decision to be partial were made -- this is, after all, the nature of intervention -- and human rights themes came to be a preoccupation rather than an afterthought.

The seventh signpost is the "stitch in time" prevention issue. We have absolutely nothing original to say about this, other than the obvious. All of us are persuaded that somehow we have to move ahead more quickly. It is a comment on our own political system that somehow we could not move quickly enough to stop mass murder in Rwanda, but a few weeks later, it was possible to spend several hundreds of millions in order to pick up the pieces in Goma. We had USA President Clinton arguing that under no condition was the situation in Rwanda in anybody's -- certainly not the US's -- interests. We were not going to touch it with a barge pole. And then, a few months later, in we came with a group of soldiers, spending a few hundred million dollars in a very short period of time.

In fact, it seems to me that the one dynamic that may be pushing prevention is this financial one. I just looked at some Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) figures, for example, and the same countries that said that they were basically not going to do anything in Rwanda are now footing the bill -- probably a billion dollars in calendar year 1994 -- in Rwanda. This represents something like two per cent of all overseas development assistance and 20 percent of total humanitarian assistance across the globe. So it may be Polyannaish to think about prevention. On the other hand, if you are not going to stay out, the bill is much more significant afterwards, and so maybe costs will push governments to act proactively.

The eighth area, and this is the theme of this "New Peacekeeping Partnership" seminar, is about the entire international safety net. As someone who thinks about strengthening the UN, I see in the future that the strengthening will come about largely as a result of helping other partners work side by side, in tandem with the UN. I am thinking especially of nongovernmental organizations. They have various benefits in terms of energy, cost-effectiveness, and grassroots linkages. On the other hand, one should not be under the illusion that all of these people are professionals, that they all know what they are doing. There is a real difference between larger, more professional NGOs, and a whole lot of other ones at the other end of the spectrum. Whatever the intensity of their commitments may be, many are fairly loose cannons.

Last week, I was talking to a couple of colleagues just back from Kigali. I learned that there are at least 150 international NGOs in Kigali tripping over one another, vying for turf, looking for resources. I have described this effort as like trying to herd cats. Somehow, this group has got to be pulled together, and, somehow, it has to be made to work in tandem with the UN.

A second institutional group that needs to be pulled into this gambit is the group of regional organizations, but here I do not think that our usual way of looking at them may make any sense, except for NATO. On the whole, they are militarily absolutely bereft, they have few human resources. In the Former Yugoslavia, one could argue that even in the best cases these institutions have been inept. I see regional institutions as being more important at the diplomatic and negotiating level -- looking closely at what the Contadora Group did and the Central American presidents afterwards, in terms of pushing people to an agreement. Then, farming out the implementation to the UN made sense. It was the same with ASEAN in Cambodia.

A third big group of institutions is the Washington-based financial institutions. Those of you who ever look at UN organigrams note that IBRD and IMF always have these little dotted lines that suggest that they are somehow part of this UN system. But they are really not part at all. And what seems to happen increasingly often is that they get involved after the fact. Certainly in the case of El Salvador, by not being involved at the outset in the peace agreement, they came in with a whole set of propositions that, in fact, Alvaro de Soto has described as being on a "collision course" with the UN-brokered peace agreement. So the left and right hands, so to speak, of the UN system have to be coordinated.

The final area is the media. Here, it seems, anecdote is much stronger than analysis. There is a sense that somehow Ted Turner of CNN is in control of the world. It has to be more complicated than that. Lots of people feel that somehow media influence is greater now than in the past. But in digging through some old files, I found a quote from William Randolph Hearst, who said to the photographer Frederic Remington, "You give me the pictures, I'll give you the war." And lo and behold, we had the Spanish-American War.

The media have been important in Biafra, Bangladesh, and Ethiopia, a couple of times. This is not new. Somehow we find ourselves having to explain why these pictures from Somalia are so compelling when pictures from neighbouring Sudan or from across the continent in Angola are not. And how is it, if these pictures are so "compelling," we can look at Bosnia on our screens and in our newspapers for the last two years without actually doing much to turn that situation around?

The International Politics of Peacekeeping

On the ground, peacekeeping is an activity based upon, and depending upon, impartiality. Indeed, this is its fundamental principle. A host state extends an invitation to peacekeepers only in the belief that they will not turn against it. Disputants cooperate with peacekeepers only in the belief that they will behave impartially. As a result of these two assumptions, states contributing personnel do so assuming that their personnel will be operating in a relatively risk-free environment — at least to the extent that they will not themselves be directly involved in battle. They go to help the contending parties, not to discipline them.

Impartiality may therefore be seen as the most essential quality of peacekeeping. Impartiality is the quality that gives the activity its distinctiveness, determining the size, equipment, and operating procedures of all peacekeeping missions. Putting the point differently, peacekeepers are not intended to be players in the local political game.

However, peacekeeping also has an underlying political character. Any individual mission is a manifestation of the political life of the society of states, and is therefore subject to its changes. A mission may be the vehicle for the political agendae of international officials connected with it. And peacekeepers may have an effect on -- and even come to be seen as participants in -- the political scene to which they have been despatched. In

Professor James is a member of the faculty of the University of Keele and the International Advisory Board of Peacekeeping and International Relations.

these respects, therefore, peacekeeping has an intrinsic political aspect. It is not divorced from international politics, but is a reflection of them.

It may be argued, therefore, that peacekeeping is at one and the same time both non-political and political. It is non-political in its immediate operational activity and attitudes. But it is also political in two ways: it is a manifestation of the policies of certain third parties, and it is assessed by disputants on the basis of the way in which their own policies are likely to be affected by the work of the peacekeepers.

The Misunderstanding of Peacekeeping

Three factors help to explain why the political character of peacekeeping has often not been understood. The first of these is wholly conceptual in nature -- arising directly from the notion of peace, which is frequently perceived not as the outcome of political activity (which I believe it to be) but as being, in some unexplained way, above politics. Accordingly, any activity which is concerned with keeping the peace, including peacekeeping, is perceived as being above politics. Peacekeeping is one thing; politics another. Peacekeeping is simply a good thing, and that is the end of the matter

This view is reinforced by the second factor, derived from the nature of peacekeeping, what peacekeepers actually do on the ground. As was mentioned above, peacekeepers are expected to behave impartially, and not put their own oar into local political waters. Much is made of this point in the discussion of peacekeeping, and rightly so. But it may all too easily (and misleadingly) be assumed that this is the end of the story.

The third factor is a combination of the historical and the political. The concept of peacekeeping arose not long after the UN had mounted its first peacekeeping force -- the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) which went to Suez, Sinai, and the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the invasion of Egypt by the UK, France, and Israel in 1956. The establishment of this Force was widely welcomed, and its smooth, non-controversial operation led to the perception that political elements were not involved in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping activity could be left in the hands of the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld -- hence the phrase, "Leave it to Dag."

This, however, is an inadequate view of politics. True, politics usually does involve controversy, but not always. Sometimes usually varying political views will converge in agreement on an end or a means. Such agreement, however, does not mean that the policy in question thereby becomes non-political. It is simply non-controversial, and no more.

In fact, with the establishment of the UN's operation in the Congo in 1960, certain aspects of its peacekeeping work did become very controversial. But this seemed largely to have been forgotten when, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the end of the Cold War heralded a remarkable upsurge in UN peacekeeping. Again, there was a considerable and rather uncritical enthusiasm for peacekeeping. Expectations were high. It seemed to be thought that the activity was, by virtue of its then non-controversial nature, in a different category to politics. At present, however, the issue has been brought back to earth through the development of disputation about it — and also by the associated difficulties experienced by peacekeepers on the ground. Now, in the autumn of 1994, there is perhaps less danger than there has been for some time that the political aspects of peacekeeping will be overlooked.

The Provision of Peacekeepers

One respect in which the political character of peacekeeping is very marked has to do with its instrumental nature; that is to say, the large decisions which from time to time need to be taken about the establishment and maintenance of a peacekeeping mission will be an expression of the political purposes of the relevant states. Correspondingly, individual states will withdraw their support from a mission if it comes to be seen as undesirable or as an obstruction to their policies. This is made evident in three different ways.

a) Mandates

The first concerns the establishment and extension of peacekeeping operations. These operations are authorized by states, usually in their capacity as members of an international organization, usually the UN's Security Council. In taking these decisions, the relevant states will in effect be recording that in their several views it is desirable that such action should be taken. Thus, in the case of the UN's first peacekeeping force (which, as

it happens, was set up not by the Council but by the UN General Assembly), most states were, while expressing their disapproval of the assault on Egypt, also indicating their desire that the aggressors should be afforded a face-saving mode of retreat. Likewise, the Council's 1978 decision to involve the UN in Namibia's assumption of sovereign statehood, and in the eventual implementation of that decision a decade later, was an expression of the opposition of the Council's members to South Africa's continued rule over the territory.

Correspondingly, it cannot be expected that the Council would set up, or continue, a peacekeeping mission in circumstances where its members (or even just one veto-wielding member) oppose this. An example of this was the Council's failure, after the signing of the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, to keep the UN's Second Emergency Force in existence

b) Finance

States have to supply the funds needed to establish a peacekeeping operation and keep it going. In the case of the UN, the purse-strings are held by the General Assembly. There is no case to date of the Assembly's refusing to authorize the finances for an operation which has been set up by the Security Council (but it ought not to be assumed that there will never be such a case). However, authorization emanating from a majority vote is one thing; actual payment is another, though UN members are legally obliged to pay up once the Assembly has acted.

There are many non-political reasons for states to delay paying their peacekeeping bills, but it is also possible that they may refuse to contribute financially to particular operations because they disapprove of them politically. The Soviet Union took this view of the UN's first two peacekeeping forces, as France did of the second. For a decade after China's seat in the UN was occupied by the Communist regime, that state refused to have anything to do with peacekeeping, and hence ignored the arrival of peacekeeping invoices. The United States has in the last decade defaulted substantially on payments for the UN Force in southern Lebanon. One may also assume that if a state pays for a peacekeeping operation, it is at least not strongly opposed to it. Here too, therefore, political factors

influence national decision-making processes, thus demonstrating that peacekeeping cannot be divorced from political considerations.

c) Personnel

States may also decide to provide, or not to provide, peacekeeping personnel for similar reasons. Just as the UN does not have an independent source of finance, neither does it have an army of its own (nor, despite suggestions to that effect, is such an arrangement likely to be made in the foreseeable future). The UN must therefore look to its member states for personnel. In deciding whether to grant such a request, an individual state may be influenced by factors which, while essentially political, have little to do with peacekeeping. It will, for example, consider the benefit to its armed forces of peacekeeping experience, and, hence, the impact of such a role on the state's international standing.

A state will only provide military personnel, however, if it is not opposed to the object of the particular peacekeeping enterprise. And it may actually be anxious to respond if an operation is seen as serving some national purpose, whether specific or general. It is, for example, notable that it was certain small-to-middle powers, such as the Nordic states and Canada, that were virtually ever-present in UN peacekeeping during the Cold War period. Even more than most states, they had (and have) a keen interest in international stability, which is peacekeeping's most general, and most fundamental, contribution to the international scene. More specifically, it may be noted how, early in 1994 and at a time when the Bosnian Serbs were under considerable diplomatic pressure, Russia moved some of her troops serving with the UN Force in Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was widely seen as an expression of Russia's traditional Slavic support for the Serbs (although, from the Bosnian Serb perspective, things did not work out quite as they would have wished).

Conversely, a state may withdraw its contingent if the peacekeeping force in question is judged to be diverging from a desirable political course, or if continued participation is thought to be contrary to its national interest (perhaps because of worry about adverse political repercussions at home). The UN Force in the Congo (now Zaire) in the early 1960s ran into this sort of trouble. The removal from power of the left-wing prime minister was judged by some states, with reason, to have been at least facilitated by

those in charge of the UN operation; similar allegations were later made regarding his violent death. This led a number of states to threaten to withdraw their contingents, and several did so. Correspondingly, the withdrawal in 1993 of the United States and other Western states from the UN operation in Somalia reflected the view that it was no longer in their interest to participate. And, towards the end of 1994, some European states appear to be contemplating withdrawal from the UN Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina should arms begin to flow to the Bosnian government, their fear being that their troops will be unacceptably endangered by an escalation of the armed conflict.

Behaviour on the Ground

When a contingent of troops from a particular state is placed in a peacekeeping force, it comes under the command of the body which has established the force, such as the UN. But national ties cannot, as a practical matter, be doffed and donned like a coat or a hat. The troops in question remain under national discipline; they continue to receive their pay from their state; an officer's promotion will depend on how he is viewed by his national authorities. Thus, for a number of reasons, close links will necessarily be maintained with the home state. Not surprisingly, suspicions may arise that these channels are carrying more than non-political communications; or, to put it more bluntly, it may be thought that a contingent is being used by its state to advance specific national purposes. Furthermore, the behaviour of contingents may reflect well-established national attitudes towards certain political issues.

A host state will be very conscious of these possibilities. In principle, it has no veto over the composition of a peacekeeping force. But in practice it certainly does — and with good reason, for peacekeeping depends on the cooperation of the host, who could make life intolerable for a disliked contingent. In turn, this could jeopardize the prospects for the whole peacekeeping mission. Accordingly, those responsible for the raising of such a force take care to ensure that the host is agreeable to the nationality of its component parts, and, conversely, will not include any to which firm opposition is expressed. This problem was encountered by the UN with its very first peacekeeping force, when Egypt was very unhappy about the planned inclusion of Canadian infantrymen — because they looked and were named suspiciously like the British troops they were, in part, to replace.

Thirty years later, South Africa prevented a contingent from Sweden -- the almost archetypal peacekeeper -- from being included in the UN operation in Namibia. Here it was Sweden's perennial sympathy with the anti-apartheid movement which caused South Africa to doubt the ability of troops from that state to be impartial.

Such circumspection, however, is not proof against the subsequent emergence of problems on the ground. The fluidity of politics may result in a once-approved national contingent's losing favour with the ruling authorities. Even a handful of US military observers in Kashmir (members of a UN observer group) was found by India to be too much in the 1950s after Pakistan had joined the western alliance system. Or it may be that the sponsoring organization gets edgy about the behaviour of some of its contingents. In the Congo in the early 1960s there was a well-founded suspicion that certain nationalities in the UN Force were trying to play a hand in the local political scene, and, for that reason were closer to their countries' ambassadors than to the UN Command. But it is not politically easy, in such circumstances, for the UN itself to send a contingent home. Thus, it is said to have long been recognized -- and accepted -- that one of the UN's contingents in its Force in southern Lebanon was more sympathetic to the operations of the Palestine Liberation Organization than it should have been. Those who wished to make this point referred to the battalion in question as "PLOBatt"!

The possibility of a contingent's hearkening more to its own state's policy than to the peacekeeping ethic is perhaps in direct proportion to the strength of the state from which it comes, especially if that state is one of the world's strongest. Such states tend to be receptive to the idea that they have a certain international mission, and become impatient if the work of this mission is obstructed. Moreover, they will have the wherewithal to try to do something about it. The behaviour in 1993 of the United States contingent in the UN Force in Somalia offers an instance of this. The apprehensions which were voiced in 1994 about the employment of Russians in the UN Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina were an expression of similar concerns. It may also be noted that in the 1970s and the 1980s the French contingent in Lebanon was, in effect, twice judged by the UN to have overstepped the peacekeeping mark.

In fact, and contrary to what has often been thought, the inclusion of large powers in a peacekeeping force may give rise to more difficulties than benefits. Certainly, a local faction may walk more warily in the presence of US troops than would be the case with troops from, say, Austria. But there is no guarantee of that. Moreover, it could be that nationals of a major power, or of a power that once had a major role in the area in question. introduce simply by virtue of their nationality an element of provocation. Additionally, the chance that such a power may decide to throw its weight around may make both the host and the sponsoring organization uneasy. If that actually occurs, all-round embarrassment may ensue. Thus, the non-UN Force that went to Lebanon in 1982 on a peacekeeping mission left in some disarray a couple of years later following the abandonment of peacekeeping principles by the US and French contingents. In Somalia a decade later, much the same thing happened, the United States again having become impatient with the restrictions of a peacekeeping role -- and then, once more, having to make a somewhat embarrassing withdrawal.

The Role of Officials

In theory, international officials, like national civil servants, simply carry out policies that have been set by their political masters. But within the state, things are sometimes not as simple as that. In the first place, the necessary task of interpretation of a mandate by contingent and force commanders may be influenced not just by mental and behavioural characteristics, but by a political element as well. There can be little doubt, for example, that the final military move against the secessionist Congolese Province of Katanga in 1962-63 (which, arguably, went beyond the bounds of peacekeeping) had something to do with the fact that Indian soldiers were in charge.

Civilian officials may also add something of a political input to a peacekeeping operation. Some believed -- once more, in the case of Katanga -- that it was the sensitivity of a UN official of Irish nationality to what he saw as neo-colonialism that contributed to the somewhat hasty policy that was followed by the UN Force in the fall of 1961. Shortly afterwards, the election of a Secretary-General of Asian nationality, in succession to one from western Europe, seems to have contributed significantly to the growing impatience of the UN Force with the white-backed secessionists in Katanga.

A further instance of the possible political role of the Secretary-General is to be found in the behaviour of the current incumbent, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In the matter of peacekeeping in Somalia and Rwanda, he has chivvied the members of the Security Council, and may well have helped to induce the tougher line that was temporarily taken in the former case. It may be thought that this line does not reflect well on the political acumen of those responsible for it. But to the extent that the Secretary-General is to be included in that company, it says something about that official's potential political influence.

It must not be concluded that officials have large possibilities open to them in this respect. It must also be remembered that responsibility for what the UN does lies ultimately with the member states. But it is also necessary not to forget that occasionally the UN may be reflecting the political views of those who are in its pay.

The Attitudes of Disputants

From the point of view of disputants, peacekeeping operations have unquestionable political significance. After all, a state's willingness to play host to peacekeepers is indicative of the judgment that to do so will in some way serve the national interest. It may well be a negative interest, to the extent that accepting a peacekeeping mission is not so much a means of advancing national purposes as the least of the evils facing the state in question. But it remains an interest, inasmuch as agreeing to a peacekeeping proposal is a less undesirable course than others which are on offer. Equally, the possibility that the potential host state has been pressed hard, and successfully, to accept international peacekeepers does not exclude that decision from the category of those that may further national policy. Again, the alternatives are all presumably worse. These observations apply equally to states whose cooperation is necessary for the mounting of a peacekeeping mission but who are not formally hosts to it, as well as to disputants that are not states.

It follows from these remarks that if a peacekeeping mission frustrates the host state's purposes or offends its sensitivities, that state may well, on the assumption that it has not given up its right to do so, withdraw its consent to the continued presence of the mission. Peacekeeping takes place by consent; and, in general, what has been given may be taken away.

Non-state disputants will also respond to the peacekeepers in the light of how their interests are affected by the ongoing operation.

a) Disputant States

The Force that emerged from the Suez crisis of 1956 is an excellent example of the political significance, for disputants, of peacekeeping. It enabled Britain and France to withdraw from their ill-fated enterprise without too much egg on their faces (and, indeed, gave rise to the claim of the British Prime Minister that his country deserved credit for having jolted the UN into the assumption of its proper responsibilities). Through the arrival of peacekeepers, Egypt was freed of the forces of the two European powers, and of Israel's, too. And Israel secured the benefits at least of a respite from cross-border incursions from Egypt and the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba to her shipping. In these ways the peacekeeping operation was of benefit to the policies of all who were involved in the affair. Not everyone won; but, in relation to their several predicaments, each of the disputants came out clutching some kind of prize.

Likewise, to take another example more or less at random, the UN operation that assisted Namibia's transition from a South African dependency to sovereign independence served the policies of all concerned — and handsomely at that. South Africa's relinquishing of what had become an incubus was eased; all the people of Namibia were, for the first time, given a voice about their future; and the whole process, which otherwise could have become exceedingly messy, was thereby facilitated.

If, however, the development of events makes the maintenance of an operation undesirable for the host state, its attitude to the operation will, naturally, change. A state is in the political business of looking after its own interests, and judges a peacekeeping mission in that light. Thus, when in 1967 President Nasser of Egypt decided to live dangerously *vis-a-vis* Israel (at least partly because of taunts that he was allowing the presence of the UN Emergency Force to dampen his pan-Arab and anti-Israeli ardour), he asked that the Force be withdrawn from the international frontier. This led to its complete withdrawal — and, in the event, a humiliating defeat for Egypt.

A somewhat similar scenario currently (November 1994) presents itself in Croatia, where the Government claims to be getting increasingly impatient

with the role of the UN Force with respect to Croatia's Serbian enclaves. It says, not for the first time, that unless the UN restores these areas to Croatian rule, it will withdraw its consent to the Force's presence. This situation is, in legal terms, somewhat complicated by the fact that the UN is assertedly operating in Croatia under Chapter VII of the Charter. In consequence, Croatia (as a UN member) is obliged to honour the UN's decisions. In other words, its consent is no longer crucial for the UN's presence. It is also true that Croatia is not as well placed as a host state usually is to make life uncomfortable for peacekeepers, as it does not control their area of operation. But it is perhaps doubtful whether the UN would insist on its rights if Croatia seemed determined to assert itself. The organization -- and more particularly the relevant contributor states -- would not want to get caught up in an outright Croatian assault on the Serbian enclaves.

b) Non-State Actors

These observations are no less applicable to non-state disputants' attitudes to a peacekeeping mission. Their approach will be guided by judgments about the peacekeepers' impact on their goals. If what the mission does has the effect of furthering these goals, or at least of not obstructing them, cooperation may be extended to it. But if the mission gets in the way of what such an actor wishes to achieve, it is only to be expected that the actor will cease to cooperate, and may even become openly hostile to the peacekeepers. Indeed, the likelihood of a non-state actor so behaving is probably greater than in the case of a sovereign state, for, with no international standing, such a body may well be less concerned about honouring an agreement (a ceasefire agreement, for example) than a state would be, or about showing respect to the representatives of the world organization. Without a stake in the society of states, its behaviour towards that society can, in general terms, be relatively untrammelled.

Two other points deserve mention in this respect. Each of them applies to a government involved in an internal conflict with a non-state actor. But they perhaps apply with even greater force to the latter, as the body trying to engineer a fundamental political change. The first point relates to the possible fluidity of the conflict. Politics is, almost definitionally, a volatile affair, and this characteristic may well be reflected in an internal dispute which, for one reason or another, has attracted peacekeeping attention. The

balance of advantage may change frequently, and, with it, the assessments made of the worth (to the side making the assessment) of the peacekeepers. In one month they may be seen as helping the government's challenger; in the next, not. Its attitude to them will fluctuate accordingly.

The second point is that the struggle taking place is likely to be particularly intense. What is at stake is the seat of government, with all the power, perks, and prestige which that prize probably carries. What is going on is therefore, politically and perhaps even literally speaking, a life-and-death matter. In these circumstances a non-state actor, like the governing group, but perhaps more so because of the likelihood of a charge of treason should it fail, is not easily going to allow its activities to be frustrated by mere peacekeepers.

The manner in which a peacekeeping mission can in these ways get caught up in an internal political maelstrom is very evident in the current tribulations of the UN Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are more than echoes here of the UN's problems in the Congo in the early 1960s. The attitude of the Khmer Rouge to the UN operation in Cambodia in 1992-93, and of UNITA to the operation in Angola at the same time, and since, is also comparable. And, in a somewhat different type of context, the difficulties faced by the UN Force in southern Lebanon over the years, first with the PLO and then with the Islamic resistance groups - Amal and, especially, Hezbollah - are symptomatic of the same basic phenomenon. An internal political conflict may well be particularly bitter. The life of a UN force trying to keep the peace in such a conflict will be correspondingly hard.

The Independent Impact of Peacekeeping

Thus far, this discussion of the ways in which peacekeeping is inextricably bound up with politics has concentrated on the relatively passive, or secondary, nature of the activity. Peacekeeping depends for any success it may have on the cooperation of a variety of states, especially the parties to the dispute in question and, very importantly, the host. In major respects, therefore, a peacekeeping mission does not make an independent input to the situation to which it has been despatched. In the end, it depends on the behaviour of others.

But that may not be the whole story. Even in relation to an internal conflict, if there is sufficient cooperation from all concerned, peacekeepers

may have a marginal deterrent effect on promise breaking activity. The state in question, and perhaps also the non-state disputants, may have reasons of their own for wishing to be seen as playing fair, in which case the presence of peacekeepers will create an additional barrier to improper behaviour. In the absence of an impartial watching eye, temptations may occur to cut a corner here, to do something dubious there, notwithstanding the overall intention to honour the agreement that may have been made. With such a watcher present, there will be an additional incentive to keep more to the straight and narrow. To that extent, therefore, the freedom of action of the internal disputants may be limited by the peacekeeping body.

Such a consideration may well have assisted the smooth departure of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in the late 1980s and the equally-smooth departure of Cuban troops from Angola at about the same time. It was almost certainly present in respect of South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia, and may even have been influential in Cambodia a couple of years ago.

With regard to peacekeeping operations at a border, peacekeeping's deterrent factor is almost always present to some degree. Of course, if one of the parties is determined to march straight through the peacekeepers' positions, there is virtually nothing they can do about it. Peacekeepers have occasionally experienced this indignity. But there are many other occasions when political calculations are less stark. In these circumstances, a UN border operation, particularly a force which has an exclusive operational area -- such as the UN Force in Cyprus since 1974 and the UN Disengagement Observer Force between Israel and Syria since the same date - may assume something in the nature of an independent deterrent life of its own. The states on either side of it are likely to impress their front-line forces with the need for tight discipline, as they will not wish to have an accusing finger pointed at them by an impartial body. They will probably think several times before authorizing a land raid on the other side, given that this will involve passing through the peacekeepers' lines and hence will have adverse diplomatic repercussions, relative to the UN itself and to the states from which the peacekeepers come. Such a move will also involve, on the part of the host state, a breach of its agreement with the UN.

Of course, there are still going to be problems between the peacekeepers and the disputing parties, especially when the latter test (as

they frequently do) the vigilance and resolve of newly arrived observers and contingents. But generally, and for as long as the disputants are anxious to avoid armed conflict, a peacekeeping body encourages them to take extra care to ensure that their behaviour is not open to unnecessary criticism. In these ways their political freedom is additionally constrained by a peacekeeping watch on a potentially troublesome border.

Conclusions

These last remarks point to peacekeeping's considerable worth. Provided that the disputants are anxious to avoid a resort to arms, or to implement a peace agreement, peacekeepers can assist valuably in the achievement of these ends. This may be so even in respect of internal conflicts, which are generally more fraught than tense situations at a border. Indeed, peacekeeping help may sometimes be essential if internal disputants are to make any progress towards resolution. Notwithstanding the best will in the world on the part of leaders, internal tensions can easily flare up at a local level, and may sometimes carry the leadership with them. Here, impartial third parties may be able to exercise a calming influence. It is, for example, hard to see how the peace could have been kept in Cyprus between 1964 and 1974 without the presence of the UN Force. Similarly, South Africa's departure from Namibia in the late 1980s could easily have gone dramatically off the rails had not UN peacekeepers been present in numbers

Such contributions to peace are a reflection of the peacekeepers' impartiality. As emphasised at the start of these remarks, this is the fundamental requirement of peacekeeping. But while peacekeeping is in this sense a non-political activity, this must not obscure the fact that it has its being, at more than one level, in a political context. For a full understanding of the nature of peacekeeping, therefore, it is necessary always to be aware of the influence of its political associations. Peacekeeping emerges out of politics, even in cases where these politics are non-controversial. Its operation on the ground may, through national contingents and officials, be influenced by politics. It will certainly be seen by disputants in a political light. And it may have an independent impact on the local political scene. The maintenance of operational impartiality in politically infused situations is no mean feat, and it is to the credit of modern peacekeeping to date that this impartiality has been so well and so generally achieved.

The Role of Police Forces in International Peacekeeping

When the organizers of this seminar first contacted the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to have someone come and address the topic of peacekeeping, I was somewhat hesitant for a few reasons. First of all, the RCMP has really had very little experience in this area. Secondly, we are not really peacekeepers but rather monitors, trainers, or helpers under the greater umbrella of peacekeeping. The last reason was that I knew my Commissioner would probably use his usual system of getting volunteers, and say, "Deputy, you are volunteering, are you not?" So, here I am, though I want to make clear that I am far from being an expert on the subject. However, when you talk about civilian police monitors, you soon realize that there are not too many of them that are experts.

What I would like to do is share some of the limited experiences we have had as UN civilian police monitors and how as a police organization we are able, or attempting, to cope with the rather unusual tasks and problems and difficulties that arise as a result of our involvement.

From the historical perspective, the RCMP came into being in 1870. It is therefore a very young Force compared to many other countries' police forces. It was first known as the Northwest Mounted Police,

Deputy Commissioner Beaulac is a 32-year veteran of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who has specialized both in criminal investigation, international policing, and in training, staffing, recruiting and other matters of human resources.

then the Royal Northwest Mounted Police, and finally it became what it is today, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Our early role was to ensure peaceful settlement of the Canadian West, to prevent crime, to establish friendly relations with Canada's aboriginal people, to see to the containment of whisky traders (some of you may say we cannot have been very successful as we are still trying to get a handle on this practice, not only within our own borders, but across borders as well), to promote peacekeeping between new European settlers and the First-Nation Police, and to supervise treaties between First-Nation people and the Canadian government. There are many similarities between these early mandates and those of today's civilian police monitors. The RCMP is responsible for policing in all provinces and territories in Canada with the exception of Ontario and Quebec, each of which has its own provincial police force. Some cities and towns have municipal police forces; however, the RCMP contracts with some 200 municipalities for municipal police services. This does cause a problem when we seek to release personnel for United Nation duties.

You can see, then, that the RCMP is the sole three-level Police Force in many areas, acting federally, provincially, and municipally. For example, in the city of Burnaby, British Columbia, we are, at one and the same time, the federal, the provincial, and the municipal police force. However, in cities such as Montreal and Toronto, we function solely as a federal force, seeing to such matters as drug enforcement, immigration, customs, and many others. Provincially, we investigate economic crimes, enforce the Criminal Code of Canada, monitor traffic offenses, provincial statutes, and so on. In municipalities we act as a local police force, enforcing all applicable federal, provincial and municipal statutes.

At present the RCMP's total establishment is approximately 22,300, of which approximately 17,000 are regular uniformed members. Civilian members, who are specialists, scientists, lab technicians, and so on, number approximately 2,200, and public service employees, who are support staff, are approximately 3,800 in number. Organizationally, Canada is divided into 13 divisions followed by 52 sub-divisions and some 723 detachments across the country. Although a 22,000-force establishment appears quite heavy at the outset, when you spread the members from coast to coast, it does not appear to be so numerous.

All our members undergo basic training at our RCMP Academy in Regina, Saskatchewan. All regular members of the force start from the bottom and progress through the ranks. Our basic cadet training lasts 26 weeks, and is offered to men and women in both official languages, French and English. After successfully completing the six months training at the Academy, members are posted throughout Canada to various detachments and are required to work under the close supervision of the detachment commander. The entire cadet training lasts one year, and is followed by an additional year of probation.

Throughout its history, Canada and its armed forces have developed a worldwide reputation as world leaders in the field of peacekeeping. When the United Nations identified a need for civilian police peacekeepers, it was only natural that Canada would be called upon to provide trained civilian police-officers to carry out the fine tradition previously established by the Canadian military. The RCMP, as Canada's national police force, was called upon to provide peacekeepers in the form of civilian police monitors and trainers in Namibia during the late 1980s. Since then we have participated in the Former Yugoslavia, and now in Haiti.

To date, our peacekeeping duties have always fallen under the auspices of the United Nations. These duties require our members to take on the role of civilian police monitors, human rights supervisors, and humanitarian and refugee workers, as well as many other duties. In Namibia's UNTAG mission, we committed 100 police officers to oversee the elections, and also continued to provide some training following the elections. In the Former Yugoslavia, we became involved in 1992, at the beginning, and to the present time we have supplied some 200 police officers for that area. As of December of this year, we will be sending our seventh contingent for duty to the Former Yugoslavia. In Haiti, we have promised the United Nations approximately 100 monitors and a further 25 police officers to work with the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program, which is better known as ICITAP. At present, we have 13 members that were deployed to Haiti as an advance team before the assumption of the mission. We also have 15 of the trainers that I just spoke about, that are already onsite. We are in the process of providing basic police training at our Academy to 100 Haitian expatriates selected by the Haitian government to become police officers in their country.

Generally, volunteers for today's peacekeeping duties are recruited from all parts of Canada. Members, in most cases, are unarmed, experienced police officers. Prior to departure, contingent members participate in six days of briefings by military and RCMP personnel on such matters as mine awareness, officer survival, post-traumatic stress, and medical safety, to mention a few. Once members arrive in the theatre of operation, they are deployed to different police stations or detachments throughout the area. They work hand-in-hand with civilian police from other contributing countries, functioning under the constant direction of the United Nations while on the mission. Most mission postings are for a six-month period, and I should mention that this is a Canadian decision, because normally the UN requires police officers to serve for a one-year period.

Our police officers are basically involved in monitoring duties. Civilian police monitors may be called upon to provide training to the host country's police force; there is a very high need in this area for both human and material resources. They may monitor the everyday activities of the host country's force -- obviously this is easier to accomplish in some areas than in others, depending on the local situation. They may monitor human rights issues, report any infringements to the United Nations, supervise elections, oversee humanitarian and refugee relief efforts, as well as prevent the use of violence and abuse against individuals or groups -- again, a very difficult task for civilian police officers, who have very little legal authority with which to enforce laws

Selection standards vary depending on the mission. There may be specific requirements -- certain languages, or experience in special tasks. Performance criteria are established by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police staffing and personnel department; we have our own criteria of selection, and these are modified after consultation with contingent commanders following advance party recommendations and the requirements of specific missions. The performance criteria include a high level of maturity and selfconfidence, demonstrated leadership abilities, and family stability. We also expect them to be in good physical and emotional condition, with a good performance record and a minimum of five years' experience in policing operations. Any service attitude problems could be cause for rejection. We need people with strong positive attitudes to do the work that is required in peacekeeping missions.

Our UN civilian police logistics unit was recently created in Ottawa to come to grips with the needs of our police officers while in theatre. The unit maintains a link between the contingent personnel and their families, and sees to the needs of the members in the field of operations, including Force psychologists and senior officers who visit personnel in the mission area. The logistics unit also provides follow-up assistance to members once they have returned from the mission. We are experiencing problems in trying to meet the demand for qualified volunteers for international police monitoring duties while at the same time satisfying the need for police resources in the municipalities and provinces we serve. We are particularly concerned with providing our police officers with the necessary training to prepare them adequately to assume their roles as police monitors in foreign environments.

Ensuring that policing needs back home are not affected or forgotten is probably one of our biggest problems. We are about to make a presentation to the government to try and set up a system that will allow us to replace members that are serving overseas or in other countries. When a municipality has a contract for policing for X number of personnel, and we take a certain percentage of this for United Nation duties, there is a void left back home. We are therefore suggesting to our political leaders that they set up some sort of a buffer, some sort of a group of trained volunteers, that would be surplus to our establishment throughout the country and would be always ready to fill the needs of the United Nations; a sort of pool that we could use without bothering municipal or provincial government authorities.

I think this is very important because not only is Canada suffering from a shortage of police, but so are many other countries. The presence of foreign police authority is, in my opinion, less intrusive; it could be, therefore, that in the future we may see more involvement by civilian police organizations in peacekeeping as monitors. There is no question that the RCMP's primary responsibility is to Canada and to Canadians, but Canada's historical reputation is such that we have been asked to provide members of the RCMP for UN work, and I expect this to continue.

Sally Armstrong

The Role of the Media in Peacekeeping

As peacekeepers, you have found yourselves in the spotlight. A spotlight most of you do not like. A spotlight that will not go away. You are hot right now. You have become the world cops. You are managing against all odds -- I mean ALL odds -- to keep some sort of order in the post-Cold War chaos.

Remember when reasonable people presumed that the end of the Cold War would mean peace in places like Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe? We could not have been more wrong. The consequences -- a collection of perilous pot-boilers -- have been placed on your shoulders. And you therefore have the dubious distinction of being on centre-stage.

Sometimes the glare of the spotlight is too hot, and accusations and recriminations start to fly between the military and the media. You question the role of the media and wonder whether our presence adds to your problems. Well, we have known ever since Louis Pasteur turned on the light in his lab that when something is put under scrutiny, there is going to be change -- and news!

We also know that when people are aware that their actions and reactions are going to be observed and reported, the public is better served.

Ms. Armstrong is the Editor-in-Chief of Homemaker's Magazine, Canada's largest circulation magazine. She recently wrote an award-winning article on peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia.

The public used to be able to say "I did not know." Famines in China, wars in central Africa, and nasty government policies all over the world went on because there simply was not a way to transmit photos, footage, facts and quotes to the world. Then CNN moved into our living rooms and now we know. If the reaction of our 1.6 million readers to the global village stories we do at *Homemaker's* is any measure, people want to know more. These are riveting stories in which you as peacekeepers find yourselves in the middle.

This is peacekeeping at its best and its most confounding. You have inherited pieces of the earth that are soaked with centuries of conflict. Blue beret missions give way to blue helmet strife before the ink even dries on the request from the United Nations to bring your troops to these places. The mandates are invariably not do-able. Politicians invariably use you to further their own political careers. Your job is tough, frustrating, dangerous.

That makes for great stories for journalists. For some reasons, we do not get to tell those stories easily. There is an adversarial role between us. One commanding officer even told me the media is considered part of the enemy package because he said: "You present things we do not want you to present in terms we would not use."

Ever since Hannibal came over the mountains, the generals have wanted to keep their thumbs on the messengers. In the Second World War, the media even wore uniforms and submitted their copy for censoring. Photographers were actually in the service. In Vietnam, the generals were still in charge of the media — although the media did not like to acknowledge that. There was very little free reign. In fact, the media would be told to be on the bus at 7:30 a.m., and "we will drive you to the front." The Gulf War was the same thing. Whenever you see 1,200 reporters turning up to a press conference you know someone has put a fence around them, that they cannot get out to the action they want to cover. You could have covered that war from a condominium in the Caribbean. Not any more. Somalia, Bosnia are the new world in peacekeeping and conflict coverage. You need a new policy to cope with that. Perhaps we do too.

I sometimes think you have not realized how much a part of the story peacekeeping really is. In fact, last night at the Authors Awards in Canada, two of the eight prizes given out were for stories about the military. You are

in the midst of the fighting, the misery, the confusion. You are living through the changing face of peacekeeping. You are setting new rules and learning each day from the confounding conflicts that surround you. You are at the centre of the biggest stories in the world. And there is not much evidence to say that is going to change in the near future.

The media has no role in your work as peacekeepers. We are there to record the events and let our listeners, viewers, readers know what's going on. In the course of that reporting, peacekeepers will also come under scrutiny. Your actions and reactions may or may not become the news of the day.

I have an example. In Pakraz in 1992, I was covering a story about refugee families trying to return to their homes. I thought families were being returned to this particular town on this particular day. A Canadian peacekeeper walked with me down the smashed main street. As it turns out, we were in the wrong place -- at the wrong time. Suddenly we were surrounded by paramilitaries. They were enraged that I was there -- who knows why? When they demanded that I go with them, this young man from Calgary stepped in beside me as though we were joined at the hip. He did not yell or boast or behave boldly. He simply stood his ground and did not speak a word. When the paramilitaries screamed at me to move forward, he moved in lockstep with me. After what seemed like an eternity, they told me in language that would have burned my mother's ears -- to get lost. The peacekeeper and I walked away. It was very clear to me that they had decided they did not want to have to deal with the peacekeeper so they let me go. The bottom line is: this young man from Calgary knew what to do. He was trained. He was disciplined. He was a pro. I was not only relieved. I was proud of him.

But a single criticism in the media makes you gun-shy. If you were to gather up all the stories written about this conflict, I think you would find peacekeeping has been given a huge amount of very positive attention.

One of the major problems I see is a mix-up between public relations -your job -- and the reporting -- our job. It is not our job to sell your program. If you want to do that you would have to take advertising space just as Health Canada does. Or put out special editions as Travel Canada does to get your point across. It is our job to find stories that engage our readers. In the case of stories that involve peacekeepers we need to observe what you do, to report the facts -- as accurately and as objectively as possible.

Remember, there is a new post-Watergate style of media that has spawned both the best and the worst of reporters. There is better investigative journalism than ever before. There are also a lot of journalists who hope to blow a whistle -- any whistle, often with little regard for the facts and in a harsh intemperate style -- and become a star à la Woodward and Bernstein. That makes your job even more difficult. Frankly, it makes our job difficult too. As a result of being burned a few times, most of you do not trust the media and use policies that make our jobs more difficult.

The UN does not want the media there and has instructed the peacekeepers not to tell anything to media representatives. In Sarajevo one morning, the man giving the daily briefing to journalists said: "The ceasefire is holding." Thirty minutes earlier at the Holiday Inn, we could hardly hear each other for the noise of rocket-propelled grenades falling.

- You claim we get everything wrong. We claim you do not tell us the truth.
- You say we travel in packs and transmit one story -- perhaps not the one that best describes the situation -- all over the world. We claim you do not let us get to the places we need to reach. There is a ban on travelling in UN vehicles (except for the shuttle from the Sarajevo airport into town), and a ban on using UN communications.
- You say we are not sensitive enough even to learn your titles. Let me tell you about my first assignment in the Former Yugoslavia. A peacekeeper had set up an interview for me with a family he had come to know. He had heard the name of my magazine, and told a woman who was barely keeping body and soul together in an apartment that had been shelled that I was here to get new recipes from her. Tell me about being sensitive!

A very senior person at DND told me that our job is to convince the Canadian taxpayer that spending all this money on peacekeeping is a good idea. That is not my job. That is the job of your public relations department. I would never subject my readers to that. But would I share a passionate

story of daring and caring and talent and risk in the hellholes of the world? Of course I would. That is where you are. That is what you are doing. So you are going to be at the top of a lot of story lists.

There are going to be some negative stories because like everyone else you are human. I certainly acknowledge the frustrations of misinformation, of insensitivities. But I believe there are ways to improve communications between us:

- More information on our part is a must. Press updates, facts and figure sheets handed out to every reporter who turns up on the scene are also helpful.
- The Canadian Journalism Foundation is very keen on improving communication between the media and various institutions. In a perfect world there would be a military beat, just as there is a finance beat, a health beat, and a foreign affairs beat. Reporters assigned to military stories would be expert in military affairs. This is not a perfect world, however, and budgets do not allow for that. The Foundation wants to arrange symposiums. I believe your organization does too. It is a step in the right direction.

It is also in our interest to stop warring with each other. The old adage about biting the hand that feeds you comes to mind. I will close with a story that reminds me over and over again of how far a bit of goodwill can go.

I was in the Persian Gulf to do a story on the women serving for the first time in a combat zone. I was assigned to HMCS Protecteur and was invited to join a helicopter crew that was going out on night patrol and practising refuelling in flight. The pilot explained that if I wanted to go I had to attend the briefing just like everyone else. At the briefing I was assigned a helmet and night-vision glasses — they were so heavy I had to keep propping my head up under the weight of the equipment. The pilot went through the drill about what would happen if the helicopter went down. "First of all," he said, "if we 'turtle', you need to right yourself, then find your way to the door. If there is a fire, you need to get your anti-flash gear on. Remember, if you have to jump into the Gulf, there are poisonous snakes. But the good news is that their mouths are very small, so cover your ears and fingers — like this — and you will be all right."

I was thinking, "Is this a joke? Assuming we survive the crash, assuming I can right myself, get the anti-flash gear on, dive through a fire-ball and find the door, I am not going to worry about poisonous snakes --- I will sink like a rock with this helmet on."

Then the pilot said, "Do not worry. We will probably have a very smooth flight. It will probably be such a quiet evening that you will be bored. In case that happens, I brought along reading material." With that he leaned over and unzipped the pocket on his flight suitcase and pulled out a copy of *Homemaker's Magazine*. You could have knocked me into the Gulf with a feather. His wife had sent him the magazine because he happened to like --you guessed it -- our recipes!

Now what do you suppose I would write about this well-read intellectual I met on my assignment in the Persian Gulf.

Naval Peacekeeping: Multinational Considerations

The naval community's apparent disinterest in "peacekeeping" should not be mistaken as disdain for those operations. On the contrary, the naval community has debated the topic widely from theoretical perspectives¹ and engaged in several such operations. What might seem as disinterest in the practical aspects of those operations stems from the fact that there are no precise or unique naval "peacekeeping" or even "peacemaking" roles. Rather, it is a case of using warships, submarines, naval auxiliaries, and maritime aircraft to support a broad range of UN and other multinational operations in much the same way they are used on national roles. My aim is to expand on that belief and also to delve more deeply into the practical aspects of multinational force planning.

Naval Forces

Naval force planning must take many factors into consideration, including: politics; command and control concepts; naval force structures and capabilities; and design trends in equipment, warships, and maritime aircraft. Effective force planning demands, among other things, detailed knowledge of both equipment and operations.

During the last 10-15 years most of the world's larger navies began to move away from the tradition of designing their ships and aircraft for a single

Commander (Retd) Haydon is a defence analyst with the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University in Halifax, NS, and a Senior Research Fellow of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies specializing in naval and maritime security issues.

purpose, such as air defence or antisubmarine operations, and adopt instead policies that made their fleets far more versatile. This trend from specialized to multipurpose forces is driven by technology and the proliferation of naval weaponry, especially missiles. As a result, the cost of maintaining modern naval forces is extremely high, to the point of being prohibitive for many countries. This led to a new hierarchy of sea power, based largely on technology.²

Global Order of Sea Power

The new order of sea power has three levels:3

- The first level is made up of the few navies able to *project power* and operate independently in most parts of the world. They maintain the full scope of naval capabilities including aircraft carriers, amphibious forces, and nuclear-powered submarines. They also have tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.
- The second level consists of a relatively small group of navies able to operate freely in the world's oceans either in multinational formations or in autonomous national task groups, and exercise sea control⁴ over large ocean areas. They have the equipment to enable them to cooperate with level one forces when necessary. Select units of smaller navies may also be able to cooperate at the higher level. There are also several navies who have the potential to take part in complex operations with equipment modernization and further training. Some navies are also able to deploy national task groups that could operate in general support of high-intensity operations.
- The third level consists of those navies that essentially have territorial roles and are designed to operate within their own territorial waters or, on a limited basis, in the 200 NM area of national jurisdiction.⁵ These navies have no political requirement to operate outside these boundaries or remain at sea for prolonged periods. Some of the smaller naval forces are more correctly categorized as coast guards or marine police forces.

In the form presented, the hierarchy does not take specialist forces into account. However, it is not unrealistic to assume that modernized fleets also

have up-to-date specialist forces, such as mine warfare. The hierarchy does not make separate provisions for proficiency or the general ability to work in a multinational formation, because these are short-term variables within navies whose structures are increasingly functions of technology. *Naval Operations*

How does this affect UN naval planning? The short answer is that individual ship capability is the driving force behind all but the most simple maritime operations because it establishes potential for effective cooperation. In simple terms, warships are the building blocks upon which a multinational naval force is built. To put this into a general framework, we need to start from the assumption that all naval operations have three fundamental elements: *surveillance*; *patrol*; and *response*.

- Surveillance is a term used to describe the gathering, collation, and evaluation of information to determine what is happening in a particular ocean area. It is the first step in any operation, and can be active or passive, overt or covert depending on the operational objective and resources available. Monitoring a maritime exclusion zone or the seaward part of a demilitarized zone, for instance, is best done overtly because it can deter a potential violator. A submarine exclusion zone, on the other hand, can be monitored passively by fixed or towed acoustic arrays, or even with sonobuoys though the latter method gets very expensive over a long period. The entire process of information gathering is technology-dependent. Essentially, the more modern the equipment, the fewer units needed to maintain full coverage.
- The patrol function establishes the presence of authority in an area. It can either be in conjunction with a surveillance task or as part of a graduated political response to an uncertain or deteriorating situation. In terms of intervention, the deployment of naval forces, either a single ship or a task group, is far less intrusive than the use of ground troops. Another factor is that warships have unique symbolic value. As legal extensions of their home states, warships can be used to send deliberate and clear diplomatic signals expressing a range of possible intentions from formal concern over the course of events to a show of support. A multinational task group can be used in the same way with considerable effect. However, for a warship to be an effective

instrument of diplomacy, it must be perceived as having the potential to intervene or influence events. This is not a new concept and has been practised for hundreds of years in one form or another, as clearly explained by Edward Luttwak and James Cable.⁶ And the concept of political use of sea power is as valid for coalitions as it is for a single nation state. For the presence of the warship or naval forces to be effective in a crisis situation those vessels must constitute a potential threat. Paper tigers have no diplomatic value.

In making a response to an incident or actually intervening in a situation, naval forces can deliberately offer violence to an aggressor or law-breaker. Offering violence does not necessarily mean that force is used, but it should be made quite clear that force could be used in the case of non-cooperation. In addition there are instances where ships can respond directly to a situation without using force, primarily by providing humanitarian assistance. However, most response requires the use of force or the intent to use force if necessary.

The key point about multi-ship operations is that they demand close cooperation, a high degree of professional training, the right equipment, and an on-scene commander with the authority to take the necessary action.

Naval Force Planning

From this discussion it should be clear that structuring a force for UN or other multinational operations at sea must follow the same planning procedures as for any other naval operation. Several authors⁷ have discussed force structuring issues but have not done so in sufficient detail to bring out the importance of that process or the fact that the success of an operation is invariably a function of the time and care spent in its planning. Those who are familiar with military planning will recognize the acronym SMEAC (Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration, and Coordination⁸) as the framework used for operational orders. It also provides an excellent framework for examining the various dimensions of multinational force structuring.

Describing the initial *situation* is almost entirely a political function in laying out the circumstances that warrant a collective military response, establishing the non-military criteria as well as the broad civil-military and operational concepts for the operation. In most UN responses, the Security Council Resolution should contain most, if not all, of the essential information and planning guidance. Thus, it becomes important that in drafting any resolution that requires the use of military forces, naval or otherwise, the Security Council have ready access to good military advice.

Mission

The *mission* is the translation of the political guidance into a concise and completely unambiguous statement of what the military force will do, when they will do it, and under what restrictions. Preparing the mission statement is without doubt one of the more difficult parts of the planning process for not only must it be precise in stating objectives and limitations, it must also be politically acceptable. There are those who argue that the criteria are mutually exclusive. If the political and military leaders cannot agree on what they want the military to do in a certain situation, then there is absolutely no value in deploying military forces. Thus, it is in this one area that multinational force planning is most likely to fail.

Sailors traditionally express their operational intentions in simple language and invariably with stark brevity. In the days of sail, for instance, it was not uncommon for a ship to be sailed for as long as three years with instructions of about 100 words that frequently only directed the Captain to "act in His Majesty's best interests..." Not only does this reflect the enormous degree of trust between politicians and senior naval officers of the day, but it also shows that warships are truly diplomats at large. While this latter principle has not changed significantly, that degree of trust no longer exists. To a considerable extent we can blame this on the fact that the quill pen was replaced first by morse code and later by satellite communication systems.

The tendency in civil control of the military today is to rely on direct communications rather than write good orders. This is the curse of the Space Age. As a result, military forces can be and often are deployed with less than precise instructions or without the commander having the full authority necessary to execute his mission. This invariably prejudices the effectiveness and sometimes the integrity of the operation. The lessons of history, naval and otherwise, clearly show that the force that is deployed under carefully crafted instructions has a greater chance of success than one forced to operate under poor orders or a less than adequate command structure. Although the chain of command and personalities have considerable effect on the outcome, it is the coherence of the instructions -- the mission statement -- that has the greatest impact on the end result.

Developing the mission statement thus becomes a key part of the planning for a multinational naval operation, as it does in any complex military venture. There can be absolutely no room for doubt in a commander's mind over what is expected of him. Writing that statement requires understanding not only of the capabilities of warships but also the character of the commanders at all levels.

This leads to the issues of who should lead a multinational force. This is not a simple issue. Captain Allison of the US Navy discusses the sovereignty issues associated with multinational command and the difficulties these can cause. The NATO experience, however, has shown that effective multinational command is possible. In NATO, command of the Standing Naval Force is rotational, and countries take great care in selecting their senior officer when their turn for force command comes. It is not unknown for a commander to be replaced quickly if he fails to live up to expectations. You simply cannot afford to appoint a commander of a multinational force on the basis of some political bargaining process or lottery, especially if that force is to undertake a dangerous or politically sensitive mission. Selection of the force commander has to transcend politics in a multinational situation.

In the end, the mission statement essentially becomes a contract between a commander and his political masters to undertake a specific operation, but the mission has to have the full support of the countries providing the actual forces.

Execution

One could write a book on the execution of missions. Time and space available in this paper permit only a review of the most important factors. In planning the execution of a mission many factors must be taken into consideration. These can be examined through a series of questions concerning command, tasking, and the limits of operations. Of those, the question: "How shall command be assigned?" is probably the key to success.

Command of a multinational force cannot, as I stated earlier, be a function of a political bargaining process. Yet that does not mean that it will not be a political appointment. Again, the history of such appointments clearly shows that they are intensely political and not always popular. A commander skilled in diplomacy can often smooth over some of the apprehensions of the politicians whose forces he will command, while a commander who is insensitive to those concerns will invariably increase the level of tension. This is one of the key lessons of the NATO experience. Under a good commander, a multinational force can become highly proficient.

One of the realities is that in some cases the assignment of forces to a multinational operation is conditional on approval of the command structure. There will be times when command will be conditional to certain countries taking or not taking part. The United States, for example, rarely allows its forces be commanded by foreign nationals. In this, Canada has been one of the exceptions, having taken command of US naval forces in NATO, in the bilateral defence of North America, and in the Persian Gulf in 1991. Also, where specialized forces (mine countermeasures, amphibious, etc.) are being provided, countries will be very specific on the acceptable command structure. In the end, the choice of commander will likely be a compromise unless major US units are taking part. That, simply, is the reality. However, for relatively low intensity or uncomplicated operations, the choice of commander will be less constrained by the political requirements of the larger naval powers.

The process of coalition building, which is how we should think of the way a multinational force is formed, also has the potential to be highly political. The reasons why particular countries want to join a specific

multinational operation are invariably political: national interests may be at stake, as some perceived in the Persian Gulf in 1990/91. It could simply be a case of altruism; or it might be that one country believes it has something to offer the collective capability. But here, one needs to be careful of perennial joiners, flippantly known as the Canadian disease, where it has become nationally impossible to refuse an opportunity to join a peacekeeping operation no matter where it is. 12

One of the more important factors is to match capabilities to the work that has to be done. It is here that a commander may face problems, particularly if his political masters have accepted offers of support without taking operational factors into consideration. In a multinational situation, one of the hardest things to do is to refuse an offer of help. But if a mission is to succeed, it may be necessary on occasion to decline a well meaning offer on the basis that including those forces or ships would create operational problems, especially in key areas such as communications. Compatibility is essential between units working together, especially if there is a risk of damage. ¹³ Let me bring these points together through some examples, both real and hypothetical.

- The Persian Gulf was an American show throughout. That was made quite clear when George Bush formed the coalition. However, when tactical decisions were made, it was remarkably simple to integrate national restrictions, such as that of several navies not to enter the Gulf itself, with capabilities and tasks. The net result was a highly effective multinational operation with some delegated tactical command. The authority of the US to lead was not challenged and the forces were assigned in the full knowledge that tasking would be done by the Americans in consultation with national detachment commanders. This region could well become a problem again. One has to wonder if we would be as successful next time.
- Command of operations in the Adriatic has also been delegated, this time to NATO. Because NATO has an established command and control structure and well proven tactical procedures, the operation is also a success. Again, I doubt that the UN could assume direct responsibility for that operation; the command and control system does not exist.

Operations in the Gulf of Fonseca, on the other hand, were simple to control and conduct. The Spanish-Argentine coalition worked well, aided to a great degree by the fact that the seagoing resources were provided by Argentina. The command system, the resources and the procedures could be tailored to the situation. Because it was relatively simple it had a very low political profile, which increased the potential for success, yet

there were financial problems. 15

- If it becomes necessary to put a UN naval force in the South China Sea as a signal of UN concern or as a deterrent, building an appropriate coalition will not be easy because of the naval potential that could become embroiled in any large scale dispute in those waters a situation that is not being helped by the growth of naval power in the region. Essentially, a UN force would be absolutely meaningless without American, British and French participation. A coalition of other navies would have virtually no coercive value. A small force would be little more than observers and might even run the risk of becoming hostages rather than acting as a deterrent.
- The last example I want to use is that of a sea mine clearance operation -- the location is not relevant at the moment, but plenty of possibilities exist. This would be a far more complex operation that the Gulf of Fonseca, but with less of the political dynamics than either the Persian Gulf or the Adriatic. However, such an operation would require specialist skills that are only maintained in a limited number of navies, mainly European. Could such an operation be completely controlled by the UN? Again, I suspect not.

One of the more frequent complaints of UN operations has been the lack of precision in UN planning, particularly in defining the duration of the operation. In fairness, though, the military objectives of Chapter VI and VII operations cannot always be specified to the level of detail military planners would like. Nevertheless, time will always be a major consideration in naval planning. Unlike forces assigned to national security tasks, which are not constrained by time, those on UN tasks are necessarily time-limited simply because of the relative lack of importance of that tasking. Unless national interests are involved, most major maritime powers are reluctant to assign their naval units to the UN for any length of time. Much of this reflects concern over the UN's ability to plan and control complex operations.

A case could be made for a standing (non-specialist) UN naval force, but the reality of the situation is that it would take a great deal of time, perhaps 5-10 years, to create a multinational naval force independent of NATO that has the necessary tactical credibility. To produce that force, some countries would have to be prepared to modify their ships to common standards in a wide range of equipment including communications, datalinks, and replenishment at sea. Another major problem will be the adoption of common tactical procedures. The Russians, for instance, have been calling for NATO to provide everyone with their basic tactical handbooks -- Allied Tactical Publications. This has a certain irony, but makes some sense because they are tested and effective procedures. However, the Russian and other navies so inclined should not assume that they can merely pick up the book and assume that the procedures will work. Some practice -- extensive practice in fact -- is needed first.

Admittedly, my concept of multinational cooperation differs greatly from that proposed by Derek Boothby, ¹⁸ whereby "Multinational naval cooperation should be addressed on a regional and subregional basis, preferably in low key meetings." His concept is largely symbolic, perhaps even a confidence-building measure, rather than a useful naval formation that can apply sea power in the collective interest. Michael Pugh's concept of multinational forces exploits the capabilities of specialist forces and generally envisages naval forces operating collectively at the lower end of the conflict scale. ¹⁹

One of the concerns I have over the concept of standing naval forces is the potential for misemployment. The question one has to ask is: What is the purpose of such a standing force? Much of the purpose and value of the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic was political. It was simply a form of gunboat diplomacy focused on one potential adversary as a clear signal of allied solidarity. Whether it would have been as effective in the face of escalation we shall never know. However, in the Adriatic today, that force is proving its effectiveness and that the concept works. The symbolism of an effective multinational naval force is considerable and should not be overlooked.

Could a UN standing naval force work? That is a good question. As we move even more deeply into a maritime era in which *security* is writ large, ²⁰ especially under a Law of the Sea that has become a part of international law, quite a strong case could be made for UN naval forces in a number of

areas of potential dispute and conflict, as Gwyn Prins argues.21 He sees a standing UN naval force as a lightly-armed formation emphasizing national diversity rather than potential capability. Michael Vlahos, 22 on the other hand, envisages a far more powerful force, or forces, anchored on a US Navy carrier battle group to be committed only to the high risk confrontations as a display of purposeful or expressive force23 and as the means of enforcing law and order. What Vlahos' concept really amounts to is pax americana. Somewhere between the two extremes a realistic alternative must exist. Who is to say, for instance, that the South China Sea will not become an area of dispute? There are other parts of the world where boundaries are unclear and states may lay claim to new ocean domains forcefully. The South Atlantic, the Aegean, the Persian Gulf, or the Gulf of Guinea could easily be the venue of violence in the future. It might become necessary to put a naval force into one of those regions to monitor the situation, establish a physical presence in the area, and be prepared to respond to an incident if necessary.

The point about gunboat diplomacy (and let us not be afraid to use that term because it is very descriptive) is that the force must be tactically credible or it will not be seen as a deterrent. The NATO Standing Naval Force was backed up by the massed naval power of NATO, especially that of the United States. Could such guarantees be obtained by the Security Council for an operation in the Aegean or South China Sea? I very much doubt it. For smaller, less-political joint ventures such as the Gulf of Fonseca or a mine clearance operation it is much easier to form a coalition because the political risk to members of the partnership is far less. The conclusion is simple: the more naval capability needed for a specific operation, the higher the political price to be paid. The temptation, for the UN, may be to try to form coalitions from less experienced and less capable naval forces. The offers are there and altruism can run rampant, but failure is more likely and the price of that failure could be much higher.

The last issue I want to raise in this discussion of executing naval missions is rules of engagement. Far too few people understand the concept of rules of engagement, particularly the fact that they epitomize the way in which civil control of the military is exercised. Let me explain. The Captain of the 18th century warship, introduced earlier, had but a single rule of engagement: act in His Majesty's best interests. Today, the NATO naval rules contain something close to 100 different criteria to control the way naval forces respond to situations. Under that concept, a force would be sailed into a potentially dangerous situation with little freedom of action initially because the intent was not to escalate, but if it deteriorated, those rules could be changed to allow the force to operate in a higher threat environment without prejudicing the mission. This was explained in a recent article by Admiral William Smith,²⁴ in which he set out four fundamental functions of rules of engagement:

- help keep the peace and guard against accidental escalation;
- impose political control of combat operations in conflict situations;
- provide guidelines for the conduct of operations; and
- ensure adherence to international law.

It is completely wrong to view rules of engagement merely as constraints on operations. The idea that the purpose of rules of engagement is to specify how much force can be used belongs in the archives. Rather. the rules represent necessary guidance to commanders in the conduct of an operation, particularly where the intent is to avoid conflict. Gunboat diplomacy, in any form, is dangerous without precise rules of engagement. The rules can be changed if the situation warrants. If you consider the problem of trying to apprehend a vessel that blatantly refuses to submit to search in an economic sanctions enforcement situation the difficulty facing a tactical commander becomes clearer. The traditional way to warn an errant ship in such situations is to put a shot across its bows once all other options have been exhausted. In a "sanctions" operation, the tactical commander may not have the necessary authority under his rules of engagement. So, he must engage in a consultation process with his superiors to obtain approval to take that action. If the next superior commander has the necessary authority the consultation will be short. If, on the other hand, the superior commander needs political authority to approve that action, the consultation would take longer. The point being that delegation of authority requires careful prior planning. If the politicians have absolute trust in their commander, they are more likely to give him the necessary freedom to exercise his judgement in conducting operations. If that trust is lacking, as it was in the 1980 debacle when the Americans tried to rescue the hostages in Teheran, the commander will have little or no freedom of action. In so far as the mission statement can be seen as a contract between a commander and his political masters, the rules of

engagement become essential clauses in that contract. As my colleague Steve Staley explained:

If intelligently developed, ROE's ensure command authority over individual ships; provide a reliable and universally understood system of authorizing and restricting the use of military force; providing standing guidance for all conceivable situations; ensure the defense of national security interests; avoid precipitating a larger conflict; ensure the survival of deployed forces from preemptive attack; and preserve a spectrum of responses to the national command authority.²⁵

As I understand it, the underlying concept of self defence in use in UN operations today is based on the principle of only returning fire directed at you. This may work in the relatively low technology battlefield but it is totally inadequate at sea where an attack on a ship puts 200-300 people at risk, to say nothing of the investment of several hundred million dollars in that vessel and the potential damage to national pride. In naval terms, concepts of self-defence are necessarily based on hostile acts and hostile intent, to both of which are precursors to actually coming under fire. Under most situations, illuminating a ship with a missile guidance radar is an act of hostile intent, if not a hostile act. The bottom line is that establishing appropriate rules of engagement for a multinational naval force is as important as defining the mission statement. These are two planning functions that cannot be left to the politician alone. War may have become too important to be left to the generals, but modern crisis management, particularly at sea, is far too complex to be left to the politicians alone.

Administration

The various aspects of administration and generally caring for a multinational fleet are no less political or any less complex that defining its operational criteria. One of the more descriptive terms that seems to be too little used today is the *Fleet Train*. The term used now is *afloat support*, which does not create the same image of the continuously moving chain of oilers, repair ships, ammunition and logistics vessels needed to keep a naval force operating in distant waters. How much easier it was when only canvas, rope, salt beef, and fresh water were the major logistic

considerations, with the occasional new mast or spar. Today, you cannot just deploy a naval force, it has to be supported at three levels:

- at sea through underway replenishment;
- from a local port for small repairs and to serve as the forward logistic base; and
- from its home base, or through a commercial supplier, for major items.

Although local arrangements can be made for many support services, the link to the home base cannot be abandoned as it was in the days of sail, and to a considerable extent at the beginning of this century -- with the obvious exception of coaling requirements.

It is this regard that the small number of navies able to take part in complex multinational operations becomes significant. Some would even argue that it is impossible to mount such an operation without US involvement. Yet, one cannot overlook British and French capabilities or the fact that NATO has much of this capability. This is not to say that alternatives do not exist, but any attempt to be independent of those forces will be both expensive and more difficult to control in the first instance.

Should the UN decide to assume responsibility for supporting a naval force, the staff would have to accept a subordinate status within a military command structure. This may not be achievable. For example, no matter what system is adopted, the need and expense of meeting Immediate Operational Requirements (IORs) must be acknowledged. No matter how carefully one plans, the unexpected happens. A key system in a ship may also be critical to the overall capability of the force, such as the command, control and communications system. If it breaks down and cannot be fixed locally, a replacement part will have to be flown in. This is expensive and in the meantime, the force is operating at less than full capacity. An early planning consideration, of course, is to ensure that an alternative HQ ship is designated -- another constraint on who can participate in the multinational force.

Coordination

Finally, *coordination* presents itself as yet another obstacle to effective cooperation. In naval terms, *coordination*²⁹ is more than appointing liaison

officers and synchronizing clocks. Of its many factors, I will highlight two: communications and tactical procedures.

- There are countless references to the pitfalls of not ensuring complete communications compatibility. And this has to go beyond the basic language of operations. Today, modern warships are linked electronically and automatically exchange information gained from sensors, received via satellite, and from other external units, such as submarines and maritime patrol aircraft. If ships in a formation cannot link together, then their performance will be significantly degraded. As experience in NATO attests, multinational forces that are required to conduct complex operations must have compatible technology throughout the command and control process. The same is true, to a lesser degree, for specialist operations. This will severely limit the forces able to participate in any multinational force outside the NATO framework. If lower standards are accepted, the force becomes a mere token rather than an instrument of sea power.
- Much the same argument can be made for tactical procedures. In this, although the Russian proposal to supply everyone with NATO procedural documents may make sense in theory, in practice it is foolish. Before those procedures can be used operationally, they have to be translated with new amplifying comments made for national idiosyncrasies, and they have to be practised extensively.

Until such time as a higher degree of standardization exists between the world's navies, the existing technological hierarchy will determine who can be useful participants in multinational naval forces. This may sound like elitism; it is not. It is reality.

Conclusion

So where does this leave us? Although I do not see the need for a standing UN naval force now, I can see occasions when such a force might be useful. Here, I believe I am echoing the concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations envisaged by John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra³⁰ for operations "beyond peacekeeping" when forces must operate in the grey area between Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. However, I may differ by believing that those forces must, above all, represent a completely credible

military force. There are, however, huge obstacles to be overcome before such a force could be deployed as a credible symbol of UN authority unless it is formed on either US or NATO principles and under that leadership.

If the UN sees the requirement for a more diversely based multinational naval force for symbolic or operational purposes, it should embark on a program very similar to that used by NATO in 1965 to begin the process of building the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. This was essentially the conclusion of the December 1991 Greenwich conference on multinational naval forces. Although NATO progress was slow in some areas, having common operating procedures from the beginning shortened the learning process. Also, by only having to work in the NATO Atlantic area, logistic problems were greatly reduced. Even using a nucleus of NATO ships, the learning curve for a UN naval force will be long and slow. Assuming that the initial force has no immediate operational purpose, some key issues will have to be addressed before it sets sail for the first time.

- Who is able to command such a force? The answer, as I have tried to explain in this paper, is not simple. It requires a truly dedicated professional who the others respect and will follow, even in difficult times.³²
- Moreover, the UN will have to accept the need for a full-time naval operations centre, manned by naval personnel from those navies taking part in the new naval force. This not only requires a new approach to the management of UN military operations but also the expenditure of a great deal of money to establish the necessary HQ. Some may ask why this money is being spent when such facilities exist within NATO and in a few of the member countries.
- Who will or can join this force? Simply, there are far too few navies that have the necessary basic levels of common training and equipment interoperability to merely leap into this new formation. Navies that have not had the experience of being part of the NATO naval structure or one of the US led initiatives such as RIMPAC or UNITAS will have to accept some of the electronic equipment used by NATO and also adopt the NATO operating procedures. It is just far too difficult to develop new procedures now, and for what purpose when perfectly good ones exist. Even then, one must wonder if those navies are able to conduct the

necessary training to gain the prerequisite levels of proficiency. To change the configuration of one's fleet and adopt so many new procedures is strong medicine some countries may not be willing to take.

Supporting that force as it sails in distant waters, as it must to consolidate training and show solidarity, will require a new approach to logistic support. The UN will have to figure out how to organize this support or contract it to a country that can.

Perhaps the best solution for the UN is to accept that it may be far easier to delegate the responsibility for naval coalition building to other agencies. This need not be the United States or NATO alone. There are other options, but this very process begins to lead to the conclusion that the existing UN security management process is inadequate for the challenges that lie ahead -- this will unfortunately dampen the aspirations of many theorists. Perhaps the time has come to temper theory and idealism with common sense and experience.

Paraphrasing George Allison, 33 realistic guidelines for the future development of multinational naval forces should include the need to:

- (1)build confidence and gradually increase the number of navies able to cooperate in a wide range of maritime situations;
- learn from past experience; and (2)
- (3)ensure that the right military advice is available to the Security Council

This calls up a considerable investment in time, effort, resources, and money. Is the UN willing to make this investment? Are nations prepared to make the kind of commitment necessary to make the concept work? Do we actually need a UN naval capability beyond that already available and that is more than mere tokenism? These are questions politicians must answer.

Notes

For instance, see: Captain George Allison, US Navy, "The United States and United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations", Naval War College Review, Summer 1993, pp. 22-35; C. Uday Bhashar, "Navies in UN Peace-Keeping: Need for Conceptual Reappraisal", Strategic Analysis, (India), Vol. XVII, No. 1, April 1994, pp. 123-138; Peter Haydon, "Navy and Air Force Peacekeeping: an Expanded Role", in Alex Morrison, ed., The Changing Face of Peacekeeping, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), pp. 83-98; Gwyn Prins, "The United Nations and Peace-Keeping in the Post-Cold

War World: The Case of Naval Power", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 22(2): 1991, pp. 135-155; Michael C. Pugh, *Multinational Maritime Forces: A Breakout from Traditional Peacekeeping*, Southampton Papers in International Policy Number 1, 1992; Jeffrey I. Sands, *Blue Hulls: Multinational Naval Cooperation and the United Nations*, (Washington: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993); and Robert Stevens Staley II, *The Wave of the Future: The United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping*, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publications, 1992).

- Each navy can also be further graded by the extent to which it has modernized or is
 modernizing its forces. In constructing the ranking of sea power that follows, the criteria
 for modernized is that over 50% of the fleet or, for smaller navies, at least one surface
 task group have post-1985 technology.
- Unfortunately, time and space do not permit a more complete discussion of which navies fall into the various categories.
- 4. Sea control is a term used to describe both the capability and the act of preventing the unauthorized or illegal use of an ocean area. It incorporates the basic maritime functions of surveillance, patrol, and response. Sea control differs from command of the sea or sea denial in that it is not necessarily prohibitive. The sea control category implies that the navy can deploy and sustain a credible surface task group of 4-5 frigates/destroyers and a support ship without depleting its naval resources or jeopardizing national security.
- Although common practice, it is incorrect to refer to these areas collectively as Exclusive
 Economic Zones until individual states have formally declared that such zones exist.
 Canada, for instance, has a Fisheries Control Zone and not an economic zone.
- 6. In particular, see: Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, (London: Macmillan, 1981); and James Cable, Navies in Violent Peace, (London: Macmillan, 1989). However, one should not overlook the points made by other authors, especially Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990); Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, (London: Croon Helm, 1977); and J.R. Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986).
- 7. See Allison, op. cit., Sands, op. cit., and Staley, op. cit.. (Note 2 supra)
- 8. In most cases today, coordination is assumed to mean command, control and communications.
- This point is well made by John G. Roos, "The Perils of Peacekeeping", Armed Forces Journal International, December 1993, p. 13.
- 10. Allison, op. cit., p. 30-31.
- The problems of civil-military relations and the difficulty of command of UN formations are discussed by Christopher Brady and Sam Davis in "UN Operations: The Political-Military Interface", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 59-79.

- 12. For a complete discussion of the problems of Canadian over-commitment to peacekeeping operations see the excellent analysis by Joseph T. Jockel Canada & International Peacekeeping, ((Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies (Significant Issues Series), 1994. (Available in Canada from the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.)
- 13. Mats R. Berdal discusses some of these problems from a land-force perspective in his monograph Whither UN Peacekeeping? Adelphi Paper 281, (London: IISS), 1993), pp. 39-45. In general terms, those difficulties apply across the spectrum of UN military planning.
- 14. There have been many analyses of the potential for recurring maritime instability in the Persian Gulf. Of the more recent analyses, Lieutenant (j.g.) James Kraska, "Gatekeepers of the Gulf", Proceedings, March 1994, pp.44-47, is noteworthy.
- 15. For details see: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations in the Gulf of Fonseca by Argentine Navy Units, Report 01-93, 12 January 1993, (Newport: Naval War College, 1993).
- 16. For instance, Berdal, op. cit..
- This point has been made by several Russian naval officers and foreign service officials and is implicit in the articles written by Admiral Selivanov, op. cit. and Captain 1st Rank N.I. Vlasov, "On the Question of Cooperation Between Russian and Foreign Navies", Voennava Mvsl. 2 February, 1994.
- 18. Derek Boothby, "Sailing Under New Colours", Proceedings, July 1992, pp. 48-50.
- 19. Pugh, op. cit., (note 1 supra) and Michael C. Pugh, "Multinational Naval Cooperation". Proceedings, March 1994, pp. 72-74 and his article "Peacekeeping - A Role for Navies", Naval Forces, No. IV/1992, Vol. XIII, pp. 8-10.
- 20. This is explained very well by Admiral Sir Julian Oswald, "Security Has New Meaning", Proceedings, March 1992, pp. 46-51.
- 21. Prins. op. cit., pp. 144-8.
- Michael Vlahos, "A Global Naval Force? Why Not?", Proceedings, March 1992, pp. 40-22. 44
- 23. These are James Cable's terms (Cable, op. cit., pp. 57-67 and 81-83) in which the former is essentially a form of coercion by introducing a threat of violence while the latter is more a demonstration of concern with a veiled hint of violence.
- 24. Admiral William D. Smith, U.S. Navy, "Peacemaking From the Sea", Proceedings, August 1993, pp. 25-28.
- 25. Staley, op. cit., p. 47.
- 26. This is also the understanding of Captain George Allison (Allison, op. cit., pp. 29-30).

124 THE NEW PEACEKEEPING PARTNERSHIP

- For a more complete discussion of this issue and on the legal basis of rules of engagement, see D.P. O'Connell, *The Influence of Law on Sea Power*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964), particularly pp. 169-180 on ROE.
- 28. See Berdal, op. cit., pp. 32-3.
- 29. In the context of this discussion, coordination is better thought of as command, control, and communications, perhaps even with intelligence included for good measure.
- 30. John Mackinley and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations", Washington Quarterly, Summer 1992, pp. 113-131.
- See: Jeffrey I. Sands, Multinational Naval Cooperation in a Changing World: A Report on the Greenwich Conference 12-13 December 1991, (Washington: Center for Naval Analyses, October 1992).
- 32. For a very interesting discussion on multinational leadership see: Joel J. Sokolsky, *The Fratemity of the Blue Uniform: Admiral Richard G. Colbert, U.S. Navy and Allied Naval Cooperation*, (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1991).
- 33. Allison, op. cit., p. 34.

Isebill Gruhn

The USA Peacekeeping Experience: An Assessment

ntroduction*

The post-Cold War world of the mid-1990s has had to address the need or policies and capacities to contain intrastate as well as the more conventional interstate conflicts. By the start of the 1990s, intrastate conflict had become the main cause for huge human dislocations and emigration. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates, one out of every 114 people in the world in 1994 had been uprooted by conflict and forced to move elsewhere in search of security and sustenance.

^{*} For the sake of simplification, this paper will use peacekeeping and peacemaking as imbrella terms. A multiplicity of terms are currently in use. For drawing technical distinctions, neacekeeping most often refers to the traditional placement of troops between contending prices after a ceasefire has been achieved. Most UN peacekeeping actions prior to 1989, luring the Cold War, fell into this category. Peacemaking most often is used today to refer to iplomatic efforts, although, at times, the term is also used for subsequent military efforts to top an intrastate conflict. Peacebuilding tends to be used for such non-military operations as immanitarian activities and for rebuilding infrastructure, such as the judicial system and the folice. Peacemaking and peacebuilding tends to be used in various phases of such complex operations as Somalia. The term peace operations tends to be used for all aspects of perations that include military activities. Peace enforcement appears to have become a puphemism for warmaking, for example, in the Gulf. The confusion of terminology mirrors the tack of uniformity and the complexity of situations where a multilateral capacity is sought and used.

Dr. Gruhn is a Professor of Politics at Stevenson College, University of California, Santa Cruz. She has written extensively on peacekeeping and African development issues.

In retrospect, the ideological conflicts of the Cold War and interstate conflicts, in general, have seemed to some big power policy-makers to be more easily handled than the myriad complexities and elusive solutions produced by the violence of today's intrastate conflicts.

A world no longer neatly divided ideologically is also a world in which many states do not feel directly threatened by distant intrastate conflicts; however, when an estimated 23,000,000 people are now refugees, with another 26,000,000 thought to be "internally displaced", it has become a world of wide-ranging instability able to affect even physically distant states. Under such circumstances, the peoples of the world must also ask whether losing millions of lives to starvation and disease is consistent with modern views as to what can and should be tolerated, especially if the means exist to prevent such human suffering.

It has become obvious that the multilateral machinery developed during the Cold War is ill-equipped to address the tragic conditions now plaguing the world. Neither the UN peacekeeping capacity nor the UN's humanitarian assistance programs were designed to deal with situations like Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, to mention only the three most obvious crisis points.

The post-Cold War idea that multilateral actions are appropriate to manage conflict in the world today has been rhetorically supported by most world leaders, but the reality has been all too often one of inaction and mismanagement. Today the world lacks adequate capacity to deal effectively with the violence and human suffering now raging in various parts of the world. The UN has been unable (with the possible exception of current efforts in Macedonia) to respond with expedient action to prevent expansion of the conflict and restore order. Rwanda has been a stark reminder of the consequences of the absence of timely preventative action.

If the planning and development of capacities for dealing with the complexity of contemporary conflicts is meant to be multilateral, then the onus for the failure of resources and resolve should not fall on one single institution, leader, or state. Nonetheless, the US is the one remaining post-Cold War major military power and it is still a major force in the world's economy. Hence, the US must bear some of the responsibility for failing to develop effective multilateral capacity to prevent and manage today's crises.

At the same time, the major powers -- the US in particular -- are often ill-suited to join in collective action because their participation would give the appearance, due to prior policies, of a lack of neutrality. Neither are the major powers particularly well-suited to act as one among equals with their partners in multilateral actions. In addition, the US is ambivalent about its role in the post-Cold War expansion of UN peacekeeping, following a history of pursuing national interests unencumbered by dictates from without. Neither is the US used to mustering the kind of patience required to pursue national interests through multilateral institutions and negotiations, especially in ill-understood and complex situations.

Background

The US began its independent political identity by rejecting foreign entanglements. US history is, of course, replete with foreign entanglements, but it is also a history laden with isolationist tendencies, an impatience with complexity, and a predilection for withdrawal when entanglements threaten to become protracted. All too often, US presidents have been faced with a strongly ambivalent strain in American society with respect to its overseas commitments. President Woodrow Wilson discovered, to his dismay, that his enthusiasm and leadership in establishing the League of Nations was shared neither by his Congress nor by the general public. After the First World War, the US was only too happy to return to a general state of isolationism. President Franklin D. Roosevelt subsequently experienced considerable difficulty in preparing the nation for entry into the Second World War and the defeat of Fascism. In a sense, Roosevelt was rescued by the attack on Pearl Harbour, after which America was ready and willing to fight.

The US emerged from the Second World War as the undisputed economic, political, and military leader of the so-called free world. US leadership in forging alliances with its allies in the post-Second World War period is beyond dispute. The US not only led but helped build support for a variety of multilateral institutions and mechanisms. US leadership in the development of the United Nations, its development and participation in NATO, and its early enthusiasm for the development of the European Community have demonstrated American commitment to multinational institution-building.

The US, nevertheless, has always been cautious about giving up its power to veto the actions of multilateral mechanisms. At San Francisco in 1945, the US led in writing the charter for the United Nations, but at the same time insisted that the Permanent Five members of the Security Council should each have power of veto. While this could be taken as "realistic," given the face of the emerging Cold War with the Communist world, it is also further evidence of US ambivalence about giving up any sovereign authority in a multilateral setting. A segment of US policy-makers and the general public has always chosen to interpret the US constitution in ways that preclude transferring any of its decision-making authority to a multilateral mechanism.

US belief in its own "exceptionalism" is deeply ingrained in American culture, history, and actions, and is not confined merely to its sense of sovereignty. In the second half of the twentieth century, the US has grown accustomed to thinking itself "exceptional" in its role as world leader. Today, however, the US is faced with new and as yet unaccustomed and undigested realities: it is no longer, as was true for much of the twentieth century, the one and only dominant economic power, and while it is the only remaining military superpower, its high technology military capabilities are not necessarily suited to today's intrastate and ethnic conflicts.

Amid a plethora of new domestic and international concerns, the US compass has become more unsteady in charting the course of international affairs. President George Bush sounded the call for a "new world order" in 1989. In the post-Cold War world, the US, President Bush asserted, ought to think of itself as pursuing universal aspirations in its cooperative deterrence engagements and its joint actions against aggression. 1 This call for a "new world order" was received with a good deal of cynicism by commentators. On the one hand, it seemed he was stating the obvious: the end of the Cold War predicated a new world order. But more often critics saw, in his pronouncement, not a vision of ongoing US commitments to help shape the new international system, but simply empty rhetoric by the US government to gain domestic and international support for its objectives in the Gulf War. The use of UN cover for largely US action was generally not interpreted as a new commitment by the US to support UN capacity-building for multilateral peacekeeping. At the same time, Bush's pronouncements may also be seen, in retrospect, as having generated discussion and even hope that multilateral conflict prevention and management under UN

auspices might be given a higher position on the policy making agenda of JN member states.

Presidential candidate Bill Clinton expanded Bush's multilateral "new world order" theme. The combination of a generational change and a Democratic candidate appeared to offer genuinely new enthusiasm and apportunity for the US to help address the post-Cold War world order brough its participation in the development of multilateral capacities to prevent and manage future uses of force. Candidate Clinton's call for assertive multilateralism" certainly sounded as though the US would be oning in to develop the UN's capacity for action. During the early months of the Clinton Administration, this tone continued. Multilateral action seemed the principal post-Cold War method of maintaining US political-military influence. This approach was considered "realistic" in the post-Cold War world as well as desirable, given the budget-cutting phase of US domestic policy formulation.

The Clinton Administration's apparent withdrawal from "assertive multilateralism" may be linked in good measure to US reassessment of the Somalia operation, and the conclusion that US participation there had been ll-fated. This withdrawal may now be viewed as a consequence of overeaction to a specific and, in this sense, narrow policy failure. It may also be seen, as by former President Richard Nixon in his last writings, as nothing out good sense: "Assertive multilateralism being advanced by some supporters of the United Nations can only be described as naive diplomatic publications. Even a collective body as close-knit as NATO was not able to be 'assertive' in Bosnia. Can anyone seriously suggest that a collective body such as the UN, nearly one-third of whose members have populations smaller than that of the state of Arkansas, could be 'assertive'?"

Whether one believes that the post-Cold War world holds promise that he US will rethink its national interests in ways that will lead it to fully participate and support the building of effective multilateral peacekeeping nechanisms, or whether one views the Bush and Clinton pronouncements is cynical and naive, there is no question that the Clinton Administration's current policy on reforming multilateral peace operations, as enunciated in he spring of 1994, draws back from earlier promises. Current policy juidelines have found a generally hospitable political reception in the US. Hardline "realists" such as former President Nixon welcomed the change as

a return to "realism." But Congress and the press resonate with other supporting themes; typical among them are notions that US soldiers should not lose their lives in distant conflicts of indirect US national interest, as 44 did in Somalia. UN peacekeeping is often labelled "too costly" and economic needs at home are evoked to explain why little or no resources need be expended in distant lands on distant causes.

Support for the above positions is easily garnered. Americans find it easy to support a type of neo-isolationism in the face of potentially costly, messy, and incomprehensible foreign entanglements. In addition, the US's revulsion over having others tell it what to do are as strong as its hangover from the Vietnam War. The US tends to respond well to big causes and grows quickly impatient with ill-understood complexities in distant places. Ironically, its reticence to become involved early in the Rwandan situation through timely UN preventative intervention makes as much sense, given its historically-wrought proclivities, as its belated outpouring of huge expenditures necessary to address that crisis.

The US Experience

US experience in world affairs contrasts rather sharply with that of many other states. Its historical reluctance to become deeply involved in the affairs of others became transformed into its new role as "free-world" leader and dominant world power. It is worth recalling that when the US has engaged in the world, it has often been in an almost messianic sense: making the world safe for democracy and safe from Communism. US political engagements costing lives and the expenditure of resources have been justified in terms of "major causes." A public often largely disinterested in foreign affairs may be whipped up to support a "historical" cause. When a major enemy lurks, it is possible even for the average citizen to tell the "white hats" from the "black hats" as in a movie "western."

Very little in America's earlier twentieth-century experience has prepared it for a role in which the US is the dominant military power but finds it difficult to identify the enemy, the cause, or the solution: i.e., in civil and ethnic conflicts, where the issues are often cloudy and complex. The virtue of the Gulf War was that President Bush managed to identify clearly the enemy for the US public: Saddam Hussein, the villain, identifiable by his black hat, whom the US posse, with the help of others, had to stop. No such

obvious villain is present in most of the UN's current peacekeeping actions. Attempts to make the Somali warlord Aidid into the villain worked only temporarily, and the messy situations in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti do not lend themselves to easy generation of America's support for the cause. In fact, there is little in the US political or military tradition that demonstrates a willingness to participate in conflict resolution when the task is neutral interposition and peacebuilding.

Presidents Bush and Clinton, in their various pronouncements on the US post-Cold War role, have identified the need to define and redefine US national interests. Both presidents have seemed to be saying that the US ought to play a role in developing the post-Cold War order and in developing a new approach to global peace maintenance. The underlying assumption has been that the collapse of the old order gives the international system an opportunity to structure new ways of doing international business. The use of UN peacekeeping in managing conflict, in a wide assortment of places and under new circumstances, is now part of the global agenda.

Criticism in the US of the UN bureaucracy and the various UN peacekeeping missions, US unwillingness to confront peacekeeping costs and discussions of the future role of the US in UN reforms have all hinged on the issue of US national interests in the post-Cold War world. States large and small tend to pursue their national interests, but the issue is not a state's prioritization of its resources in support of its interests but how it defines and pursues its national interests. During the time when President Bush, candidate Clinton and, later, President Clinton spoke about the new world order and "assertive multilateralism," the US appeared to be groping toward defining its post-Cold War national interests in ways which included giving priority to development of multilateral peacekeeping capacity. With the promulgation of the Clinton Administration's Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 in the spring of 1994, the US essentially reverted to its old stance on multilateral peacekeeping.

According to PDD-25, once the US has identified that it has a national interest in resolving a particular dispute, and only if the US perceives UN peacekeeping to be the appropriate means of achieving its aim, it may consider this possible route for achieving its interests.⁴ In other words, the subject and nature of the conflict becomes the basis for judging the issue of national interest, not UN institution-building *per se* or a preference for using

UN capacity. US policy does not set out to construct a "new multilateral" approach to today's issues; it merely reconfirms that the US will act as it always has: it will pick and choose if and when to get involved, unilaterally or multilaterally.

Neither the debate nor the current policy is new to US foreign policy. Henry Kissinger, in a recent piece in *Foreign Affairs* entitled "Reflections on Containment," gives a very useful historical account of traditional US patterns of thinking. He identifies persons such as Walter Lippmann who asked that US foreign policy be guided by a case-by-case analysis of US interests, while other "realists" and "idealists" view policy as more broadgauged and mission-oriented. However, it is a mistake to view the current debate on peacekeeping, as Kissinger is inclined to, as merely more of America's age-old debate: its role as world saviour versus its desire to remain detached; and America's penchant for messianism versus the case-by-case approach to global participation.

We do, after all, live in a new world context. There are almost two hundred so-called sovereign states whose similarities with respect to the conventional features of political, economic, and social life are greatly varied. Overriding this vast array of political units is the reality of economic and technological interdependence. Appreciating that we face new realities, there are, at least, two interests that capable and resource-competent international state actors must confront: "interests", defined, first, as developing a mechanism to handle the policy issues that arise and, second, defined as causes or goals that a state wishes to pursue. A brief discussion of PDD-25 will be useful in understanding the Clinton Administration's pronouncements about its future policy.

Clinton Administration Policy

PDD-25, the formal articulation of the Clinton Administration policy on UN peacekeeping, which was announced in May 1994 after months of study, can be seen not only as a departure from the Administration's early pronouncements but as a serious withdrawal from the idea that multilateral peacekeeping is a priority US national interest. PDD-25 is a reconfirmation of the traditional idea that the substantive conflicts for which peacekeeping may be deployed will be judged according to US national interests, on a case-by-case basis. The policy is consistent with long held notions that the

US and only the US will make judgements about peacekeeping participation and that the US will resist being drawn into collective multilateral actions under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General or under pressures to join the UN membership in collective decision-making.

There is, however, an extra wrinkle in the Clinton policy: the UN must be able to show its capacity to act effectively in any peacekeeping effort. This is a particularly odd US demand given the fact that the US, in recent years, has been perpetually in arrears in paying its debt for UN operations directly related to peacekeeping, owing the UN \$3.3 billion in July 1994. In August 1994, Congress finally appropriated \$1.2 billion for UN peacekeeping, which will allow the US to pay off much of its peacekeeping debt. However, congressional conflicts, the slowness of approving appropriations and the rising number and the rising costs of UN peacekeeping operations give little promise that the US can be counted on as a reliable financial contributor to developing and sustaining UN peacekeeping capacity.

There is a "Catch-22" aspect to the current US posture. In PDD-25 the US declares its right to make a unilateral determination about whether a UN peacekeeping mission has clear objectives, a defined duration and scope, correct strategy, and the requisite resources to carry out the strategy. However, even if the US rules favourably on all these conditions, there are other stringent conditions outlined in the document for committing US troops to UN operations. For example, the mission must advance US national interests with "acceptable risks," and US participation must be necessary for the operation to succeed. There must also be a credible exit strategy.

The US appears to consider the UN peacekeeping role important, but its participation is based on unilateral, ad hoc decisions and requirements that the UN prove itself competent. The document does not give much reassurance that the US intends to use its power, leadership, and resources to enhance UN competency. The double-edged conditions set by the US for its participation seem designed to give the US an easy way out of participation in UN missions and lending support and resources to assist in developing UN capacities.6

The crisis in Rwanda is a useful confirmation for sceptics that the US lacks commitment and leadership in developing UN multilateral peacekeeping tools for crisis management. A *New York Times* editorial dated 15 June 1994, pointed out:

One can stipulate that the US has no vital interests or historical ties in Rwanda that might justify sending troops to this tormented central African country. That said, the Clinton Administration chose an awful time to delay logistical aid to UN peacekeepers, and a worse time to apply a semantic sponge to crimes against humanity -- a paralyzed Pentagon quibbles over nickels and dimes instead of rushing US armoured vehicles to the first elements of a projected force of 5,500 UN peacekeepers.⁷

The Rwanda crisis is a fine illustration of the defects of the Clinton policy. First, the US decided that its interests did not lie in Rwanda, then it hedged on its commitment to legal human rights obligations, in the face of genocide, by unilaterally redefining the issue as something other than genocide. By declining to participate, the US made contributions by others slower and more inefficient, and it fed the claims of critics that UN peacekeeping actions are too slow and too inefficient to command US support and participation.

In the face of criticism, the US finally moderated its "policy" by speeding up the shipment of equipment and the Administration even revised its view that "acts of genocide may have occurred" to the point of acknowledging that the events in Rwanda were "genocide."

As we now know, the human tragedy in Rwanda escalated to the point where the US government felt compelled to mount a very large and costly relief effort. There is little doubt that the cost in lives coupled with the cost of the relief effort will be far more expensive than a timely international UN intervention would have been. Reasonable people may differ over the extent to which the crisis could have been avoided, but all must agree that the magnitude of the tragedy could have been contained through quick and effective intervention. Neither the US nor the UN acted in a timely fashion. Rwanda may now be added to Somalia and Bosnia as instructive examples of how not to cope with new outbreaks of world disorder. Clearly, PDD-25 provides appropriate guidelines neither for US policy formulation nor for resource allocation to Rwanda.

Interwoven in the discussion of US policy and the future of UN peacekeeping efforts are two issues: necessary and desirable UN peacekeeping capacity, and US participation in it. Neither issue, to date, has received adequate discussion and attention in the US.

UN Peacekeeping Reform

There is no shortage of recent literature on the subject of peacekeeping reform. Even the UN's staunchest supporters and harshest critics agree that UN peacekeeping capacity requires urgent attention and reform. The various proposals for alternative reforms are fairly familiar: (a) the UN should have a standing multilateral peacekeeping force essentially under the control of either the UN Secretary-General or the Security Council; (b) the UN should have a rapid response capacity in the form of a small voluntary strike force to enable it to respond quickly and expeditiously to a crisis; (c) UN member states should designate and train units within their own armed forces ready for UN service; and (d) UN peacekeeping ought to be treated on an ad hoc basis (a notion still widely held by the US government and the Congress).

Whatever the virtues of a large competent standing UN peacekeeping force under UN control may be, there is general agreement that this idea is, at best, premature. Many states, the US included, are unprepared and unwilling to place resources and manpower under the control of the UN. The idea of a small voluntary UN force to serve as a quick-action "trip wire" enjoys more support internationally, but it has been clearly rejected at this time by the US. The US objects to providing concrete resource support that could be used in UN actions without prior US approval. Given the obstacles to developing a large or small UN force, option (c) has attracted a good deal of attention and support; in fact, Canada and the Scandinavian states, among others, have gone far to develop specially trained forces within their national military units earmarked for UN service. Such well-trained troops could be quickly gathered and dispatched, once the Security Council has authorized a UN peacekeeping action, and the forces would have the specialized training appropriate to the mission in a multilateral context. Oddly, the US appears to resist such a plan, arguing, falsely, I believe, that the American range of forces provides every kind of specialty that might be needed

Under PDD-25, the Clinton Administration seems largely to favour the option of business as usual: UN peacekeeping efforts should be handled on an *ad hoc* basis. However, in Rwanda, US red tape in transferring equipment to the UN has shown that the current US *ad hoc* approach can slow down and obstruct effective UN action.

Conceptually, the US appears to be obsessed by three concerns: UN ineffectiveness and incompetence, reluctance to transfer power and authority to the UN, and reluctance to place US troops under non-US command. Paradoxically, these concerns are both real and imaginary. In the past, US troops have served under non-US command, and they will likely do so again in the future. The issue is one of confidence.

If there were well-trained national units and joint international training of commanders, along the lines provided by NATO, US concerns might be overcome. That a state declines to participate in peacekeeping operations due to conflicts of interest need not be an obstacle to helping develop multilateral peacekeeping forces. On the other hand, it is possible but unlikely that a major power could be forced to participate in ways counter to its interests. Imaginary worst-case scenarios of US involvement against its wishes have side-tracked the advantages of building a multilateral UN peacekeeping capacity. US concerns about UN inefficiency and incompetence have validity, but to use them as excuses for not extending US leadership and assistance only reinforces the problems rather than expediting reforms.

Future Direction for US Policy

US policy on UN peacekeeping hinges on a wide variety of historical and contemporary assessments and reassessments. The hangover from the Vietnam War continues to make Americans uneasy about foreign engagements and intervention abroad, as does the weariness left over from the Cold War. For many citizens and policy-makers, the loss of US life in distant lands when direct security interests are indiscernible makes little sense.

In the Vietnam War, neither the causes nor the goals were clear, which made that involvement particularly problematic. In Vietnam, the US lost its innocence, and what emerged was a strong feeling that goals ought to be

clear and the enemy well-defined.¹⁰ However, in the current international system, the disputes that most frequently call for UN intervention are intrastate conflicts in which the above criteria are difficult to discern. The US would be more enthusiastic about participating in multilateral peacekeeping if, for example, the army of country A invaded country B.

Peace enforcement, building a civil society, providing humanitarian assistance, and protection against genocide in distant Rwanda do not easily fit the requirements of a "reasonable cause." US experience in Somalia further reinforced a sense that American lives should not be lost in such a complex, ill-understood arena. Similarly, in the case of Rwanda, US policy makers are unable to identify for the public the "good guys" and the "bad guys." Perhaps the Cold War, where the enemy was so easily identified, helped to create the kind of ambivalence America exhibits towards present international conflicts that cry out for UN multilateral peacekeeping intervention.

The US context is also one of inexperience, which on first hearing may strike many as odd. How can anyone accuse the world's largest military power of inexperience? It will be recalled that as a major Cold War player, the US was sidelined in all UN peacekeeping efforts before the end of the Cold War. Unlike Canada, which participated in all peacekeeping activities of the UN and is often thought of as the originator of "peacekeeping," the US has had no similar experience. Other countries too, notably in Scandinavia, have become used to participating in multilateral peacekeeping as a matter of national policy. US military and policy-makers currently operate without the socializing experience and training that other peacekeeping participants have achieved over the past 40 years.

The US perceives itself to be a military power second to none, but it cannot match Canada's cadre of experienced peacekeepers among its military officers as well as its rank and file. The US lacks veterans of peacekeeping that understand that effective multilateral peacekeeping often calls for patient, neutral interposition in a complex conflict. A US more inclined to "right wrongs" is peculiarly unsuited to engage patiently and effectively in peacekeeping arenas.

The fact is that, in the emerging international order of the post-Cold War era, the major powers are not always the most effective peacekeepers.

Defining an engagement as being in the big-power national interest can often fan a smoldering localized problem into a major conflagration. Big-power involvement may lead to escalation; it may create a situation where peacekeeping action is interpreted as a cover for the national designs of a big power.¹¹

The engagement of small and middle-range powers in peacekeeping may, in many instances, be the most effective path for organizing peacekeeping and peacemaking missions. (This actually accords with President Clinton's policy.) But there are concerns other than staffing in organizing a peacekeeping mission. A state may be politically or historically or culturally unsuited to participate in a mission, but this in no way absolves it from paying its appropriate share in developing and supporting such operations. Specifically, it does not mean that the US should not be asked to supply the hardware and logistical support that it may be uniquely equipped to supply.

What about the criticism that, to date, the UN has shown only modest effectiveness in its peacekeeping operations, and hence does not merit a vote of confidence? There is a lively body of critical literature that discusses UN peacekeeping effectiveness, posits recommendations for reforms, and outlines the appropriate circumstances for UN engagements. Some writers, such as Brian Urquhart, emphasize reforms needed to ensure greater UN effectiveness. Others have sought to define the causes that call for such intervention, such as preventing genocide, alleviating famine and epidemics, and preventing international economic disasters, while at the same time opposing intervention to consolidating and protecting democracy. One line of analysis seeks to grapple with the proper institutional capacity and resource basis for UN multilateral action, while another deals with the broader philosophical policy issues of when and how individual and collective national interests ought to lead to intervention. Both arenas deserve all available attention and wisdom.

Unfortunately, while appearing to address both the capacity-building questions and the philosophical and policy questions about UN involvement, PDD-25 is, in fact, incapable of advancing thought in either direction. US policy, as manifested in this policy guidance document, is mainly directed towards self-protection. While pointing out UN weaknesses, the policy seeks to ensure that the US is not drawn into undesirable conflicts. The current

policy, as stated in PDD-25, fails as an exercise of US leadership, either in developing creative multilateral institutional building, or in helping to refine global thinking about how and under what circumstances global multilateral action, bilateral action, or regional action should be taken. Current US policy is reactive and protective and seems devoid of imaginative leadership.

Conclusions

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has acknowledged that the UN has neither the will nor the resources to intervene in civil wars. During the spring and summer of 1994, the appalling UN inaction in Rwanda and the flawed actions in Angola were a sad reminder of how ineffective UN action can be. Even in the absence of a small standing UN volunteer force under UN command, other options exist. A system of "stand-by forces" and equipment for quick UN intervention might have reduced the genocide in Rwanda and saved the lives of thousands in safe havens under UN protection. In developing a UN capacity appropriate to cope with such conflicts, the many desirable options for multilateral action need to be pared down to what is realistically possible -- and what is possible, at least in part, depends on whether the US is willing to participate, if not lead.

To develop a major standing UN peacekeeping capacity is clearly not feasible at this point. Neither the UN membership nor UN capacity demonstrated to date makes such a vision anything more than that -- a vision. Somewhat more realistic is the concept of a small volunteer UN strike force to intervene quickly while the UN discusses its options; this could result in cease-fires and the saving of lives. However, this idea too appears to lack support by the US and others at this time.

The goal, then, should be a stand-by system of military and civilian personnel and logistical support. Training and socialization for multilateral missions and mission readiness would improve the quality and speed of UN peacekeeping missions.¹⁵

There is no shortage of suggestions for reforming UN headquarters. ¹⁶ Most recommendations include financing UN peacekeeping through an annual assessment rather than on a piecemeal mission-by-mission basis. In the autumn of 1994, there were UN peacekeeping missions on five continents, each of which had been planned and funded from scratch. Many

have also suggested that peacekeeping ought to be viewed as part of the national defence budget of each member state.

Progress has been made in 1993-94 towards creating a sophisticated command structure at UN headquarters, but more work remains to be done. The amateur *ad hoc* approach for each separate mission must be quickly put in the past. Analysts agree that there must be an available inventory of stand-by forces as well as equipment, arms, and logistical support.

The UN's scramble in June 1994 for armoured personnel carriers (APCs) for Rwanda was a stark reminder of the need for reform in this area. Without APCs to provide protection against sniper fire, UN forces could not be safely sent to Rwanda. The US agreed to provide vehicles from its stocks in Germany, but it wanted three weeks to ready the vehicles and deliver them to Uganda. The Pentagon held up releasing the vehicles until a lease agreement had been concluded by the UN. Meanwhile, the African troops earmarked by the respective countries for service in Rwanda could not be sent.¹⁷

The Rwanda case makes clear that an inventory of stand-by equipment needs to be available which can be easily pressed into service by the UN. The streamlining of UN capacity, permanent funding mechanisms, and efficient expertise in managing far-flung peacekeeping activities are correctly regarded as essential by critics and reformers. But what expectations are realistic for US participation in capacity-building and reform along the lines outlined above?

US participation in reforming UN capacity will continue to be desirable, but it is not, at present, high on the US list of policy priorities, and it will likely continue to be rated as low-priority in the future. For reasons good and bad, the US will continue to despair over UN incompetence, the remoteness of the disputes, and the apparent impossibility of approaching disputes with a clear strategy consistent with PDD-25.

PDD-25 does make progress in identifying decision-making responsibilities for US participation in UN peacekeeping. The State Department is responsible for the oversight and management of peacekeeping operations in which US combat units are not participating. The US Defense Department has responsibility when US combat units are

involved, and the Administration has offered to set up new accounts in the Department of Defense to pay for UN assessments. However, these accounts require approval from the Congress.

US funding of its peacekeeping obligations to the UN promises to continue to be a problem. ¹⁹ In June 1994, the House of Representatives deleted \$300 million for UN peacekeeping from the Pentagon budget in the face of the crises in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Angola. The modest and, to some, disappointing attempts by the Clinton Administration to improve multilateral capacity have enjoyed only limited and uneven support in Congress. ²⁰ The US election results in the autumn of 1994, bringing the Republican Party into leadership in both Houses, will no doubt further complicate US funding to the UN.

This paper paints a pessimistic picture of US policy direction and leadership in developing competent post-Cold War strategies for multilateral peacekeeping. The Clinton Administration came into office with a new look and a new commitment to managing the world multilaterally with full US participation, but half-way into its term of office the Administration is bogged down in domestic issues and the President has made only uncertain and sporadic engagements in foreign affairs. The US' natural proclivities, her historical experience, and her recent failures to provide quick fixes in Somalia and Bosnia have further soured Americans' attitude towards international peacekeeping. The origins of many of these conflicts are complex and long-range and do not lend themselves to the use of overwhelming force or quick fixes. Helping shape multilateral peacekeeping capacity and setting rational goals for multilateral peacekeeping are of front-burner issues for the US at this time.

The next two years could well be productive for developing UN peacekeeping, but under the leadership of states such as Canada rather than the US. The UN membership can insist that UN headquarters capacity and stand-by capacity among member states be streamlined and made more efficient. Many states may eventually perceive it to be in their national interests to participate. While large donors, such as the US, must also be involved, there is a greater likelihood for constructive US participation if other states demonstrate a strong resolve to act. Americans that support effective UN peacekeeping and peacemaking may bemoan the lack of

current US leadership, but it would be sad if the world community used US failure to lead as an excuse not to take action.

US policy often becomes flexible when it appears the most rigid. As in the belated response in Rwanda, world leaders often adjust when their inaction becomes embarrassing. Hopefully, at some time in the future, the US may become a more useful partner in multilateral peacekeeping. In the meantime, others should take sensible steps toward reform so that the next Rwanda does not become another bloodstain on the pages of world history:

...democracies have a large practical as well as moral stake in finding reasonable responses to wars of nation debilitation. The range of responses is no mystery: strong multilateral organizations, standing peacekeeping and peacemaking forces, preventative action, and, above all, more clear-sighted and courageous national leadership.²¹

Notes

- See the text of President Bush's address to Congress at the end of the Gulf War in The New York Times, 7 March 1991.
- 2. <u>Time</u>, 2 May 1994, p. 32.
- "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," <u>Presidential Decision Directive PDD-25</u>, May 1994: Executive Summary, Department of State Publication 10161, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, released May 1994.
- 4. PDD-25; see especially p.5.
- Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on Containment," <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, May/June 1994, pp. 113-130.
- 6. PDD-25.
- 7. Editorial, The New York Times, 15 June, 1994.
- See the following: Financing an Effective United Nations. N.Y. Ford Foundation, 1993; John Roper et al, Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: Report to the Trilateral Commission, No. 43. N.Y. Trilateral Commission 1993; David A. Charters, ed., Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict. New Brunswick: University of New Brunswick, Resolution Centre for Conflict Studies, 1994; Alex Morrison, Peacekeeping.

<u>Peacemaking or War: International Security Enforcement</u>. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1991.

- Former UN official and highly regarded commentator on UN reform, Brian Urquhart, is well-knows for his advocacy of a small standing UN capacity. See Brian Urquhart, "For a UN Voluntary Military Force," <u>The New York Review of Books</u>, 10 June, 1993, pp. 3-4.
- 10. See PDD-25 for evidence of these themes in the Clinton Administration.
- France sent troops to Rwanda with UN approval on 22 June, 1994. French action, nevertheless, raises real questions about her neutrality in Rwanda, given her earlier involvement there. See: "The French Connection in Rwanda," <u>The New York Times</u>, 7 July, 1994, p.4.
- 12. See endnote 8.
- 13. Urquhart, "For a Voluntary Military Force."
- Ernst Haas, <u>Beware the Slippery Slope: Notes Toward the Definition of Justifiable Intervention</u>. Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 42. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1993.
- 15. The establishment in 1994 of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre may be a small but important step in the development and dissemination of the skills needed to address the variety of civil conflicts and humanitarian crises effectively. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre is not intended to focus exclusively on the military side of peacekeeping and the curriculum combines theoretical knowledge with practical experience. It has invented and developed the concept of "The New Peacekeeping Partnership" the term applied to the military, government, and non-government agencies dealing with humanitarian assistance, refugees, and displaced persons; election monitors and media; and civilian police personnel as they work together to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.
- 16. See especially the Ford Foundation Report, Financing an Effective United Nations.
- 17. Editorial, The New York Times, 15 June, 1994.
- 18. In Somalia and Rwanda, in particular, where NGOs provide much of the manpower and resources for humanitarian assistance, the role of NGOs and their integration and coordination with UN activities has also become an issue. Most of the studies concerned with UN reforms barely mention the increasing role of NGOs in managing civil conflicts, the subsequent humanitarian crises and the need to inventory and coordinate UN headquarters, US specialized agencies and NGOs into coordinated missions.
- 19. Editorial, The New York Times, 22 June, 1994.

- 20. How to fund US participation and the impracticality of the idea that the State Department and the Defense Department's roles and responsibilities could be neatly divided became apparent in summer 1994, with regard to the Rwandan mission. Defence Secretary William Perry warned in early August, 1994, that the military relief mission for Rwanda was bleeding the Pentagon budget and threatening combat readiness: "We're an army, not a Salvation Army", Mr. Perry told the Congress. Mr. Perry asked the House Appropriations Committee for \$270 million more in emergency aid for Rwanda. Mr. Perry claimed that unless new funds were allocated, some US tank divisions would not be able to buy spare parts. The US Defense Department has been using its resources for Rwanda for such activities as securing airports and providing safe drinking water. In short, the use of the military in humanitarian support missions has been necessary; in fact, only the military is capable of quickly providing this kind of emergency assistance. A very good illustration that current and future crises in US peacekeeping management and humanitarian assistance can no longer be neatly divided as PDD-25 appears to indicate, nor do the allocations exist to support US participation on the scale called for in Rwanda in the summer of 1994. See "Pentagon Worries About Cost of Aid Missions," The New York Times, 5 August, 1994.
- Leslie H. Gelb, "Quelling the Teacup Wars", <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, November/December 1994, pp. 2-6.

The Role of the United States in Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is often called an academic growth-industry; it is certainly a military growth-industry. I am delighted to learn that it is also an industry growth-industry. You here are all testament to that.

What I would like to do is run through the basics of how peace operations fit into US National Security strategy, and how the Clinton Administration's recently completed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on peace operations broadens and refines the guidance that currently exists. I shall talk briefly about some of the efforts underway in the Department, and indeed at the UN, hopefully rebutting the assertion that there is a lack of courageous leadership by identifying through specific actions what leadership action is being taken by the US administration.

I am not going to describe the Clinton Administration's vision of a future order in detail, though it is worth noting that a stable order, in which democratic values and free trade can flourish, remains our principal objective. The National Security strategy notes in that regard that the dissolution of the Soviet Union has transformed the strategic landscape; yet, at the same time, there remains a complex array of old and new security challenges that the United States must meet as we approach the new century.

As you may know, our national military strategy is to be prepared to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. The US is

Ms. Sewall is the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Policy.

prepared to act unilaterally when it is in our interest to do so, and we willalways maintain that capacity. But peace operations have a demonstrated capacity to address certain of our less-than-vital interests, especially internal regional conflicts often driven by ethnic, nationalist, or religious strife. Peace operations offer us a cost-effective and often politically effective means of dealing in a multilateral context with challenges we may not wish to address unilaterally. All of these conflicts have the ability to threaten regional security.

It is also important to note, as one looks at the question of vital national interests versus more minor national interests, that the likelihood of the kinds of newly emerging conflicts in which peace operations are often offered as a potential solution is far higher than the likelihood of a major regional contingency. So, in addition to having a priority of potential engagement that one has to be prepared for, one must also address the issue of likelihood, and it is clear that here we are talking about a very new world order indeed. Perhaps "disorder" would be a better word for it.

The United States has certain views on peace operations. We have no intention of becoming the world's policemen. As a consequence, it is very much in our interest to develop other mechanisms, so the international community at large, and, indeed, regional organizations in specific contexts, are equipped and capable of dealing with the new types of conflicts that now characterize the post-Cold War world.

In our view, peace operations should be considered a form of burdensharing, and while we rightly like to complain about how much they cost, we also need to note that we pay less than one-third of the cost of all blue helmet operations (and will reduce our payments to 25 percent later this year), and we contribute a small percentage of the troops.

Some in the military like to talk about the peace operations as an economy of force. I think that is a useful way to think about them, to the extent that peace operations may prevent, maintain, or resolve conflicts, and keep them from spreading and posing far greater threats that would require far more significant responses. They are indeed a force multiplier of a new breed, something that, as such, we must very much welcome. Nonetheless, peace operations are not a national security strategy unto themselves. They are one component of the US National Security strategy, albeit an important

one. As the UN's Shashi Tharoor so eloquently puts it, now our challenge is to change from focusing on doing the right thing, to focusing on doing the thing right. That is very much the challenge that is before us both within the Department of Defense and, more broadly, within the US government, and, of course, as an international community, as an integral part of a United Nations.

The PDD on reforming multilateral peace operations was signed on 3 May 1994, after a long and healthy gestation period. It reaffirms the role that peace operations can play in the context that I just described, and provides a much more expansive and comprehensive view about both their utility and their shortcomings. It also devotes a significant amount of attention to how to resolve those shortcomings, focusing on what the United States can do to enhance the abilities of the international community to improve peace operations. The directive focuses on making peace operations both more effective and more selective, seeing those two as being a hand-in-glove approach to using this tool wisely in the years ahead.

We hope that, in addition to being an internal guideline for the United States, the review that we conducted may be adopted as appropriate by other nations as a way of refining their own attitudes toward supporting and participating in peace operations, and as a blueprint for helping strengthen international and regional organizations, so that they can most effectively play their part.

Let me briefly describe some elements of the PDD, which is often misunderstood as an attempt to curtail US support for peace operations. I am referring here to the issue of "factors for consideration" when supporting or participating in a peace operation. The Clinton administration realized upon coming into office that we had no considered framework for approaching the question of when it was appropriate in the Security Council to support, or, indeed, make a decision about, national participation in a peace operation. So one of the first things we set about doing was trying to devise a list of factors for consideration in making those decisions.

The first of these factors is not only that a proposed peace operation should further US interests, but there should be an international community of interests for dealing with a given problem, on a multilateral basis. We will also ask whether there is a threat to, or breach of, international peace and

security, and we may define that security in a way different from the way in which it might have been defined in the past. So these two factors are fundamentally different from what outside observers may suppose.

We define a threat to international peace and security as including not only traditional international aggression across borders, but also humanitarian disasters coupled with violence, or a sudden interruption of established democracy, or a gross violation of human rights that is coupled with violence.

We also think it is very important in considering new operations to focus on whether that operation has a clear objective that is linked to a concrete political solution, and whether there is an identifiable end-point or end-state for that operation. This has historically not been a strength of the Security Council's deliberative process.

For Chapter VI peacekeeping operations, we believe it is very important to insist on a ceasefire being in place since consent of the parties is indeed the fundamental basis of the Chapter VI operation.

The threshold, if you will, of factors for consideration when we are debating whether the United States should be directly involved in a peace operation, is higher for obvious reasons. It includes looking at the degree of US interests in the context of the risks, and asking if the risks are commensurate with the interests involved, and whether US participation is critical for the operation's success. Do we have any capabilities that would make success impossible if the US did not participate? Do we have the personnel, the funds, and the resources available to participate in the mission — obviously, keeping an eye on our primary responsibility for being prepared to respond to direct threats to US interests? Can the likely duration and end-point for US participation, sometimes defined differently by the UN, be identified? Do we have domestic and Congressional support for the operation?

Earlier reference was made to the impact of Somalia, as having a direct result in Congress that forced the end of our participation in that mission. This only reinforces an earlier point I made about not asking the United Nations to do what it is not well equipped to do. It clearly taught us an

important lesson about the need to ensure that we have the support at home to maintain our commitment to peace operations.

Finally, the command and control arrangements are something we need to pay particular attention to as we look at US participation. We have laid out a framework for making a systematic assessment and a thorough evaluation of what we believe to be the most important factors to look at the very outset of an operation.

It is sometimes supposed that this list of factors is intended to restrict US support for or participation in UN peace operations. This is fundamentally untrue.

A brief look around the world at where the United States is and what we are doing in support of these operations, I think, makes that very plain. Our direct participation in UN blue helmet operations is relatively limited. We have some 1,000 armed forces members participating in blue helmet operations. But we also have tens of thousands of servicemen and women providing direct assistance to peace operations and related activities which are conducted pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions but independent of the UN.

I will briefly note here the other major elements of the PDD review. We have devoted significant time to coming up with new initiatives and mechanisms for consulting with Congress in an effort to ensure that we do a better job of explaining the importance of peace operations, bringing Congress on board in decisions to support and participate in them. Otherwise, building a consensus for this important tool in the years to come certainly will be more difficult, especially given the results of the 1994 federal election.

The centrepiece of the review, in fact, most of it, is devoted to making suggestions about how to strengthen the United Nations. There is a significant section devoted to budgeting and financing, but the real heart of the matter is the US's commitment to strengthening the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' ability to plan, mount and oversee, and conduct peace operations.

The review also discussed the importance of involving the US Department of Defense in decisions about, and indeed, proposed that the Department of Defense start financing a share of US assessments for, UN peace operations. Given the more ambitious nature of many of the missions, the Administration concluded that the Department needed to play a larger role in those peace operations in which US forces participate. And finally, the review also clarified what has been long standing US policy toward the command and control of US forces in the context of the multilateral operation.

Turning to the Department of Defense and what we have underway within our various component pieces, in terms of preparing for peace operations, one of the things you will find if you excavate recent military guidances is that the specific guidance pertaining to peace operations is a new development. I think it speaks directly to the fact that the US Armed Forces recognize that these missions are here to stay and pose some unique challenges and require a greater attention and greater efforts on the part of our military leadership to make sure that when we ask US military personnel to participate in these operations, they are as well prepared as is possible.

For example, the use of overwhelming and decisive force, the central tenet of our war fighting doctrine, is not necessarily relevant to peace operations. The enemy may not be an easily identified foe approaching in a tank. The military tasks that are common to both the work of war and peace, such as patrolling or conducting or escorting convoys, may have fundamentally different purposes when conducted in the context of a peace operation. The services have begun to reflect this. Not only has the Army written Field Manual 100-5 (Operations) which deals for the first time with a comprehensive section on Operations Other Than War (OOTW), it has published Field Manual 100-23 (Peace Operations), which is a doctrine dealing specifically with peace operations. This is an important indication of the change in attitude that is underway in the US Army. At the same time we are also moving toward a joint doctrine on peace operations which will provide overall guidance to all of the Services that are involved in varying degrees in these operations.

Alongside doctrinal development, and in fact, one might argue, preceding doctrinal development, have been innovations in training our

forces. While it is very clear that a well-trained, disciplined combat soldier s the necessary foundation for a soldier who is fully equipped to participate n peace operations, there is a growing understanding within the military that some of the specific challenges that are unique to peace operations do require different knowledge, skills, and sometimes attitudes. The Services have initiated a wide variety of training activities at virtually every level that deals specifically with peace operations. It varies enormously from Service to Service, but even those Services which have not been as involved as the Army in implementing new types of training -- for all levels of its personnel -have at least made changes in their educational system, to ensure that at more senior levels, there is exposure to the whole range of OOTW missions. One of the great success stories that I like to tell is about the Army's joint readiness training centre in Louisiana and the Combined Military Training Centre (CMTC) in Hohenfels, Germany, where they have developed astonishingly effective and realistic training scenarios for peace operations. In fact, in the context of the CMTC, we have had a number of Allies who have recognized the unique opportunity for training for peace operations available there. There have been nations, who shall go unnamed unless they wish to identify themselves, who have insisted on rotating their units through before sending them off to peace operations. We have also got US Atlantic Command (USACOM) developing joint peacekeeping training programs designed to prepare the Joint Task Force commanders and staff better for these operations. This is a long term effort, only now in its initial stages. If one canvasses the whole range of activities that are underway, it s a very impressive start, begun under Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell and now under Chairman General John Shalikashvili to help adjust and respond and fine tune our military for the demand of peace operations.

Turning finally to the issue of enhancing the capabilities of others to participate in peace operations, the bottom line is that this is central. If peace operations are to be an economy of force, if they are to be Service force multipliers, they require that others are well equipped to perform their part of what needs to remain a multilateral effort. The United States certainly recognizes this fact and it is part of the reason why the PDD on reforming multilateral peace operations focuses so extensively on improving United Nations capabilities.

The efforts that we have underway, and I am speaking just from the Department of Defense's perspective, to improve UN capabilities are numerous. While they tend to be relatively small scale, they should not be construed as being ineffectual. We provide US military personnel to the United Nations in a variety of capacities, generally for two year stints: Service military planners, logisticians, budget and procurement experts, etc. We provide a little over ten percent of all foreign military personnel detailed to the United Nations. In addition, we have provided in the context of smaller teams of experts, significant degrees of expertise. A good example of this is a working group from the Joint Staff from J4 that went up and worked hand in hand with logistics planners at the United Nations, stayed with them for several weeks and taught them the ABCs of how we do their work in a US context, and left them with a series of recommendations and a series of basic templates that they could use for various contracting purposes, organizational purposes, as well as budgetary tools. In fact, the UN has begun implementing many of their recommendations. At the same time my office sponsored a study, by the Defence Information System Agency (DISA), to go up and survey the entire range of communications and information requirements of the United Nations. The DISA team sat down with the UN and said: What are your needs, what do you have for technology, what do you need in the future? It designed a blueprint of a communications architecture that is commercially available that the United Nations can procure in modular units to increase vastly its ability to communicate from the field and within the headquarters, and to enable the UN to transfer enormous amounts of data that are now regrettably somewhat still inaccessible in the context of the technology that they have. These types of initiatives will continue and they are very much reflective of the direction that is provided in the PDD for strengthening UN operations.

The last point I want to make is that NATO, the Partnership For Peace and bilateral programs, and the whole web of security system programs that we have underway in the department, offer very important opportunities to strengthen the capabilities of other individual national militaries and of other regional organizations to improve their own peace operations capabilities. I think we will see a significantly increased emphasis in the context of the security assistance program and our participation in multilateral organizations, to try to make them very useful tools for expanding the pool of foreign forces that can keep multinational operations truly multinational.

Joseph Jockel

Canada and International Peacekeeping: An American View

Experience teaches that this can sometimes be a perilous topic to address in the United States, particularly in the light of a contest run by a New York magazine, in which contestants were asked to invent the most boring book topic in the world. The winner was "Canada, Our Northern Neighbour," which sounds alarmingly close to my topic. Some wag added that the most boring newspaper headline would have to be, "Canada Takes New Diplomatic Initiative." But if there is one area that makes Americans perk up and pay attention to Canada, and show interest in Canadian affairs, it is in the area of international peacekeeping. Canada has a reputation as a peacekeeper par excellence, a reputation won particularly during the Cold War.

My basic thesis this afternoon is that Canadian peacekeeping policy is going to require some real innovation if it wants to retain that reputation. The Defence Policy review which is currently underway by the Liberal government comes at a particularly opportune time, and I will return to this.

In retrospect, it is striking how relatively effortlessly Canada won its reputation as an international peacekeeper during the Cold War. Above all

Dr. Jockel directs the Canada Project for the Americas Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He has authored and coauthored several books and many articles on Canada, including <u>Canada and International Peacekeeping</u>, published as part of the Center's Significant Issue series, and co-published by the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

else, peacekeeping operations during the Cold War were infrequent. The United Nations over the past several years has authorized as many operations as it did during the entire course of the Cold War. Furthermore, great powers and superpowers were usually excluded from serving on peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations, so the system was rigged in Canada's favour. Canada was the Western peacekeeper at a time when other great powers, particularly the United States, were often excluded. At the same time, Canada's relatively substantial military could relatively easily supply up to 2,000 personnel, the informal benchmark that the Government of Canada had set for itself through this period. So, again, it was relatively easy for Canada to win its reputation as international peacekeeper: the system was rigged, and the demands placed on Canada were not, in retrospect, all that great.

Yet it has to be recognized that at the same time, the Canadian formula for peacekeeping success in the Cold War was simple, but very effective: always supply highly professional, well-trained military personnel, usually, but not always, from the infantry. But this simple and effective formula also meant that peacekeeping during the Cold War never developed as a real specialty of the Canadian Armed Forces. Despite the extensive peacekeeping experience of many Canadian officers, no special Canadian peacekeeping units were ever established, training for peacekeeping during the Cold War was minimal, and little was done to develop either doctrine or plans.

In Canada today, there is a striking discrepancy between the public's and the military's perception of the peacekeeping role, both current and historic, of the Canadian Armed Forces. The public, surprisingly, tends to see peacekeeping as the historic specialty of the Canadian military. This perception has been encouraged by recent governments, despite the fact that Canadian contributions to collective defence through NATO and NORAD cost far more in money, personal commitment, diplomatic contributions, and indeed in accidental loss of life. Bear in mind that it was a monument to international peacekeeping that was dedicated with great fanfare a few years ago in downtown Ottawa -- not one to NATO or NORAD. This perception of Canada, and the Canadian military, as having a specialty in peacekeeping exists outside the country too. It is strikingly at odds with the Canadian military's perception of itself, and, I might add, its most deeply held hopes for its future.

Today, Canada's simple but effective Cold War approach to peacekeeping has been under very heavy strain. The main reason for this is that the number of peacekeeping operations has increased enormously. Canada has participated in virtually all of them; indeed, you can say all, depending upon how you count the Angola missions. At the same time, the Canadian military is shrinking dramatically. There has been a substantial decline in personnel. This accelerated under the Mulroney government, and continues to do so under the Chretien government. The Chretien government has decreed that within several short years, the Canadian Armed Forces' total enlisted personnel and officers will be fewer than 67,000. The Canadian Armed Forces are going to become a very small force. Within it, the Army's cutting edge, and it is the Army that bears the brunt of peacekeeping, is being reduced; it has been reduced to three brigade groups of roughly, and this is stretching it a bit, 4,000 personnel each. So the Army's ability to contribute to international peacekeeping is tight. At the same time, Canada faces competition from other countries. As the old Cold War exclusions no longer apply, Americans, Germans, Russians -- to name just a few countries -- are all peacekeeping. The system is no longer rigged in Canada's favour.

This is a topic that we could explore at length, but time limits are great, so I won't say very much, except that Canada's notion of itself as a peacekeeper is wrapped up in the mythology of its relationship to the United States. Canadians are peacekeepers, and Americans are war-fighters, so goes the myth, despite the fact that its historical roots are shallow, despite the fact that the United States is entering the peacekeeping field, and ignoring the fact that the system was previously rigged in Canada's favour.

Peacekeeping itself is changing, especially as it shifts from interstate to intrastate involvement. On the one hand, it is becoming more dangerous; on the other, it involves a host of all new functions, including civilian personnel, as the international community attempts to rebuild shattered states. This has required some rethinking of peacekeeping in Canada.

The effect of recent stresses on Canadian peacekeeping has been quite evident. The Canadian Armed Forces have been stretched absolutely to the limit. About three years ago, there were over 4,000 Canadian peacekeepers on duty, which came close to producing a personnel crisis. That crisis eased with the withdrawal of Canadians from Cyprus and the ending of the

Somalia mission, as well as some other factors. However, today there are 2,700 Canadian peacekeepers in the world, most of whom are in the Former Yugoslavia, and the strain on the Army is still evident.

The Army has reacted in the recent past by sending Reserves, that is militia personnel, on peacekeeping assignments including the Former Yugoslavia, which has produced some considerable debate at home in Canada about the wisdom of that course. The Canadian public, which was once absolutely supportive of peacekeeping, is still largely in favour of peacekeeping, though Canadians have grown noticeably frustrated as the efforts in the Former Yugoslavia drag on.

Today, there is a formal review of Canadian Defence policy under way, begun by the Chretien government earlier this year. A Parliamentary Committee was first given the task of assessing and making recommendations and that report, entitled "Security in a Changing World," came out recently. The Minister of National Defence will be making his own recommendations, partially as a result of an internal review, and the Minister will be asking the Prime Minister to make up his mind about the future of Canadian Defence policy. A number of potential directions is evident.

Recently, one very clear-cut direction was pointed out and crystallized by a group called "Canada 21," which is a collection of some very well-known Canadians. It called for Canada to relinquish military roles outside of North America, except for peacekeeping. So one way to deal with the fiscal and the personnel crunch facing the Canadian Armed Forces, would in essence, turn the role of the Forces outside of North America into what would be simply an international peacekeeping force. This, of course, would remove Canada's capability to contribute to peace enforcement operations in the long run. There is substantial domestic support for such an approach, and as I suggested, such an approach would dovetail very, very nicely with some national self-perceptions, as well as some perceptions about the role of the Canadian Armed Forces.

But there are some other possibilities under discussion. The Committee itself came to what it called a "key recommendation." Let me just read it to you:

Our investigations and deliberations over eight months have led us to the following conclusion. In this new post-Cold War environment, Canada should maintain armed forces composed of sea, land, and air elements that are unified, properly equipped, combat capable, and multi-purpose. These forces should be able to operate together at home in defence of our territorial sovereignty and security, and together abroad in support of Canada's multilateral peace and security interests and responsibilities.

In short, the Committee recommended the retention of general-purpose combat capability that could be used for either peacekeeping or peace-enforcement measures, as well as for other domestic measures. More specifically, the Committee recommended that: the Air Force's fighter strength be reduced by 25 percent, by mothballing CF-18 fighters; the Navy's procurement program be continued with the possible exception of submarines; the Army's personnel strength be increased by 3,500 personnel, in order to deal with the shortage caused largely by the peacekeeping crunch; and further, that the Army be equipped with new armoured personnel carriers.

There are many of other possibilities under active discussion that would allow Canada to retain general-purpose combat capabilities, but still rest on the premise that Canada can no longer base its distinctive peacekeeping contribution simply on providing infantry or other combat battalions.

The first of these possibilities is the vanguard approach, whereby Canada would contribute units only at the start of a peacekeeping operation with specialized military skills, such as communications or logistics. Such units are difficult to establish.

A second possibility is relying on more civilian public servants, as well as personnel from non-government organizations, especially those specifically contracted out to provide services such as transport. Canada has been pioneering, I should add, relations between the military and non-government organizations in peacekeeping operations, and the Chretien government has signalled that it is going to be placing a major emphasis on the use of police personnel in peacekeeping operations. Royal Canadian Mounted Police personnel are currently participating in the Haitian

peacekeeping operation and have served with distinction in Namibia and Yugoslavia.

Finally, another emerging element is a new emphasis on Canadian contributions to peacekeeping research and research-based training evident, most prominently I suppose, in the creation of the new Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre. The relationship of the Canadian Armed Forces to the Centre is still going to have to be hammered out, since there is still considerable scepticism within the Forces about the utility of dedicated peacekeeping training and its necessity. The Canadian Army still largely holds the view that a well-equipped combat soldier is the essence of peacekeeping.

In recent years, the Canadian economy has had to adjust to international competition by switching from an emphasis on raw materials to an economy based on higher value. This affects the concept of Canadian peacekeeping. If Canada wants to retain its distinctive peacekeeping reputation, it will similarly have to move from simply supplying highly professional soldiers to emphasis on personnel with special skills and assets.

Let me add a footnote to my own conclusion: that we in the United States have an interest in the outcome of these debates. First, as Secretary of Defense William Perry made very clear in a recent visit to Ottawa, the United States hopes that Canada does maintain general-purpose combat forces, that Canada does not merely specialize in peacekeeping. On the other hand, the United States also has a strong interest in Canada retaining its distinctive role in international peacekeeping.

Humanitarian Peacekeeping: Ethical Considerations

In our work at the Quaker United Nations office in New York, where we have an office of six people who work full-time on UN issues, matters of peacekeeping have come to take a very central role. We now have two people doing Security Council and peacekeeping work nearly full-time. Five years ago the Security Council used to meet twice a month. These days, it meets twice a day, and has numerous items on its agenda each time. Peacekeeping issues have risen to the top of the international agenda. I want to discuss what that implies for our policy-making and implementation strategies.

There is a joke going around the UN these days: "What is the difference between the United Nations and Jurassic Park?" Answer: "The United Nations is a theme park full of dinosaurs, and Jurassic Park is a movie." Personally, that is not my view of the UN and it is my job to help combat that perception. But the joke raises a critical question that may shed light on some of the issues we are discussing at this seminar.

My topic is the ethical considerations of humanitarian peacekeeping. I want to begin by stressing that this topic is not the icing on the cake, but, rather, the flour of which the cake is made. Today the primary task of the UN is the maintenance of peace and security -- if you like, the yeast for that cake.

Since 1986, Mr. Collett has been Director of the Quaker United Nations Office at UN Headquarters in New York, where he specializes in matters of disarmament, regional cooperation, and sustainable development.

The UN was created in 1945 as a mechanism for the maintenance of international peace and security. The United Nations Charter is an international treaty, and governments that have joined the UN are bound to those principles and to the process by which they will meet to deal with issues of common concern, to identify options, and to agree on approaches that will meet the common goal. That is the process of the United Nations, and it is a treaty-bound obligation of member states to adhere to it. It is that process which has led us to accomplish, in 50 years, an amazing amount towards the structuring and maintenance of better world order.

The purpose of the UN is the maintenance of international peace and security; that is, to prevent war. The Charter goes on to say that the UN is also to promote social progress, with better standards of living and greater freedom, to build and maintain respect for international law, and to reaffirm the basic principles of human rights and their implementation. These are not discrete objectives, but the whole package is the foundation upon which peace and security is built.

This leads us to the key word of our topic: "Ethics." Ethics is about what is good for a given society. It also defines a standard of behaviour for individuals and for groups within that society.

Sir Brian Urquhart in his wonderful autobiography, A Life in War and Peace, writes about peacekeeping from the point of view of one who has been a leader in the field for the past 50 years. I want to read two things that he has said about peacekeeping. First, "Peacekeeping depends on the nonuse of force and on political symbolism; that is, by political will. It is the projection of the principle of non-violence onto the military plane. It requires discipline, initiative, objectivity, and leadership, as well as ceaseless supervision and political direction." Later in the book, as he describes the successes and failures of various operations that he was part of through the years, he says, "A peacekeeping force is like a family friend who has moved into a house stricken by disaster. It must conciliate, console, and discreetly run the household without ever appearing to dominate or usurp the natural right of those it is helping." Continuing, he compares peacekeepers to attendants in a lunatic asylum: "The feelings and reactions of peacekeepers must be kept under rigid control, and must always come second to those of the afflicted. But they must also be firm and assert their authority in violent situations."

Although some are calling this the "second generation" of peacekeeping, what we are doing is not really new. This is what peacekeeping has always been about. I also want to say that conditions on the ground have not changed all that much; each operation still starts from scratch, in a "seat-of-the-pants" kind of way. There is almost nothing prepared and ready to go. There is very little in the way of definitions of peacekeeping, how it is to be done, what the trip-wires, the thresholds, are, and how they are to be managed in each situation. The experience of Sir Brian Urguhart over 50 years is not that different from what we find today. as we talk to UN Secretariat officials involved in peacekeeping.

The idea that peacekeeping is applying non-violence on the military plane gives us an ethical charge that is applicable at each level and at every scope of operations. This applies from the mandate given by the Security Council on the objectives, and the procedural mechanisms for an operation right down to field command and operations. It is in the same light unethical to have mandated so many operations without the resources to back them up and implement them fully. The resulting frustrations in the field only serve to increase the cynicism both of the host countries and of the contributors.

I want to underline that the answer to this problem is not what we often see argued, both in political and scholastic circles, that it is basically a question of identifying the limits of what the United Nations can achieve. In other words, we have certain resources, which means we cannot take on every problem, and we must strictly limit where we get involved. This is not the charge laid out in the United Nations Charter. Where there is a problem that calls for an international response, that is a threat to international peace and security, then there is a charge to activate mechanisms. The challenge is to organize those resources that are available and see how we may best orient ourselves to what we are called on to do, and what the ramifications are for an international system trying to handle many other problems.

At a second level, we should also aim to simplify the rules of engagement for peacekeepers. The principles and guidelines of war are fairly clear. They are also fairly simple, and all soldiers and officers are taught them, though they may vary in application in any given situation. They involve things such as minimizing vulnerability, maximizing destruction on the other side, maintaining force, opening areas, and so forth, though I would underline that operations in war are to respect the Geneva

Conventions. The rules of engagement for peacekeeping would be as simple to describe -- to spread-out your positions and make yourself as conspicuous as possible, to engage all sides in dialogue and to do no damage -- but our forces are, necessarily, less trained and experienced in providing this type of response to violence. Once again, this is a resource question. The corollary to this is that we may be more effective in peacekeeping if more of the resources spent preparing for war were spent to make peace. But it is also a political question: governments need to decide -- both in the general case and in each specific case -- that the responsibility is ours, and that more can be done, before, during and after conflict breaks out.

Some thought has been given to these matters, however. I borrow here from Robert Johansen, Head of Notre Dame University's Graduate Peace Studies Program, who has given us what he believes to be some of these principles applying to peacekeeping rules of engagement. His primary principle, which we must keep absolutely clear, is that we are to negotiate differences between adversarial parties with an eye to promoting justice and avoiding loss of life. I remind you that in the Charter, most of today's operations come under Chapter VII, which is a response to threats to peace and security. But Chapter VI, which is about pacific settlement of disputes, states in Article 33 that conflicts and disputes should be submitted for arbitration, negotiation, and reconciliation. There is a long list of different approaches given, and disputes may be resolved locally, regionally, or nationally -- whatever the parties may choose. That is supposed to be done first.

Now, we need to ask today, where are these mechanisms? Where may countries go for adjudication of disputes? Certainly, the World Court is there, but that body cannot do all of the things required in that list in Article 33. And, just as we have recognized the need for mediation in families, in neighbourhoods, even in labour disputes, by creating automatic mechanisms to facilitate this, so we need to build mechanisms that will do this internationally. Even people like Saddam Hussein, when they have legitimate gripes -- their oil is being pumped out, they do not have access to the sea -- are expected to submit these issues to adjudication, so that military "solutions" are delegitimized.

A second peacekeeping ethics principle stated by Johansen is that peacekeeping forces should intervene non-violently and legally before violence breaks out, in order to prevent it. Once violence sets in, it is much more difficult to deal with the situation. A third is that avoidance of coercion is important, though of lower priority than avoiding violence and achieving justice. So coercion may be used to avoid violence, but if used it must be legitimately authorized and principled in application.

A fourth important principle is this: do nothing to legitimize military force. Military people may have trouble swallowing that, but I think it is of vital importance that they do. I repeat: do nothing to legitimize military force. Under this rubric comes everything from arms exports to the alleviation of conditions that lead to violence in societies. We should try to make it so that the aggrieved do not feel the need to resort to violence, and we must refuse to recognize territorial gains achieved through violence.

On the other hand, principled police force should be legitimized, to enforce legal norms that are established by the world community. There we have to underline "world community" -- not one or two governments. Enforcement should be against the violator and not the whole society, and, as far as possible, through non-lethal means. War crimes could be prosecuted in a new international war crimes tribunal.

This all implies the democratization of the United Nations, because if the UN is not democratized, that is if there is not a broader consultative consensus in the way decisions are made, then sanctions and enforcement will be applied unfairly.

How do peacekeepers relate to the places where they are sent? Peacekeepers are the extension into those situations of the UN mandate. This implies, for one thing, a change in the paradigm of politics involved with conflict. It is not simply a matter of identifying who is guilty and how to punish them. The objective overall from mandate to operational activities is to heal nations and to begin early with the reconstruction that will prevent violence and retribution many years later.

We need to think in these terms. If we do not, we shall find ourselves in one violent cycle after another. There is no other solution. We have to take collective responsibility for sustainable human and global development.

Finally, all of this has very significant implications for the training of peacekeepers. There is a very interesting progression that you should consider, in the development of the resolution on Peacekeeping and all its Aspects recently passed by the General Assembly's Fourth Committee and the Committee of 34, the special committee on peacekeeping. The General Assembly is now working to consolidate this committee's work on peacekeeping operations, and to make recommendations that are systemwide.

In last year's General Assembly resolution, training was mentioned as the responsibility of governments at the national level. There is a contradiction there, in that at the same time the UN Secretariat was supposed to find out what needed to be done in peacekeeping, and to draw the experience of peacekeeping together for those that are doing the training. It was not clear how that was to be done both nationally and by the UN.

This year, however, there is a whole section on training of peacekeepers. Training is now seen as an increasingly important element for peacekeeping operations, especially training in negotiation and conflict resolution. This underscores again the difference between a soldier just trained for soldiering and someone who is trained additionally for peacekeeping operations. A soldier is trained to go and do what he is told to do, but a peacekeeper cannot rely on that. If a peacekeeper meets a situation of violence with an armed potential opponent and fails to deal with it immediately, there is the probability of escalation: in this, the introduction of peacekeepers is a potential escalation in itself. It is like neighbours in a neighbourhood dispute bringing in the lawyers -- up go the stakes. The introduction of a peacekeeping unit will automatically have that effect, especially if the peacekeepers are not prepared to deal with conflict resolution and negotiation as necessary on the ground. In sum, we must approach peacekeeping fully aware of the ethical responsibilities involved. It is the only way we will be truly effective.

Management of Future UN Peacekeeping Operations

I am hopeful that with such a high degree of interest in this seminar from the business community we can somehow transpose the well-known efficiency and effectiveness of American business to the operations of the UN.

The United Nations Association of the United States America (UNA-USA) is a non-profit organization that has been around for about as long as the United Nations itself. It has 35,000 members around the US, and is an umbrella organization for about 150 NGOs and other organizations in America.

I would like to tell you about the procurement project that is ongoing at UNA-USA. We serve three different constituencies. One is the White House and Congress. The second, of course, is our membership. And the third is the UN itself. We serve to educate and inform as to what is happening at the UN. We work very closely with legislators, and we work with the UN officials, both in the diplomatic corps and in the Secretariat.

We at UNA-USA have traditionally been known for our policy work. Over the course of the last two years, we have added a new constituency to our outreach, and that is the corporate community. In so doing, we have tried to move away from the policy aspects of the work and deal on a more practical

Mr. Cwerman is the Vice President in charge of the Department of Corporate and Congressional Affairs at the United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA).

level to help corporations, business executives, and any other interested parties understand how the UN procurement system works, what is wrong with it, how to fix it and how the business sector can do more business with the UN procurement system.

What we have found in our work so far is that the frustration level among American companies in particular is very, very high. They are not used to working in the culture of the UN, they expect a high degree of efficiency and effectiveness, based on their experiences with other large institutions.

Basically, we take business people to visit UN missions, so they can see peacekeeping operations for themselves, see what kinds of things are needed in each of these different operations. We have gone all over the world, which has led to a great deal of cooperation between certain companies and the UN Secretariat.

Recently, we have been putting together what, to my knowledge, is an unprecedented publication. It is a guide to 16 of the largest procurement centres in the UN system. Every year the UN spends about US\$3.5 billion acquiring goods and services. Out of that US\$3.5 billion, US\$1.5 are spent on peacekeeping-related activity. Two billion dollars is spent on non-peacekeeping-related goods and services.

I think that the procurement issue in general will be a very, very hot political issue in the coming two years. If any of you have read the Republican Party's "Contract with America," you will see that it makes mention of the procurement issue, and I believe we shall see some strong legislative activity in trying to reform the procurement system at the UN.

If we are to believe what Senator Jesse Helms said in a recent news conference in Raleigh, North Carolina, I think that there is going to be a great debate, a renewed debate, about what exactly the US role is in the United Nations, not only overall, but particularly in peacekeeping. Our hope is that moderate Republicans and Democrats will forge a common-sense approach to the UN, and will reform UN procurement in a sensible manner.

Some of the statistics that we have uncovered and that will be available in our publication are interesting. The Chief Administrative Officers of

peacekeeping missions purchase on their own about US\$770 million worth of goods and services annually. UN Headquarters purchases about US\$470 million worth of goods and services. The UN's Purchase and Transportation Service handles procurement of about US\$470 million and is staffed by 30 full-time procurement officers. (By contrast, NATO Headquarters employs about 1,100 people to do much less procurement than that.)

The United States, of course, continues to be the UN's largest supplier. In 1993, US companies sold US\$505 million of goods and services to the United Nations, which is about 14 per cent of the UN market. In 1993, the US share of UN peacekeeping purchases handled by the Purchase and Transportation Service, which is the main organ of peacekeeping procurement, amounted to about US\$129 million or 27 per cent of total peacekeeping procurement.

There is a growing appreciation at the UN that there needs to be a better kind of approach to all these procurement activities. The UN has been greatly criticized in this area, and I think that criticism will continue in the coming months, but I think it is important to note that there has been some improvement, and that has come with the assistance of the US Defence Department and also with the assistance of some companies in the US business community.

Some major structural changes have taken place within the UN procurement department during the past few years. The Field Operations Division is now a part of the Department of Peacekeeping, a logistical operations centre has been opened, and a 24 hour a day situation centre has opened. A new policy analysis unit has been established, and two new Assistant Secretaries-General have been appointed: one for operational supervision, and one for planning and support. The procurement process is starting to function on a geographical basis, with three divisions; one for Europe and Latin America, one for Asia and the Middle East, and one for Africa. A new unit has been set up to deal with electoral assistance. For the first time there is some long-range planning. A whole Planning and Support Division deals with field administration, financial management, logistics, communications, personnel management, supervision over civilian police, and de-mining. There are improved procedures for planning and budgeting, and a whole new series of communications architecture has been designed.

The UN is changing, and there are some unbelievable opportunities for American and international business at the UN, especially within the NGO community. Many goods and services are required, and I think that the business community has awakened to the fact that there is a new opportunity there. All of a sudden, everyone has come running to the UN, and Secretariat officers are a bit overwhelmed.

It is a myth to think that there is some sort of quota system at the UN, that certain countries automatically receive a certain proportion of the procurement pie. The US continues to be the number-one supplier, but other countries are gaining, and I still think there is plenty of room for increasing American contracts with the UN. And not just peacekeeping contracts, but also humanitarian, also social -- in the order of US\$2 billion.

There is a lot of work down the road to make the procurement system more efficient, but it is happening, and it is happening at a fairly rapid rate.

Command and Control of International Forces

I was asked to talk to you about the selection of a UN force commander, the qualities that a commander ought to have and the challenges, and the responsibilities that face an individual once he is put into command of a UN contingent.

I have worked for two UN Secretaries-General, and I asked each of them in turn how they went about choosing a Force commander. (I remember the reaction of Perez de Cuellar, the first of the two. He sighed deeply, his eyes glazed over, and after a considerable pause he said, "You know, General, it is very difficult. It is a very complex problem.") Both agreed that it was a difficult process and then went on to describe in detail the political implications and the complexities of the political choice. Both said little about military qualifications.

Obviously, the nationality, the race, the religion, the language of a commander are all factors -- not so much for what they enable him to do but because some of them may rule him out for a specific mission. I think that you will all understand that. Until 1989, a NATO general or a general from one of the permanent members of the Security Council was rarely selected.

Major-General Milner recently retired from the Canadian Forces after 35 years of service in the Armoured Corps. In 1989, he was promoted to the rank of Major General and appointed as an Under Secretary-General in the UN and Commander of the UN force in Cyprus, a position he held until his retirement in 1993.

Thankfully, that period is over, and these nations now are providing commanders, which has certainly opened up a greater potential for good commanders for UN missions.

As to a commander's military considerations, all nations have a list of qualities that they like to see — courage, decisiveness, dependability, endurance, initiative, integrity, judgement, sense of justice, loyalty, robustness, knowledge, experience, confidence, charisma. And, yes, it helps to have a little bit of an ego too. I would add a number of other necessary qualities, based on my own experience, my relationship with other Force commanders, and the five years that I spent wearing the blue beret. These are optimism, boundless energy, and enthusiasm. I would also add to the requirement for courage, *moral* courage. Most of all, a commander must have credibility; he must have credibility with the belligerents, with the civilians, with the police, and especially with the soldiers in the mission. He also needs a lot of patience, and, preferably, he should be from a nation that has worked within an alliance. That experience will stand him in good stead when he comes to work in the international environment of the UN.

In the case of ongoing missions, the process is relatively simple. Commanders are selected from amongst those nations that contribute the most to current missions, perhaps not for that particular mission, but to any ongoing mission. It is a kind of payback time for those countries that contribute the most troops, the most equipment, etc.

For new missions, it is a little more difficult. Some in the UN Secretariat describe it this way: "Give me two battalions and a helicopter squadron, and you can have the deputy commander and the chief-of-staff jobs." As the UN Secretariat staff go through this selective process, they will be approached by national representatives to the UN in New York, many of whom are eager to obtain force commanders' positions.

One thing is important in new missions, and I cannot over-emphasize this: the selection of its commander should be made as early as possible. This does not always happen; it did not happen with UNPROFOR, for example, but it should. Get the field commander picked, give him sufficient time to prepare himself, and, if at all possible, give him time to conduct a reconnaissance in the mission area. Give him a say in the selection of his

staff. Give him a say in the organization of the mission, and in the types of unit. Give him a say in its deployment.

The reality is that selection of a commander more often than not takes blace after all these other matters have been decided. And once they have been decided, it is extremely difficult to change them. UNPROFOR is a case in point. The reconnaissance was conducted without a commander having been named. It was suggested to the UN that, to go into Yugoslavia, we needed an army corps -- not a peacetime corps, but a real wartime corps of 125,000 troops. With that, we might, we just might, be able to stabilize the situation so that we could then start to talk about the resolution. Now, I am not suggesting for a moment that such a corps would have solved the Yugoslavian problem, not at all. But with the proper deployment, it might have been able to reduce the number of villages that were destroyed, the number of people that were killed, and the number of mass graves that have since been discovered.

A commander should have experience; that should go without saying. Right now, there are thousands of officers in the world who have UN experience, many in the room here. There are dozens of senior officers who have experience at the senior level -- both staff and line experience. If you get an officer that has primarily staff experience, you may find that he will stay in his headquarters, he will sit in his office, and he will appear to be in control and doing a good job, though this is not necessarily true. On the other hand, if you take an officer that has primarily line experience, he delieves that out on the line is where he should be. He may neglect his staff and his headquarters, and his relationship with New York and with the delligerents and the missions will probably suffer as a result.

Somehow or other, you have got to get a commander with both those experiences, so as to provide a balance between troops and headquarters, as well as among all the other factors and organizations.

UN missions require, perhaps even more than war missions, a commander that leads from the front. I cannot emphasize that too much. A commander has got to get out on the line and be seen and be known by the troops.

A word or two about command and control. How does a commander run the operations? A commander is only as good as his staff. He must have a quality staff, a good deputy commander, chief of staff, deputy chief of staff, operations officer, logistics officer, humanitarian officer, public information officer, and on, and on, and on.

It is preferable that a commander have a say in the selection of these people, but this is difficult in the UN. All nations like to get key appointments, for no other reason than to think that puts them closer to the Force commander, or to the head of mission. Nations vie for these positions, so it is virtually impossible for a commander personally to select his overall staff.

It is essential that a commander be able to pick his own executive assistant, however. The executive assistant is of vital importance. At high-level meetings, that young major, that young lieutenant colonel has got to be able to think in the same language and be inside the mind of the commander. Quite often, note-taking is difficult at these meetings; the only "note-taking" happens later, when you have left the meeting and are back outside with your executive assistant. A commander has got to be able to turn to him and ask, "What do you think he said?" A commander needs to be told not what he thinks he wants to hear; he needs to be told what in fact took place. Then that commander has to be able to say, "OK, I want you to write up a cable, send it to New York, send it to all the national contingent commanders, and advise all the subordinate commanders." The executive assistant has to be alert, he has to be totally trustworthy.

The same is true of the personal assistant, the PA, or aide de camp. This young lieutenant or captain must be totally dedicated and able to understand the commander completely. The commander is too busy thinking about so many other things. The same is true of the driver. A commander must have a dependable driver.

You also need some good security people. In so many of the missions today -- Yugoslavia is no exception, Rwanda is no exception -- you need that security element. Many commanders I know have received death threats, and you cannot take them lightly. You have to take them seriously. You must have personnel around you that you have total trust in, to enable you to do the job. Those who want to be force commanders should not look

at this as being a kind of perk. Security people are needed so the commander can do what he is hired to do without concern.

Staff-training is important. Most nations of the world have some form of staff-training for their military organizations. Some is good, some is not so good. Those that have none will invariably send their officers to a country that does have staff-training. More and more training at national military staff colleges is being devoted to the UN and peacekeeping operations. Some staff officers arrive in mission with no staff-training at all, and it is extremely difficult to put your team together when you lack qualified people. You have to do the best you can. You can conduct some training inside the mission, though this is extremely difficult in the case of new missions. In a mission that has been ongoing for some time, you may be able to take the time to do some. A good chief of staff will train his staff officer, will conduct exercises, will burn the midnight oil to make sure that that officer comes up to speed.

By the way, military staff-training does not necessarily fit an officer for UN work. There are differences in the way that the UN does things. I think it is essential that staff-training be dedicated to UN operations. Organizations such as the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia have gone a long way towards solving this problem.

Apart from the staff, what about the contingents? How do you build this team? There are many nationalities involved; in UNPROFOR, I believe, thirty nationalities are represented in the military, with probably thirty or forty other nationalities represented among the police and civilians there. Different languages, different religions, different races, different cultures, different levels of experience -- how does a commander bring all these people together and get them to work as a team? That is probably the biggest challenge that faces anyone selected to do the job.

The one common aim that the Commander must continue to pound into everyone's head is: set aside your national differences, set aside some of your national pride, you are wearing the blue beret, you are working under the UN flag. That is the common goal. That is the mandate. That is what we are here for. Everybody has got to work towards that common goal.

As far as training of the contingents goes, the UN now has good training guidelines based on some 45 years' experience. They are good. They have been prepared by the staff, and from my own experience I can tell you that nations who follow those guidelines will produce contingents that are up for the job. Experience is passed on, obviously. Courses are being conducted. In-theatre exercises are now being conducted by missions. This helps bring teams together. These exercises should include not only the military, but also the police and civilian components as well as the staff.

The primary -- indeed the most important factor -- in all of this teamwork, though, is the commander. So much depends on the individual, his personality, if the thing is going to work.

A word or two about equipment. Contingents show up with all different types of equipment. In days gone by, one nation would send a soldier with a rifle and a grey blanket and that would be it. Another would send him with top-of-the-line equipment. I think there has been some levelling here. There is more standardization, and the UN has produced equipment scales that most nations are able to meet. This works well. Nations that are unable to meet them are assisted by the UN and by the better-off nations and contingents. Napoleon Bonaparte talked about the importance of morale. A soldier's morale is kept up if you put food in his belly, and you put good clothes on him, keep his feet dry, and generally take care of him. Each nation's soldiers show up with different equipment, different clothing. They eat different food. Some bring their own medical officers; others do not. Some bring their own padres, others do not. Some bring their own dental officers; others do not. This can make things difficult for a commander, because the morale of one nation's contingent may be low simply because it lacks the facilities of some of the other contingents.

Let me talk a little about civilians, my favourite people. I am one now and I was one before I became a soldier. The military-civilian interface has been discussed at length by the previous speakers. There are, basically, two types of civilian in UN missions. There are the UN professionals, the people that sign on and make a career of the UN. They vary from plumbers to PhDs, with too many PhDs and not enough plumbers.

They come with skills and talents that the military do not have. The great thing that they have is a knowledge of UN procedures. The military come

and go -- six months, eight months, a year, and then they are back to their country, back into doing what they did before. But civilians are in for the long haul. Many of them have served in ten, twelve, or fifteen missions. They have an expertise that the mission cannot do without. It is essential to win them over and make sure they feel part of the team. Civilians do not get medals, by the way.

The other type of civilian is the local employee. These too are important people, a great asset. They may also be a problem. They come with their unions and their leaders. You know the UN is an equal-opportunity employer; at least, we like to think that it is. And it offers good pay, good employment. It does not take the locals long to figure that out. The next thing you know, you have got all kinds of problems related to this, because you are supposed to employ equal numbers from each of the parties to the conflict.

Therein lies a problem. You can have two of the belligerents working in the kitchen at the same time, while their brothers and fathers are out there on the line trying to harm one another. Sometimes it seems a force commander spends more time keeping the peace amongst the peacekeepers than he does amongst the belligerents. You have to tell these people, "Look, we are here to protect democracy, not to practise it within the mission." You will understand what I mean by that.

A word or two about civilian police. Are they military, are they civilian? I see them as a mix of both. The mission in Namibia, with its large number of military police, was a success. They did great work. Civilian police have been in missions for a long time before that. They were here from the beginning of UNFICYP.

The policeman brings with him skills that are not found in the military or on the civilian side. Back home, every day, he deals with humanitarian problems. He deals with the problems of society. He deals with all kinds of things that the rest of us prefer not to know about, problems that exist everywhere. He can be an invaluable asset. I must tell you, my relationship with the civilian police up until the time that I went in to the UN had always been on the receiving end -- a speeding ticket, etc. Now I see them in a different light. They are invaluable to UN operations.

A word or two about discipline. A force commander has no authority regarding discipline, yet he has the responsibility for it. The only people with authority for discipline over troops are their national commanders, the contingent commanders. Disciplinary measures vary from military to military. A drunk-driving charge in one army, and a soldier is reduced in rank, fined heavily, and returned home. Another army's response will be, "What's a small thing like a drunk-driving charge? No problem!"

As far as civilians go, there are very few ways you can discipline a civilian in the UN. You can threaten him about losing his job, you can do all kinds of other things, but there is no legal basis for a force commander to use in dealing with a disciplinary problem. I am sure it is the same in every mission. We had a lot of problems with accidents -- stupid accidents, alcohol misuse, and so on.

One of my advisors used to say, "Look, the next time a guy gets picked up drunk-driving or has a serious vehicle accident, send him home." Well, I thought about that for a minute and I realized that if I issued that directive, I would get at least 20 soldiers that would immediately buy a case of beer, drink it, steal a vehicle, go run into a wall, and then find an MP to arrest them. These people would welcome being sent home.

The important and special relationships that a force commander must develop, in addition to those with his staff, is with the UN's special representative, the head of mission. This is essential. This person, of different nationality, has to be with the commander on a day-to-day basis. The same is also true with the chief administrative officer, the civilian. The same is true with the civilian police officers, the diplomats, the non-governmental organizations, the other UN agencies, the belligerents, and indeed UN Headquarters itself.

Visitors can also place demands on your time. They all think they are important. Prime ministers, ministers of defence, chiefs of staff, chiefs of police, diplomats, politicians, the media, staff from UN Headquarters -- they will visit a mission area in droves. All of them want to see the commander. It takes a lot of patience and a lot of endurance, and your time and schedule is very difficult to manage but, remember, you also have to be out there with the troops from time to time.

I will not say too much about the media. I did not have complete trust in the media, and it is difficult to have that. I think their "hometown" stories are great for morale, so the families back home can know that Johnny is doing all right, and is safe. Force commanders want the media to be honest, to be accurate, and to be responsible. The media may be seen as a tool, a

valuable tool, as long as it shows responsibility, and as long as you use it

properly.

I believe the UN Military Staff Committee could be a useful organization, although there are differing views on this. When I was a force commander, I would have liked somebody in New York that understood what my problems were. On the other hand, from ten commanders you will get ten different opinions. But with 80,000 troops out there, and more than a dozen missions, the Secretary-General and his military staff and his Secretariat officials are overwhelmed with information. Some kind of Military Staff Committee, whether it be created or formed as is designated in the Charter of the UN, modified or not, could be a great help.

A concluding observation: there is no course for commanders. There could be and there should be. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada is preparing such a session.

Before you leave, just take a look at that picture of silhouetted peacekeeper at the entrance to the seminar room. You cannot tell the nationality of that guy. It does not matter; it is probably a good thing that you cannot (although the experts amongst you will probably be able to.) This is a young man, somebody's son, somebody's husband, perhaps, a little guy with a teddy bear, just doing the best he can. I think the UN owes it to him to make sure he comes home mentally healthy, with all his limbs and his life. The selection process should be such that the right commanders are chosen to make sure that this guy can do the job he was sent to do.

If you asked any UN force commander how it felt, he would tell you, "Well, I was honoured to be selected, I was proud, I was challenged, I was frustrated, but at the end of it I felt rewarded." I do not think there is any higher calling for a military officer than to command a UN mission.

Lessons from UNPROFOR: Peacekeeping from a Force Commander's Perspective

In addressing this topic, I think I should take a moment or two to introduce you to UNPROFOR, the largest, and, I would suggest, the most complex UN mission to date. I shall then highlight what I believe to be, from a commander's point of view, the principal differences between a peacekeeping mission and that of a more traditional military activity. The differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement will be examined, and then I want to talk about the characteristics that I believe peacekeeping forces must possess. In this, I shall concentrate on the concept of credibility, which I believe is the principal quality required by peacekeepers, and offer some personal thoughts as to the direction in which I believe peacekeeping operations are evolving.

Firstly, then, what is UNPROFOR? Some facts and figures are relevant. The present strength of the mission is a shade over 44,000 with some 39,000 of these being military. A total of 35 nations are currently represented in the mission, with some 25 of these contributing formed units. The UNPROFOR mission area has to date experienced 1,100 casualties, 110 of which have been fatal. As are all UN peacekeeping operations, UNPROFOR is, of course, guided by Security Council resolutions; the Council has adopted over forty resolutions which have an impact in some form or other on the operations of UNPROFOR. The

Major-General MacInnis is a former Deputy Commander of UNPROFOR and is now the Commander of Land Force Atlantic Area.

UNPROFOR mission is, not surprisingly, continually evolving as the priorities of effort shift in response to the situation on the ground. In the most general of terms, there are three main components of the UNPROFOR mission.

The first of these is the provision of support to United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) humanitarian-assistance operations. At present, UNHCR provides assistance to over 4,000,000 inhabitants in the Former Yugoslavia, 2,700,000 of whom are in Bosnia-Herzegovina. UNPROFOR's role in this operation ranges from actual delivery of food and shelter material to convoy escort to the monitoring of secondary distribution. Support to humanitarian assistance has long been our *raison d'etre* in Bosnia, although as the freedom of access for commercial traffic increases, and as ceasefire implementation requirements increase, this task has clearly become less important.

A second UNPROFOR goal is the establishment of conditions conducive to the resumption of negotiations between the warring parties, mainly through the achievement of a cessation of hostilities. This has been our primary focus in Croatia and Bosnia. More recently, however, the nitiatives of the Contact Group have pre-empted much of UNPROFOR's actions in this regard in Bosnia.

Another important UNPROFOR activity is the monitoring of the various ceasefire agreements signed by the parties, in particular, the 23 February Bosnian Croat-Muslim accord, and the 29 March 1994 agreement in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) between the Croats and the Krajina Serbs. This is in line with what I would call traditional peacekeeping, involving the interpositioning of UN troops between the forces, the creation of zones of separation, the conduct of patrols and operations, etc. It also involves joint policing and humanitarian and human-rights work.

In order to accomplish its mandate, UNPROFOR is divided into three major subordinate commands: Croatia Command, consisting of the four JNPAs, Bosnia-Herzegovina Command comprising Sectors Northeast and Southwest and Sector Sarajevo, and, finally, FYROM Command, located in Skopje, which is the UN's first preventive peacekeeping deployment. HQ JNPROFOR, in Zagreb, is headed by the Special Representative of the

Secretary-General (SRSG), and consists of three components: military, civil/political, and administrative.

Before I leave this introduction, I would like to remind you that there have been four conflicts under way at one time or the other with which UNPROFOR has had to deal: The Serb-Croat war, which started in 1991 and which has, in the main, come to an end; the Croat-Muslim conflict, which caused so much pain, damage and suffering during the winter of 1993-94, and which ended on 29 March 1994; the Muslim-Muslim conflict in the Bihac area, which ended earlier this autumn; and the current Bosnian Government-Bosnian Serb conflict, which I hope will soon be over.

Enough of my preamble. I would now like to examine key ways in which peacekeeping differs from more traditional military operations. The first of these is that in the past, military commanders have been used to fighting clearly defined, if not necessarily identifiable, enemies. In a peacekeeping mission, there are no enemies, only potential partners with conflicting aims and interests. Notwithstanding the fact that his troops may be under fire, the UN peacekeeping commander must take an absolutely impartial and objective approach to all parties; he cannot be, nor can he be perceived to be, a party to the conflict. It remains a fact of life that a peacekeeping mission can only be undertaken and maintained if all parties involved accept the presence and legitimacy of the UN force.

On a related theme, there is not likely to be a military solution to a peacekeeping mission: there is no victory to be won by armed force. The only victory is the securing of a lasting peace. All military commanders seek to have a clearly identifiable end-state or goal upon which to focus their efforts and their resources. However, the peacekeeping scenario with its mission to "implement ceasefires between warring parties" hardly provides the well-defined end-state which each commander desires. In many cases, the desired end-state has not been determined, or the parties have not agreed to it. Hence, the military commander is often in the position of having to chart his own path.

Political direction is provided to the Force Commander by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The SRSG must, however, act within the guidelines and directives issued by the Security Council, in the form of resolutions. These resolutions are often a reflection

of divergent political views, and as such are themselves occasionally contradictory or ambiguous. Thus, the SRSG and the Force Commander must wrestle with conflicting direction as to how to proceed.

The multinational nature of a large peacekeeping mission such as UNPROFOR is, in itself, a contributing factor to that mission's performance. Not only does this result in a confusing melange of equipment, procedures, and capabilities, but it can be reflected in a lack of a common approach to a given problem. Similarly, the great variance in unit capabilities becomes, of necessity, a key factor in one's appreciation of the situation. To put it bluntly, some units are better than others.

The role that is played by nationally-imposed employment limitations cannot be ignored and is a factor not normally encountered to the degree that is present in such a diverse mission as UNPROFOR. The more ambiguous the mandate, the tighter are the strings binding contingents to their capitals.

Finally, the military component of UNPROFOR comprises those units which the troop-contributing nations have chosen to provide. The same is true for all missions. The fact that the force commander's number-one reinforcement priority may well be engineer units is of little consequence unless some nation chooses to provide such troops. The result may well be, as is currently the case in UNPROFOR, a force which lacks certain key elements, such as logistics or engineers. It remains a fact that the force commander must use the force he is given and has little influence over its composition.

Each one of these key differences which set peacekeeping operations apart have an effect on the day-to-day conduct of operations. I can assure you that they have a profound effect on how a mission the size of UNPROFOR is run.

Now, having described the differences between peacekeeping operations and war fighting, what about the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement?

Peace enforcement, except in some rare circumstances which I will describe, is another name for war-fighting, pure and simple. The peace-

enforcement force is a party to the conflict, as was the case in Operation Desert Storm and as was attempted in part in Somalia. UNPROFOR is neither configured nor mandated for peace enforcement. It is, as you may have heard on many occasions, non-combatant. Yet there is a widespread misperception that UNPROFOR's job is to stop the bloodshed and somehow to compel the parties into a settlement, presumably through force. This has not been, nor is it now, the case.

Unfortunately, the precise contours of UNPROFOR's authorizations are often overlooked by outside observers. Indeed, the Council's reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter in several of its Bosnia-related resolutions, suggesting compulsory authority for certain actions, has created unrealistic expectations that UNPROFOR is postured to repel attacks against "safe areas" by force, to "punch through" humanitarian aid, and generally to assume a hostile posture *vis-a-vis* one party or another. UNPROFOR's role in monitoring the heavy-weapons exclusion zones in and around Sarajevo and Gorazde has contributed to this misperception. As a result, the operation has come under attack for failure to apply force more vigorously against the Bosnian Serbs, when in fact, apart from some increases in size, it remains configured, equipped, and mandated for peacekeeping. UNPROFOR is involved neither in the forceful imposition of peace nor in so-called peace enforcement. It is a peacekeeping force mandated for humanitarian purposes operating amidst ongoing conflicts.

I would like to point out that peacekeeping and peace enforcement do not mix. One may move from impartiality to partisanship, but returning to the previous state is all but impossible. Moreover, any attempt to overlap and produce a grey area, within which a peacekeeping mission attempts to operate, creates a condition of such dissonance that the mission is in danger of collapse. Such a condition was produced by the passage and misinterpretations of Resolution 836 to which I referred earlier, as well as the concept of a total exclusion zone activated against one warring party only. There can be no grey area, no overlap of peacekeeping with peace enforcement.

Allow me now to shift to the question of the characteristics that peacekeeping forces must possess if they are to be successful. The one overriding characteristic which is applicable at every level from the rifleman on observation post duty, to the policeman, to the civil affairs officer, to the

force commander, to the force as a collective whole, is that of credibility. If the individual, the unit, or the force itself lacks credibility in the eyes of any of the parties involved, then it will have great difficulty in carrying out whatever mission has been assigned to it.

Credibility has two principal components: capability and conduct. Capability has three aspects: combat effectiveness, equipment, and toughness. The area of conduct includes restraint, discipline, firmness, consistency, cultural sensitivity, rule of law, and impartiality. I do not have time to dwell on all these aspects, but two of them are of overriding importance: respect for the rule of law, and impartiality.

Respect for the rule of law is something which we in peacekeeping have taken for granted. With the expansion of the number of countries willing to participate in peacekeeping operations, however, and especially because of the changing nature of peacekeeping itself, we ignore this essential characteristic at our peril. Nothing breaks down the credibility of a force faster than illegal or inappropriate activity on the part of its members. In this respect, the perception of wrongdoing can be as damaging as the proof of it.

Peacekeeping forces must follow a three-track approach: first, to ensure that regulations and procedures are in place to thwart or at least dissuade those tempted to engage in improper activity; second, to educate the force to ensure that all members are aware of the conduct required; and third, to be seen to investigate in a serious manner each and every complaint or allegation made. The very fact that UNPROFOR has been seen to take allegations of improper conduct seriously has been, in my opinion, a boost to our credibility. It is a fact however that certain contributors either have no legal means to discipline their personnel while on UN duty out-of-country, or the on-site means to carry out credible investigations into alleged wrongdoing by their peacekeepers.

The importance of this cannot be overstated: the peacekeeper must not only be the model of respect for the rule of law as generally accepted, but also, as we shall see, for the law of war, and basic human rights. Further, impartiality is of the greatest importance. Once a peacekeeper or a peacekeeping force loses its impartiality then it becomes one of the belligerents. Impartiality must not be confused with neutrality, however, as

peacekeepers must abide by the dictates of the international will as expressed in the mandate. Nevertheless, the force has to deal with each and every party on an ongoing basis. Each of the parties must understand that they will be treated in the same manner as the others involved in the conflict.

These aspects of the matter of conduct together form an ethos or code of conduct by which peacekeeping should be conducted. This is, of course, easier said than done. A national army spends a great deal of time and effort in order to instill a sense of ethos within its ranks. How then does a multi-national peacekeeping force, drawn from a number of nations, each with a different sub-culture or military ethos, develop its own such ethos?

I would suggest to you that part of the answer lies in the leadership imparted by the force commander and by the unit command structure. But for the longer term, it is vital that capability standards for peacekeepers, and even more importantly, a universal code of conduct for peacekeepers are urgently needed. The credibility of a given mission is dependent upon the capability and conduct of its component parts, and without credibility a UN mission has little chance of success.

I should say a few words about the use of force by peacekeepers. Firstly, it is not part of our mission as peacekeepers, nor do we have the resources, to enforce peace. We are and must remain non-combatants. However, we must never hesitate to use appropriate force, within the framework of the rules of engagement, to defend ourselves or, in certain circumstances, when faced with blatant human rights abuses. I firmly believe that the use of force when justified, impartial and commensurate with the provocation, contributes to our credibility and acts as a deterrent against future provocations.

I now wish to take a few minutes to offer you some personal views on how peacekeeping is evolving, both within the UNPROFOR context and globally.

UNPROFOR is a large, extremely complex operation that must function under a number of mandates, some of which are contradictory. The problems facing UNPROFOR are too daunting to be solved by the military alone, or by political-affairs officers, or by the humanitarian staff of UNHCR.

Glossary

APC Armoured Personnel Carrier Civil-Military Operations Center C-MOC

CDS Chief of Defence Staff

Commander-in-Chief, Southern Force CINCSOUTH **CMTC** Combined Military Training Centre

CNN Cable News Network

DISA Defence Information System Agency Department of National Defence DND **DPKO**

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

EU European Union

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia **FYROM**

HMCS Her Majesty's Canadian Ship **IAPSO** Inter-Agency Procurement Service

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development **IBRD** ICITAP International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance

Program

International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC **IFF**

Identification of Friend or Foe International Monetary Fund

Immediate Operational Requirements IOR

MFO Multinational Force Observer

Permanent Military Representative to the North Atlantic MILREP

Council

MP Military Police

IMF

MRE Meals Ready-to-Eat

Multi-Role Support Vessel MRSV

North Atlantic Cooperative Council NACC

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NORAD North American Air Defence

NORTHAG Northern Army Group

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development

OOTW Operations Other than War

PA Personal Assistant

PDD Presidential Decision Directive
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RIMPAC Countries of the Pacific Rim

ROE Rules of Engagement

SMEA Situation, Mission, Execution and Co-ordination

SOP Standard Operating Procedures

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TCN Traditional Contributing Nations (to UN peacekeeping

missions)

UN United Nations

UNA-USA United Nations Association of the United States of

America

UNAMIR United Nations Mission in Rwanda

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNEF United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Childrens Fund UnicityPOL United Nations Civilian Police

UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNOMOR United Nations Observer Mission in Mozambique and

Rwanda


UNPA United Nations Protected Area
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
UNSC United Nations Security Council

UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group

USACOM United States Atlantic Command

VEHICLES TO SUIT YOUR OPERATIONAL NEEDS







- Peacekeeping forces
- Internal security forces
- Law enforcement agents
- Journalists



We are approved to the BS EN 9001 quality standard and have considerable expertise in designing armoured solutions for all types of vehicles.

PENMAN ENGINEERING LIMITED

Penman Engineering Limited Heathhall, Dumfries DG1 3NY Scotland, UNITED KINGDOM

Telephone: (01387) 252784 Facsimile: (01387) 267332



AlliedSignal Aerospace Canada is a major player in the aerospace industry. We design, develop, manufacture and support advanced electronic environmental controls, ice protection/detection systems, communication systems, electropotic systems and fuel control systems at six locations across the nation.



AlliedSignal Aerospace Canada 240 Attwell Drive Executive Offices Etobicoke, Ontario M9W 6L7 416 675-1411 Tel.

Exhibitors

Peacekeeping '94: The Exhibitors

AAR Manufacturing Inc. 201 Haynes St., Cadillac, MI 49601 USA Tel: 616-779-8808 Fax: 616-779-8845

AAR Manufacturing is a division AAR CORP. AAR is a manufacturer of ISU Transport/Storage Containers, specialty Air Cargo Pallets and Platforms; Transit, Operational and ATA Cases and Containers; Incraft Cargo Handling Systems and Components; Airflex humidity controlled long-term storage systems; deployable Shelter systems; Material Handling Equipment; Composite Panels and materials used by the aerospace industry; Air Cargo Flooring; Liners; Bulkheads, Lightweight Composites used in the transportation industry (buses, trucks, etc.), and applications used for composites in manufacturing lightweight fabricated structures.

Akers Krutbruk Protection AB 640 60 Akers, Stykebruk, Sweden Tel: 46-159-366-00 Fax: 46-159-30728

The Swedish company Akers Krutbruk was founded in 1552. We have supplied the Swedish UN forces and Civil Defence operations with the following: helmets, fragmentation vests, bulletproof vests, water purification, shelters, protected trucks and upgraded light armoured vehicles. We are working together with IBD - Diesenroth Engineering in Germany.

Alaska Industrial Resources, Inc. (Weather-Port Shelters) 9024 Vanguard Drive, First Floor, Anchorage, AK 99507 USA

Tel: 907-344-1565 Fax: 907-522-5262

WEATHERPORTS - the Original Fabric Shelters. We can provide shelter for thousands in just hours; including massive emergency housing overnight and semi-permanent housing for re-building. For 25 years

WEATHERPORTS have been used for portable shelters from Alaska to Saudi Arabia, from Canada's Northwest Territories to Ethiopia, and from the North Pole to Antarctica. We are unequalled in production and field experience world-wide. Because of this, we can provide a higher quality, more extensively tested product at a much less cost.

AlliedSignal Aerospace Canada 240 Attwell Drive, Etobicoke, ON M9W 6L7 Tel: 416-798-6689 Fax: 416-798-1394

AlliedSignal Aerospace Canada (ASACa) is an acknowledged leader in the specialized fields of electronic environmental control systems, ice protection/detection systems, communication systems, electro-optics, aircraft engine controls/accessories, power management and generation systems and support services. The company provides full customer support repair and overhaul services for its own products, as well as on a contract basis, to the Government of Canada and worldwide aircraft operators, for the products of more than 160 international OEMs. While the product lines exist as self-contained entities, the type of organization we developed enables common functions and company resources to be shared effectively and efficiently. AlliedSignal Aerospace Canada and its operating units are approved to NATO AQAP-1 and is currently preparing to register for ISO 9001. The company is committed to Total Quality - continuously improving all processes to satisfy internal and external customers.

Alvis Vehicles Limited The Triangle, Walsgrave, Coventry CV2 2SP UK

Tel: 01203-535455 Fax: 01203-539288

The Alvis family of 4X4 utility vehicles uniquely combines unsurpassed all-terrain mobility and agility with proven crew protection against land-mine explosions: two simultaneous mines (each 7.5 kg TNT) under any single roadwheel, one mine (7.5 kg TNT under centre of vehicle, 30 kg TNT blast 5m from vehicle) and all-round 7.62 mm direct fire protection. Logistical commonality and ready reparability result in economic whole-life costs for military, internal security and humanitarian aid uses.

AMEREX Corp./AMEREX Fire International P.O. Box 81, Trussville, AL 35173 USA

Tel: 205-655-3271 Fax: 205-655-3279

AMEREX Corp. is the first fire protection company in the United States to attain "ISO 9002 Registered Firm Status." As a registered firm, AMEREX has entered into contractual agreements with U/L and British Standards Institute to evaluate and certify that AMEREX operates under a rigid quality system. This registration includes recognition by the American National Standards Institute (NASI), the British Standards Institute (BSI), International Standards Organization (ISO), the European Community (EC), and the Australian Standards (AS).

American Defense Preparedness Association 2 Colonial Place, 2101 Wilson Blvd. Suite 400, Arlington, VA 22201-3061 USA Tel: 703-622-1820 Fax: 703-622-1885

The American Defence Preparedness Association is a non-profit educational membership association devoted to national security and the preservation of a strong industrial base. ADPA has over 26,000 individual members and roughly 700 corporate members. Our message is carried out through a network of 58 chapters nationwide. ADPA sponsors about 60 technical symposiums and exhibitions annually. Additionally, the association publishes the monthly journal "National Defense," which covers the latest breakthroughs affecting the defense industry.

American Recreation Products Inc. 1224 Fern Ridge Parkway, St. Louis, MO 63141 USA Tel: 314-576-8087 or 1-800-325-4121 ext. 8087 Fax: 314-576-8010

Range of sewn camping products (tents, sleeping bags, backpacks, functional apparel, sleeping systems, and personal floatation devices) sold through multiple channels under the following brand names: Sierra Designs, Kelty/Ridgeway, Slumberjack, Wenzel/Hillary, Travasack, and Guarantee Fit-Trekk. Channels of distribution and major customers include: national chains, mass merchandise organizations, mail order catalogues, the military and GSA

American Red Cross

431 18th St. NW, Washington, DC 20006 USA

Tel: 202-639-3924 Fax: 202-639-6113

The American Red Cross seeks to improve the quality of human life; to enhance self-reliance and concern for others; and to help people avoid, prepare for and cope with emergencies. ARC international services include: relief to disaster victims; development assistance to sister national societies in disaster preparedness, primary health care and health education, HIV/AIDS education; blood collection and processing, capacity building; provides international social services; increases public awareness of international humanitarian law.

Amican Navigation Inc.

300 St. Sacrement, Suite 218, Montreal, PQ H2Y 1X4

Tel: 514-844-2632 Fax: 514-844-1843

We are: specialists in world-wide chartering, brokerage and project cargoes, national defence contractors and freight agents, experts in international shipping of dangerous goods; major forest products carrier, dairy board contractors and freight agents, managing operators, chartering brokers, general and liner agents and the sale and purchase of ships and capital equipment.

Angenieux S.A.

42570 Saint-Heand, France

Tel: 33-77-30-42-10 Tlx: 330695F Fax: 33-77-30-48-75

Angeniuex has specialized in high precision and quality optics since 1935. We offer night and day observation universal goggles (UGO) with two functions: day function with 8x magnification and same performances as the best observation goggles, including anti-laser protection; and night function, which are equipped with second or third generation light intensifier tubes (1 x magnification for night vision and reading and 4x magnification for observation). UGO is equipped with an anti-blindness diode (IR emission), permitting vision in particularly dark places, such as a bunkers and cellars. UGO is used by the French Army (several thousand units) and several NATO countries.

Arctic Clear Products Inc. (Duninger Corporation) 2130 W. Wilden Avenue, Goshen, IN 46526 USA

Tel: 219-533-7671 Fax: 219-533-7671

Arctic Clear Products Inc., are in the business to manufacture and sell the highest quality systems to produce safe water and air for human, animal, commercial and industrial use. The products are designed to be modular. The versatility of the process to disinfect and filter water or air is a key aspect of the company's philosophy. The company can apply the same process in small or large demand requirements. The company's products are designed to operate with minimal power requirements. The water filtration systems will require 12VDC, 60 watts (5 amps). Adaptors are available to connect to 110AC or 220AC. Therefore, power can be provided from batteries, solar panels, generators or regular electrical outlets. The company has systems in Vietnam, Ukraine, Somalia, Kenya, Haiti, Sumatra and Saraievo, Bosnia.

Armed Forces Journal International

2000 L Street NW, Suite 520, Washington, DC 20036 USA

Tel: 202-296-0450 Fax: 202-296-4872

Armed Forces Journal International is a monthly defence magazine edited for the professional needs of career military officers, contracting and purchasing personnel, senior DOD officials, Congress, NATO dignitaries and foreign attaches, and senior defence industrial executives.

Australian Imports

374 Brookdale Ave., Toronto, ON M5N 1R2

Tel: 416-783-5780 Fax: 416-783-5780

Australian 'Blue Mallee' Eucalyptus Oil, an essential item for outdoor use. Suitable for combatting colds, sinuses, allergies and insect bites. Also for cleaning and healing cuts, wounds, sunburn and foot hygiene. 'Oilskin' clothing and hats, made from 100% cotton, a tough water-proof fabric that lends itself to the most rugged of outdoor conditions. Now worn by large numbers of hunters.

Barrett Firearms Manufacturing Inc.

P.O. Box 1077, Murfreesboro, TN 37133-1077 USA

Tel: 615-896-2938 Fax: 615-896-7313

Barrett Fire Arms Manufacturing, Inc. (BFMI) is engaged in research, development, and manufacture of shoulder-fireable heavy recoiling

weapons. BFMI produces the M82A1 .50 calibre semi-automatic rifle capable of achieving 1 to 2 MOA with standard ammunition. At long ranges, delivers more rounds on target in less time than full automatic fire. M82A1 Special Application Scoped Rifle is an extremely diversified weapon system, adopted by all branches of the US Military and 26 foreign military services.

Bombardier Inc., Canadair - Defence Systems Division 10,000 Cargo A-4 Street, Montreal International Airport Mirabel, PQ J7N 1H3

Tel: 514-476-4000 Fax: 514-476-4460

Bombardier Inc., Canadair Defence Systems Division (DSD) offers a wide range of products and services to private and public customers. They include: unmanned air vehicles (CL-289 drone and CL-27 Sentinel), aircraft engineering services, structural tests, customizing aircraft for special missions as well as providing *ab initio* military pilot training at Southport, Manitoba. DSD's operations are adjacent to Montreal International Airport and we recently added a state-of-the-art paint strip facility and aircraft storage facility.

Cargotec

Harles Scott Lane, Shrewsbury, Shropshire, SY13AG UK Tel: 011-44-1743-442232 Fax: 011-44-1743-469935

Design and manufacture of multi-lift material handling for payloads up to 20 tonnes. Over 5000 units in service world-wide. Multi-lift equipped vehicles currently in use with United Nations forces in Bosnia, namely with the UK, Netherlands, Canada, Malaysia, Sweden and Norway. The container Handling Unit, used in conjunction to the load handling system to handle ISO 20' containers and shelters, eliminates the need for specialist ISO handling equipment. Over 60 units are in UN service.

Carlin Manufacturing Inc.

3714 North Valentine Avenue, Fresno, CA 93722 USA

Tel: 209-276-0123 Fax: 209-222-1538

Carlin Manufacturing Inc., a world leader in the design, engineering and manufacture of specialty vehicles, for commercial organizations and all branches of the military. The Carlin Containerized Mobile Field Kitchen (CK-1E) was designed to enhance the quality of life of today's soldiers, as well as meeting rapid deployment applications and off-road conditions. The CK-1E has been field tested and is a proven performer with a growing list of

accomplishments world-wide. Our new generation, mobile field feeding system, called the Rapid Deployment Kitchen (RDK), is currently being researched and designed and resembles and smaller version of the CK-1E. The RDK is a fully self-contained field feeding system and is capable of feeding 150-200 troops using two food services specialists. The RDK contains equipment to enable roasting, grilling, boiling, baking and frying. It is trailer mounted and designed to be towed by a HMMWV.

Danish Camp Supply

Virkelyst 11, Norressundby, Denmark DK9400

Tel: 45-9-819-1300 Fax: 45-9-819-0700

Danish Camp Supply has a 14 year history of providing logistical solutions to commercial as well as military organizations worldwide. Lately, we have been one of the major suppliers of foodstuffs, equipment and duty free articles to UNPROFOR. When this mission started in 1992, Danish Camp Supply, with its reputation and experience in the field, was chosen as one of the major suppliers of food and duty-free articles supporting several thousand UN troops from different ethnic cultures. Furthermore, several UN missions around the world have utilized Danish Camp Supply's designs in container-based kitchens, laundries, toilets, workshops and explosives storage facilities. Finally, their container handling equipment (the CLT) is a well-proven in logistics field support to military forces worldwide. We have unveiled new supporting equipment for the CLT. Danish Camp Supply is synonymous with quality and flexibility.

Defense News

6883 Commercial Drive, Springfield, VA 22159 USA

Tel: 703-642-7330 Fax: 703-642-7386, Contact Jack Kerrigan,

Defense News is the international weekly newspaper of defense. It specializes in in-depth, accurate, impartial reporting of late-breaking news of concern to the world-wide defence community. Our readership consists of leaders in world defence -- key legislators, high-level defence officials and top-ranking military officers. Get the information these leaders read each week.

Defence Products North (FLN) Box 448, 9401 Harstad, Norway

Tel: 47-770-64380 Fax: 47-770-64382

Defence Products North (FLN) is an umbrella organization for 140 firms from North Norway. FLN is a comprehensive supplier of products and services. The products vary considerably and include refugees camps, housing, tents, rubhalls, rations, mobile toilets, stretcher racks, furniture, camouflage nets, radio sets, mechanical cleaning of water and sewage, oil spill separator, gloves and many other products and services.

Diesel Division, General Motors of Canada Ltd.

P.O. Box 5160, London, ON N6A 4N5 Tel: 519-452-5054 Fax: 519-452-5688

Diesel Division, General Motors of Canada Limited, is a major designer and manufacturer of armoured vehicles for the Canadian, US, Australian and Saudi armed forces. The Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) is an eight-wheel drive, amphibious vehicle, tested and driven in snow, mud, sand and extremely rocky terrain. With speeds as high as 60 mph, and a swim speed of 6 mph, the LAV has proven quick and agile off-the-road. With the deployment to Panama in May 1989 during Operation Just Cause and to the Gulf in 1990 during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, with the USMC, the USA Congressional record shows that the LAV has proven itself during these operations. The LAV continues to support the Canadian Army in its various peacekeeping missions worldwide.

Dragoon Technologies

751 N. Monterey, Suite 116, Gilbert, AZ 85233 USA

Tel: 602-813-1889 Fax: 602-813-2055

Long range surveillance sensors and signal processing equipment. Integration and evaluation of advanced sensors and fusion techniques for wide area ground surveillance, including a unique man/machine interface using common personal computer platform. In-house demonstration system includes radar, video camera, vehicle available for lease. Dragoon will provide engineering services for most sensor fusion products.

Firearms Training Systems Inc.

7340 McGinnis Ferry Road, Suwanee, GA 30174 USA

Tel: 404-813-1920 Fax: 404-813-0751

FATS training simulators emphasize marksmanship and judgemental shooting. A variety of weapons have been modified to fire eye-safe lasers, while maintaining actual weapon characteristics. The instructor is able to control the training, providing immediate feedback on marksmanship and judgement. Both military and law enforcement customers have been able to achieve better training time and ammunition expenditures. FATS simulators are designed to accommodate unique customer requirements, and are fielded in 30 countries

Foerster Instruments, Inc.

140 Industry Dr., Ridc Park West, Pittsburgh, PA 15275-1028 USA Tel:412-788-8976 Fax: 412-788-8984

Foerster Instruments, Inc. offers the highest quality of ordnance, mine and bomb detection instruments in the world. We offer unparalleled quality control expertise, comprehensive, customized training programs, and customer support that extends well beyond initial purchase.

Fontana D.D.

Stegne 7, 61210 Ljubljana, Republic of Slovenia Tel: 386-61-1591-215 Fax: 386-61-1591-610

Design, development and manufacture of electro-optical instruments and systems. Our product range covers laser range-finders, artillery observation systems, tank fire control systems and thermal sites for guided antitank missiles.

Forrest Tool Company

P.O. Box 768, Mendocino CA 95460 USA

Tel: 707-937-2141 Fax: 707-937-1817

Forrest Tool Co. will display The MAX Multipurpose Tool, a combat and work force multiplier. The MAX is a breakthrough in tool design that combines seven full size tools into a strong, compact unit. The system contains an axe, shove, pick, mattock, broad pick, rake and hoe forged and tempered to US federal specifications. Applications include all military operations, construction, relief and development, search and rescue, civilian law enforcement, emergency response, forestry, fire fighting and agriculture. The original MAX has been on a GSA contact schedule since 1992.

Freightliner Corp.

4747 N. Channel Ave., Portland, OR 97208 USA

Tel: 503-735-7183 Fax: 503-735-7100

Freightliner Corporation, the company that does things right, is a major US manufacturer of heavy trucks. Freightliner is presently under contract to produce the M915A2 Line Haul Tractor and the M916A1 Truck Tractor for transport of heavy engineering equipment and has delivered in excess of 1800 of these vehicles to the military. Freightliners commercial and military vehicle product lines include tractors, wreckers, dump trucks, mobile mixers, tank trucks, cargo & personnel vans and crew cab vehicles.

Global Shelters Inc.

24 Benfield Dr., St. Catherines, Ont. L2S 3W5

Tel: 905-687-7499 Fax: 905-687-8022

Emergency Relief Shelters

GTA Containers Inc.

1410 W. Napier, South Bend, IN 46601 USA

Tel: 219-288-3459 Fax: 219-289-6060

GTA Containers, Inc. manufactures a complete line of collapsible containers (drums and pillow tanks) for the temporary storage, transportation and distribution of potable water, fuel, etc. in quantities ranging from 55 gallons to 225,000 gallons, under conditions of extreme temperatures and rugged handling. GTA has completed numerous contracts for the US Department of Defense; all of our containers are manufactured in accordance with US military specifications, our quality control standards are in compliance with Mil-1, we have a reject rate of 0% and a 100% perfect record for on time delivery.

H & S Mfg Inc.

303 S. Pine St., P.O. Drawer D, Spring Hope, NC 27882 USA

Tel: 919-478-4997 Fax: 919-478-4998

H&S Mfg Inc. is the manufacturer of Supreme Protector Life Support Equipment. This includes, but is not limited to Supreme Protector Balance Vest, Breacher Shields, Chaps, Bomb Blankets, Plates and Fireman's Clothing. All the products are manufactured at our 25,000 sq. ft. facility in North Carolina. All ballistic products meet NIJ standards when applicable and/or US Military Standards. H & S Mfg has the production capacity to meet large volume orders and the staff to design the end-user's needs.

Hagglunds Vehicle

35418 Mound Road, Sterling Heights, MI 48310 USA

Tel: 810-264-8280 Fax: 810-268-9320

Hagglunds Vehicle (a Swedish company), is one of the world's leading manufacturers of tracked vehicles for commercial and military use, such as the Bv206 All-Terrain Tracked carrier and Combat Vehicle 90. The bulk of our deliveries go to defence forces in different countries, and to civilian administrations and winter sports facilities. We have sales companies in the US, Canada, Japan and Hong Kong. Our most recent orders were placed for the Combat Vehicle 90 by the Swedish and Norwegian Armies.

Hawk Technologies Inc.

227 Route 33, East Manalapan, NJ 07726 USA

Tel: 908-446-0600 Fax: 908-446-0611

(See listing for Siemens-Albis AG)

Hiatt Thompson Corp.

945 Garfield St., Oak Park, IL 60304 USA Tel: 708-524-0699 Fax: 708-524-0244

Manufacturers of and distributors for law enforcement and military equipment. Hiatt handcuffs; Legcuffs; transport chains; the Blue Box; specialized chain work; handcuff keys; and acme whistles.

Hutchinson

460 Southard St., Trenton, NJ 08638 USA

Tel: 609-394-1010 Fax: 609-394-2031

Pneumatic tire run-flat devices

Hydro Biotech Inc.

14,163 1D Cure Labelled Blvd., Mirabel, PQ J2J 1M3

Tel: 514-434-6099 Fax: 514-434-9424

Leading-edge (International Patents Pending) family of biocidal resins for microbiological or pathogens removal in fluids or air streams, including the development of various formulations of biocidal resins in textiles and other material for military, medical, commercial and industrial purposes. The company is able to separately alter the rate and volume of iodine releases from resin matrix. Focus on applied research and development for water purification, air purification, textile applications and dermal applications laboratories and manufacturing.

I.E.S.

50 Betzalel St., Ramat-Gan, Israel 52521 Tel: 972-375-2633 Fax: 972-375-1092

(No text provided)

IMP Aerospace

2651 Dutch Village Road, Suite 400, Halifax, NS B3L 4T1

Tel: 902-453-2400 Fax: 902-453-6931

IMP Aerospace produces a diversified line of military and civil products and services in the aerospace field. With solid aerospace engineering and technical capability, IMP completes major aircraft overhauls and modifications, produces sheet metal and composite aerospace components and produces high precision-machined parts. Additional capabilities include aircraft and spacecraft wire harness assemblies and communications equipment repair and overhaul. Qualifications include AQAP-1, ISO-9001, Boeing D1-9000, Spar Aerospace CSSP and MIL-Q-9858A.

IMT - A Division of Canron Inc.

347 King St. West, Ingersoll, ON N5C 3K6

Tel: 519-485-2210 Fax: 519-485-2163

IMT's forging and machining capabilities combine to provide an effective production facility for the manufacture of a wide range of defence-related products. Large calibre ammunition projectiles up to 155mm, suspension components for the General Dynamics M1A1 Abrams Tank, drive components for the MBY Combat systems are just a few of the many defence-related products manufactured by IMT. From rough forgings to completely finished components, our aim is to offer our customers the best solution to any product requirement.

Intact Technologies Inc./Lenbrook Industries 102 Promenade de Portage, Hull, PQ J8X 2K1

Tel: 819-771-1002 Fax: 819-776-9973 Solar and communications equipment

InterAction

1717 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036 USA

Tel: 202-667-8227 Fax: 202-483-7624

InterAction is an association of 160 US-based private humanitarian organizations working in 180 countries. The focus of its members' work is

to alleviate suffering and promote sustainable development world-wide. InterAction, directly and through its members, works with UN humanitarian and peacekeeping organizations, the US Military, State Dept. and other international organizations to improve coordination and make sure that peacekeepers understand and are sensitive to the humanitarian issues that concern private voluntary organizations.

Interchurch Medical Assistance, Inc. 500 Main St., New Windsor, MD 21776 USA

Tel: 410-635-8720 Fax: 410-635-8726

Interchurch Medical Assistance, Inc. (I.M.A.) is a private, non-profit, voluntary agency for the procurement and distribution of medical and hospital supplies for emergency and long term overseas health care programs. I.M.A. works in partnership with the Brethren Service Center's 72,000 sq. ft. warehouse facility, which packs and ships material resources to over 100 countries for 22 organizations including the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

International Engineering Technologies 596 Central Drive, Suite 101, Virginia Beach, VA 23454 USA

Tel: 804-486-5251 Fax: 804-486-8456

IET's 'Black-Lite' is the registered US, European and UK trademark to describe a family of covert linear arrays designed for infrared illumination. Used to support both CCD CCTV cameras and all generations of image intensifiers, 'Black-Lite' is totally covert, operates at extra-low voltages, and can be configured in waterproof, highly flexible tubing for a variety of interior and exterior applications. Configurations for tactical use include Personal Identifications Beacons (PIBs), Covert Vehicle Identification Beacons (CVIBs) and remote controlled Multi-Function Units (MFUs).

International Peacekeeping '95 310 Dupont St., Toronto, ON M5R 1V9 Tel: 416-968-7252 Fax: 416-968-2377

International Peacekeeping Exhibition and Seminar is a strategically-located annual exhibition which provides industry the access to clients looking to purchase for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions worldwide. The seminar section of Peacekeeping '95 will provide a forum for the discussion of the theory and practical experience among representatives from the military, industry, government and humanitarian agencies.

J & L Protech Corporation

3540 Aurora Road, Melbourne, FL 32934 USA

Tel: 407-255-3576 Fax: 407-255-3329

Our product: a modular field latrine system that collapses down into a box 18' X 18' X 32'. It is free-standing, requires no holes or chemicals and is completely sanitary and odour-free. Can be set up by one individual in 30 minutes or less.

Leica Technologies Inc.

107 North King St., Leesburg, VA 22075 USA

Tel: 703-777-3900 Fax: 703-777-3940

Leica is exhibiting the VECTOR 1000, a high performance, rugged water-proof binocular incorporating a Class 1 eye-safe laser rangefinder and a digital magnetic compass. The 7 X 42 binocular uses the highest quality optical glass and multilayer coating technology available to provide a clear image of the surrounding area. The rangefinder has an operating range of 25 to 1,000 meters with an accuracy of +/-2 meters. The digital compass provides an azimuth accuracy of +/-1 degree.

Lester B. Pearson

Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre Cornwallis Park, PO Box 100, Clementsport, NS B0S 1E0 Tel: 902-638-8611 Fax: 902-638-8888, Contact Alex Morrison

The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, at Cornwallis Park, Nova Scotia, was established in 1994 by the Government of Canada as a "private and independent peacekeeping centre...mandated to provide research and education on peacekeeping in all its forms, while also serving as a uniquely Canadian point of contact for peacekeeping information." The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre will conduct research, education and training activities for all individual, group, national and international members of "The New Peacekeeping Partnership": the term applied to the military; government and non-government agencies dealing with humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons; election monitoring and media, and civilian police personnel as they work together to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. The Centre has the capacity to offer a wide range of planned activities as well as to respond to specific requests for training.

Litton Systems Canada Limited, Atlantic Division Box 960, Enfield Postal Station, Enfield, NS B0N 1N0

Tel: 902-873-2000 Fax: 902-873-2173

Litton Systems Canada designs and develops inertial navigation systems, flight inspection systems, airborne search radars, marine commercial and control systems and flat panel multi-functional displays. In addition, Litton Canada's Atlantic division offers turnkey manufacturing for medium volume commercial and military electronic/aviation systems. Products include: airborne search radars for military and coastal/fisheries surveillance, air defence radars, navigation systems/instruments, active matrix liquid crystal displays and commercial and control systems. Litton Systems Canada serves the world market for these products.

MAXABEAM High Intensity Searchlights P.O. Box 4251, Tequesta, FL 33469 USA Tel: 407-743-8180 Fax: 407-743-8173

The most powerful portable light source, MaxaBeam delivers over 6 million candlepower, operates from any 12 Volt DC source and draws only 5.7 amps. Lightweight (3.2 lbs.)with a microprocessor, it allows users to strobe its xenon lamp (to temporarily incapacitate an enemy) and adjust the servocontrolled beam spread from pinpoint spot to a wide beam. A rechargeable 90 min. battery (5.4 lbs.) snaps in under the light or can be configured (worn) as a belt pack. Options include covert infrared filters which are compatible with night vision equipment and low light CCTV cameras.

Mercedes-Benz AG

Dept. VN/R, Stuttgart, Fellbach, Germany D-70322

Tel: 49-711-1790318 Fax: 49-711-1790932

Military missions demand a wide range of vehicles for a great variety of tasks. Being the world's leading manufacturer of vehicles of more than 6 tons payload, Mercedes-Benz is in the position to offer vehicles to meet nearly all requirements in the tactical and logistics fields. Based on standard units which have proven themselves in the field, Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicles are in operational use around the world.

Mul-T-Lock Technologies Ltd.

Southern Industrial Zone, P.O.B. 465, Yavne 81550, European Dept.

Tel: 972-8-423-336 Fax: 972-8-423-272

MUL-T-LOCK Technologies Ltd. is one of the leading companies worldwide manufacturing and marketing high security products. We offer a wide range of highly sophisticated tumbler pin cylinders and high security padlocks, which can be keyed alike and/or integrated into a master key system. High security decorative steel doors with 4-way locks, which with one key turn, simultaneously drive steel bolts into the header, floor and jambs. 4-way dead bolt high security locks installed in existing or new wooden doors; vehicle locking systems - Car Transmission (gear) Lock, which can be combined with electronic systems. This product is unique and is recommended all over the world by insurance companies, car rental companies, etc. Most of our products are patented in over 50 countries.

Mustang Survival

3810 Jacombs Road, Richmond, BC V6V 1Y6

Tel: 604-270-8631 Fax: 604-270-0489

Mustang Survival manufactures and develops personal flotation and hypothermia protective clothing for military personnel operating on land, sea and air. Mustang's operations are fully certified under ISO-9001 and AQAP-1 for quality assurance and manufacturing excellence. Mustang survival products are currently in use across North America and with allied nation's military forces across the world.

Nova Scotia Research Foundation P.O. Box 790, Dartmouth, NS B2Y 3Z7 Tel: 902-424-8670 Fax: 902-424-4679

We do the following: 1. Testing of products under simulated environmental conditions, to ensure compliance with military standards, such as MIL-STD-810. Tests include vibration, shock, temperature and humidity, thermal shock, salt, fog, high altitude, rain and solar radiation. 2. Material tests, including tension, compression, impact, hardness, fatigue and micrographic examination. 3. Package testing to ensure compliance with UN dangerous/infectious goods regulations or to ensure your product is adequately protected against shipping damage.

Nova Scotia Economic Renewal Agency 1800 Argyle St., Halifax, NS B3J 2R7 Tel: 902-424-8920 Fax: 902-424-5739

The province of Nova Scotia is proud to showcase several of its leading companies supplying the peacekeeping and humanitarian markets worldwide. These organizations are representative of the diversity and vitality of the industry in the province and the support that it is receiving from all levels and branches of government. The province is home to innovative firms which are actively serving these sectors with a wide variety of products and services. Many of these organizations are actively pursuing joint venture or other partnering opportunities for worldwide market development.

O'Gara, Hess & Eisenhardt Inc. 9113 LeSaint Dr., Fairfield, OH 45014 USA

Tel: 513-874-2112 Fax: 513-874-2558

(No text provided)

Oy Sisu-Auto AB/Sisu Defence

P.O. Box 189, FIN 13101, Hameenlinna, Finland

Tel: 358-17-6196451 Fax: 358-17-6196710

Sisu Defence is a division of Sisu Group, a transportation equipment company with a wide selection of products. Principally, these include logistic solutions for handling containers and other heavy-duty or high-volume freight, heavy-duty commercial trucks, forest machinery, agricultural tractors, military vehicles and components, such as axels and engines. Sisu Defence develops and manufactures military vehicles with the principle of producing advance solutions suited to the user's specific needs. The corner stones of Sisu Defence's know how are: mobility, protection technology, ability to produce highly customer-specific constructions reliably and rapidly.

Overseas Development Council 1875 Connecticut Ave. NW. Suite 1012 Washington, DC 20009 USA

Tel: 202-234-8201 Fax: 202-745-0067

ODC is a non-profit organization which functions as a centre for policy analysis, a forum for the exchange of ideas, and a resource for public education. As part of the above, ODC publishes analyses of economic, political and social issues, confronting the US and the developing world. ODC's three publication series include: US-Third World Policy Perspectives;

Policy Essays; and, Policy Focus.

PACT Publications

777 United Nations Plaza, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10017 USA

Tel: 212-697-6222 Fax: 212-692-9748

PACT Publications is an integrated publishing house providing affordable, professional services -- design, production, marketing and distribution -- of development resources on small enterprises, public health, AIDS education, gender issues, participatory training, advocacy and institutional development. As a distributor, we co-ordinate the marketing and promotion of materials produced by our program, and offer consignment services for numerous international agencies. PACT Publications has enabled many to contribute innovative and progressive tools to the field of international development.

PDQ Precision Inc.

P.O. Box 99838, San Diego, CA 92109 USA

Tel: 619-581-6370 Fax: 619-575-4067

PDQ Precision Inc. will have on display Mini-Max Cleaners with Arma Sol; Enhanced Cleaning Systems for weapons, electronics and all small parts -- solvent-free, while eliminating all hazardous materials concerns.

Penman Engineering Ltd.

Heath Hall, Dumfries, Scotland DG13NY UK

Tel: 0387-52784 Fax: 0387-07332

Penman Engineering Ltd. specializes in the design and manufacture of protected vehicles. These vehicles offer covert protection -- the armour is completely concealed in the existing panels of the vehicle. Our range includes Land Rover County, Range Rover Discovery, Toyota Land Cruiser, etc. Penman have supplied protected vehicles to military, police forces, embassies, news-gathering teams and aid agencies throughout the world and most recently to the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.

Peter Justesen Company A/S

Redholen, Freeport DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark

Tel: 45-3915-9600 Fax: 45-3915-9797

Peter Justesen Company A/S is the leading full-scale duty-free supplier to UN organizations, UN peacekeeping forces, diplomatic missions and commissaries worldwide. We offer more than 10,000 items of all kinds of

branded consumables and durable goods, which are stocked for prompt delivery. We are currently serving destinations in more than 130 countries with reliable transport arrangements. All you need is one contact and one source.

Prior Data Sciences Ltd.

Suite 601, 5475 Spring Garden Road, Halifax, NS B3J 3T2

Tel: 902-423-1331 Fax: 902-425-3664

PRIOR Data Sciences is a Canadian Co. engaged in the design, development and the implementation of performance-critical software and systems engineering. The company focus is systems expertise in aerospace, defence, air traffic management, communications, space and industrial applications. Defence capabilities include command, control, communications (C³), strategic and tactical communications systems, space simulation systems and battle management systems. PRIOR was recently certified to ISO 9001 and TickIT certifications and frequently works to DoD 2167A and AQAP-13 standards.

Quimpex Ltd.

5450 St. Roch, Drummondville, PQ J2B 6W3

Tel: 819-474-666 Fax: 819-474-9423

Rubber molded tracks, road wheels and drive sprockets systems for tracked vehicles.

Right Away Foods

200 North 1st St., McAllen, TX 78501 USA

Tel: 210-687-9401 Fax: 210-687-7028

Right Away Foods, located in McAllen, Texas, is recognized for value engineering in the development of modern US military rations -- the Meal, Ready-to-Eat (MRE) -- and is the premier supplier of subsistence products to the US Department of Defense. The company develops and produces innovative, flexibly-packaged, shelf-stable foodstuffs for various applications, including the Humanitarian Daily Ration (HDR) -- a full day's supply of ready-to-eat food, designed to for acceptance among a variety of cultures during emergency relief.

Scanvent US Inc.

29 A Karen Ct., Lititz, PA 17543 USA

Tel: 717-627-2700 Fax: 717-627-4003

Scanvent US markets 'Trelleborg' shelters and tents as well as heating, cooling and ventilation systems from Ventilatorverken, Sweden. Trelleborg 'Grelltents' are supplied in a variety of sizes, colours and configurations and the shelters can be supplied to provide a fully chemically protective environment. HMMWV-attachable units are also available. Ventilatorvezken supplies multifuel, portable space heaters (ash), air conditioners and a large variety of filtration and ventilation equipment for chemical warfare protection.

Schiebel Instruments, Inc. 2127 California St. NW, Suite 804 Washington, DC 20008 USA

Tel: 202-483-8311 Fax: 202-483-8316

Schiebel instruments, Inc. is a subsidiary of the Austrian, Vienna-based company Dipl. Ing. Hans Schiebel Elektronische Geraete GmbH working in the field of electronic control technology. Our main product is the Shiebel AN-19/2 is also used by UN and other humanitarian organizations. Recently, the product range was expanded by the AN-23/2 Bomb Locating Set, the AN-20/1 Underwater Mine Detector and the handy Metal Detector.

SEI Industries Ltd. 7400 Wilson Ave., Delta, BC V4G 1E5

Tel: 604-946-3131 Fax: 604-940-9566

SEI Industries Ltd. provides engineering, manufacturing and on-site installation of food and water distribution systems anywhere in the world. SEI Industries has complete tank farm designs and installations for the United Nations, Canadian Department of National Defence, and oil and gas operations in Myanmar, Ecuador, Nigeria and other countries.

Siemens-Albis AG

Freilagerstrasse 38, CH-8047 Zurich, Switzerland

Tel: 41-1-495-31-11 Fax: 41-1-495-38-16

Siemens Defence Electronic Group has over 6,000 highly qualified employees and is specialized in designing, developing, testing, producing and supporting electronic equipment and systems to our customer's tactical and operational needs. Of special interest to pecaekeepers are: the AWITEL Field Telephone Communication System from Siemens-AlbisDefence Electronics Switzerland and secure communication products from Siemens Defence Electronics Germany — both are represented in the USA by: Hawk Technologies Inc. (see Hawk listing for address and contact numbers)

Skylink Aviation Inc.

1580 Yonge St., Toronto, ON M4T 1Z8 Tel: 416-924-9000 Fax: 416-924-9006

The Skylink Group is a diversified international aviation and transportation company with offices and projects in a dozen countries. Since 1989, Skylink has operated a fleet of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in support of UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions. Skylink's fleet of Western- and Russian-built aircraft has provided cost-effective service in more than 20 countries. Missions include cargo re-supply, troop movements, VIP transport, medical support and reconnaissance flights. Other services include large-scale air cargo and passenger charters; contract logistics and project management services: flight planning; and wholesale ticketing.

Southern Avionics Co.

P.O. Box 5345, Beaumont, TX 77705 USA

Tel: 409-842-1717 Fax: 409-842-2987

Southern Avionics is a Texas-based company specializing in the design and manufacture of low-frequency radio beacons and associated products. Over 40 different models of portable, transportable and stationary units are produced to meet the unique and varied demands of the world market. Southern Avionics also offers state-wide or regional maintenance and monitoring system. Southern Avionics Company beacons meet or exceed applicable FAA, FCC and ICAO requirements.

Specialty Plastic Products Inc.

530 Sherwood Ave., Dunmore, PA 18512 USA

Tel: 717-961-2042 Fax: 717-961-5176

Established in 1969, Specialty Plastic Products, Inc. has a worldwide customer base which is supported by proprietary technology and directed by engineering oriented and quality committed management teams. Leaders in protective personal armour, the company has concentrated on the manufacture of combat helmets and soft body armour for infantry and vehicle crewman applications in military markets. The company also produces a wide variety of military personnel field equipment. The company was recognized by the US DoD as its Small Business Prime Contractor of the year in 1994 and recognized by the US Small Business Administration for Excellence in satisfying military needs of the Procurement System.

Survival Systems Limited Dartmouth, NS B2Y 4K9

Tel:902-465-3888 Fax: 902-466-2929

Survival Systems Limited is in the business of saving lives. SSL is unique in that it is both a training specialist and a manufacturer of training simulators for the delivery of realistic training to the offshore, industrial and military sectors. Training is virtual and hands-on. It covers: aircraft ditching, recreated with the Modular Egress Training Simulator; confined space entry and rescue, using the Mobile Industrial Rescue Trainer; and offshore and marine training, among others.

TCI-BR Communications

222 Caspian Drive, Sunnyvale, CA 90489-1014 USA

Tel: 408-734-1600 Fax: 408-734-1671

Technology for Communications International (TCI's) products include high-gain steerable high frequency (HF) accessories for fixed, transportable and tactical applications. Other products include systems for wide-bank signal acquisition, collection, analysis, recognition and classification, direction funding, single site location and emitter location. BR Communications develops and manufactures high frequency (HF) equipment to help select operating frequencies that will connect on the first try and provide the highest signal-to-noise ratio. Points of contact: Joe Straub, TCI Washington, D.C. Engineering Office, James M. Carter, International Marketing Manager, BR Communications.

Telos Systems Integration 460 Herndon Parkway, Herndon, VA 22070 USA

Tel: 703-471-6000 Fax: 703-471-1228

Telos Systems Integration is a full service computer service integrator, capable of providing total support from specification to implementation and maintenance of complex information management systems. Telos also designs and assembles customized computers that confirm Telo's leadership in the ruggedized computer market. Following in this tradition, Telos was recently selected by Computing Devices Company (CDC), the prime system in the IRIS program, to provide the Portable Data Terminal. The Portable Data Terminal is a major component in the Tactical Message Handling System, Communications Management System, and the Crypto Material Management System. This program integrates tactical communication under the Tactical Command Control Communications

System (TCCCS). In addition to the Portable Data Terminal (ACE 486 Portable), Telos proudly presents the entire ACE product line. All systems are rugged and portable, and built to perform in All Computing Environments

Trenton Works Inc.

P.O. Box 130, Trenton, NS B0K 1X0 Tel: 902-752-1541 Fax: 902-752-6648

Trenton Works Inc. is a major design and manufacturing facility located in northeastern Nova Scotia. Products of interest to peacekeepers include our military and commercial lines of logistic equipment, special equipment vehicle (SEV) kits and trailers. In particular, our water and fuel tank trailers and trucks, IMD container chassis trailers and infantry support trailers will be significant to our ground forces in relief operations.

Tri-Star Industries Ltd.

88 Forest St., Box 496, Yarmouth, NS B5A 4B4

Tel: 902-742-9254 Fax: 902-742-7632

Tri-Star is an emergency equipment manufacturer, specializing in the custom design and fabrication of ambulances for specific requirements and locations throughout the world. With modern CAD facilities and in-house engineering and a strict Q.A. Program working to ISO9002 standards, Tri-Star is able to design and put into production, various vehicles meeting specific demands throughout the world. Tri-Star is a certified Ford Quality Vehicle Modifier and operates to world Quality Assurance Standards.

TVI Corporation

10209 Bacon Dr., Beltsville, MD 20705 USA

Tel: 301-595-9233 Fax: 301-595-9234

Suppliers of commercial and military shelters.

UNICOR - Federal Prison Industries, Inc. 320 1st St. NW, Washington, DC 20534 USA

Tel: 202-508-8538 Fax: 202-628-1597

UNICOR has been serving the needs of the Federal Government for over 50 years with a wide array of products and services. You'll find everything from battle dress uniforms and Kevlar ground troop helmets to linen and bedding, dormitory furniture and architectural signage. Our services include printing, equipment repair, assembly and packaging as well as furniture refinishing and data preparation services.

United Nations Association of the United States 485 Fifth Ave., New York, NY 10017 USA

Tel: 212-697-3232 Fax: 212-682-9185

The United Nations Association of the United States is a non-profit, non-partisan national organization dedicated to strengthening the UN system and enhancing US participation in that system.

US Institute of Peace 1550 M St. NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20005-1708 USA Tel: 202-457-1700 Fax: 202-429-6063

(No text provided)

Vallillee Wide Format Products Ltd. 1305 Pickering Parkway, Suite 618, Pickering, ON L1V 3P2

Tel: 905-420-6786 Fax: 905-420-8199

The company mandate is to service the fast growing, large-format engineering document management market, through a complete range of equipment, services and document management systems. Our company offers the SLC36 Scanner capable of scanning an E-sized (36'X48') document and saving it as a compressed file on hard disk in under 32 seconds. The unit provides a through-put speed of almost two inches per second. The STH36 Direct Imaging Plotter has a daily duty cycle of 1000 plots per day with zero to final E/AO size output in 30 seconds. The company will soon introduce the Mil Trace System 4, a large format tactical automated trace production and transfer system.

Vallon GmbH

Im Grund 3, D-72800, Eningen, FR Germany Tel: 0049-7121-82187 Fax: 0049-7121-83643

For nearly 30 years Vallon GmbH has specialized in the manufacturing of mine detectors and bomb locators. Highly sensitive Vallon Mine Detectors are capable of detecting all kinds of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, even the smallest metallic striker pins of plastic mines. In addition, Vallon offers: UXO-Detectors for EOD, Underwater Mine Detectors and Bombs Locators for Navy Airfield Damage Repair System Inclusive Microcomputer and Software as well as VIP Protection systems; walk-through Metal Detectors, Handheld Metal Detectors.

Weatherhaven Resources Ltd. 5700 Marine Way, Burnaby BC V5J 5C8 Tel: 604-451-8900 Fax: 604-451-8999

Weatherhaven Resources is a world leader in the design, manufacture, transportion and installation of portable fabric covered structures complete with a wide range of integrated life support systems. Weatherhaven products are 1/3 the weight and 1/7 the volume of wood constructed buildings, which makes it possible to airlift full turn-key camps into remote and hostile locations using a wide variety of aircraft. This transport flexibility in combination with Weatherhaven's worldwide supplier network, expandable, manufacturing capacity, globally experienced installation crew, and reputation for fast, efficient delivery has led to several **peacekeeping contracts**. Weatherhaven has now supplied and installed over 200 remote site camps around the world. For any location, permanent or temporary, for 2 to 2000 personnel, you can depend on Weatherhaven to deliver a safe and comfortable shelter system.

W. Giertsen A/S

Nygaardviken 1, 5031 Laksevaag, Bergen, Norway

Tel: 47-5-534-2250 Fax: 47-5-534-0411

W. Giertsen manufacture the following; the RubbHall prefabricated, redeployable buildings, which are delivered to most peacekeeping missions, serving as hangars, workshops, warehouses, hospitals and transit camps; Rubb Water Tanks which are collapsible of 100 L - 50,000 L capacity; and WG Flat Mini-Houses -- 4 to 5 mini-houses, complete with 8 to 10 beds each, may be stuffed on one 20 ft container.

W.L. Gore and Associates Inc. 297 Blue Ball Rd., Elkton, MD 21921 USA Tel: 410-392-3700 Fax: 410-392-4452

Gore Products, including Gore-Tex fabric, are tested to meet the specific challenges faced by today's soldier. Gore's technology, coupled with the state-of-the-art garment manufacturing, provides the most technologically advanced protective clothing available. In fair weather or foul, Gore products have proven effective. From cold water immersion to fire fighting, to a chemical and biological environment, Gore products are engineered for survival. Gore's research and development teams continue to generate new products that meet the most demanding requirements of military forces.

Worldwide Government Directories Inc. 7979 Old Georgetown Rd., Bethesda, MD 20814 USA

Tel: 301-718-8770 Fax: 301-718-8494

Publishes two directories which list the names, titles, addresses, telephone, fax and telex information in 195 countries of the following:

Worldwide Government Directory - covers heads of state, ministeries, state agencies and corporations, defence forces, legislatures, judiciaries, central banks and diplomatic missions.

Worldwide Directory of Defence - covers in depth the ministries of defence, general staffs and various branches. Ancillary products include biographical information and monthly newsletter.

World Vision Relief and Development 220 I St., Suite 270, Washington, DC 20002 USA

Tel: 202-547-3743 Fax: 202-547-4834

To achieve successful long-term transformation of human lives though the effective implementation of emergency relief, rehabilitation and sustainable development programs throughout the world.

Zenon ENV systems

845 Harrington Ct., Burlington, ON L7N 3P3

Tel: 905-639-6320 Fax: 905-639-1812

Zenon Environmental Systems (ZES) is an advanced technology environmental company. Zenon's products include land-based and shipboard systems for water purification and waste water treatment, pure water applications including the production of potable and boiler feed water, shipboard desalination, treatment of NBC contaminated water, and emergency response and disaster relief systems. Our waste water applications extend to compact biological treatment systems for black water, grey water and oily bilge water for shipboard applications and we are capable of handling site remediation of AFFF, oil, paint waste, volatile organics, metals and other contaminated waters from soil washing, lagoons, landfills and underground storage tanks.



The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre Le centre canadien international Lester B. Pearson pour la formation en maintien de la paix

About the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and the New Peacekeeping Partnership

The mission of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre is to support and enhance the Canadian contribution to international peace, security and stability. The Centre is an independent organization established by the Government of Canada in 1994, and is a division of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. The Centre is funded, in part, by the Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, and the Department of National Defence. It is an education, training and research facility with a mandate to teach the teachers, train the trainers and educate the educators.

To guide its activities, the PPC has developed the concept of the "New Peacekeeping Partnership," the term applied to the military, government, and non-government agencies dealing with humanitarian assistance, refugees, and displaced persons; election monitors and media; and civilian police personnel as they work together to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

The Pearson Centre serves the "New Peacekeeping Partnership" by offering national and international, multi-disciplinary individuals and groups the opportunity to examine specific peacekeeping issues and update their knowledge of the latest peacekeeping practices. The Centre offers a multifaceted curriculum of special interest to all the stakeholders associated with peacekeeping operations. It offers an extensive schedule of conferences, seminars, workshops, training, and educational courses. The Centre has the ability to offer selected courses in English and in French. Off campus activities are conducted by mobile training teams or through electronic distant-learning technology.

The Centre also sponsors field research with deployed peacekeeping missions, and a Visiting Scholar Program. Researchers in any peacekeeping-related discipline can arrange for access to the Centre's archives. The Canadian Peacekeeping Press publishes proceedings, journals, newsletters, bibliographies, and books derived from the Centre's programs. In addition to its scheduled activities, the Centre has the ability to respond quickly to requests for specialized research or customized training programs. It also functions as an information clearing house and research centre. Its multi-disciplinary approach reflects the changes in the international environment and "The Changing Face of Peacekeeping."

The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre is named in honour of Lester B. Pearson, former Prime Minister of Canada. In 1956, at the time of the Suez Crisis, he invented peacekeeping for which he was awarded the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize.

The Centre, established by the Government of Canada in 1994, is funded, in part, by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence of Canada.

Le centre à été établi par le Gouvernement de Canada en 1994. Le soutien financier de Centre provient, en partie, des ministères des affairs extérieures et commerce extérieur et de la défense nationale de Canada.



The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre

Le centre canadien international Lester B. Pearson pour la formation en maintien de la paix

The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre was established by the Government of Canada in 1994 to provide research, education and training in peacekeeping in all its aspects and to serve as a uniquely Canadian point of contact for peacekeeping information.

The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre is international and multi-disciplinary in nature and serves the New Peacekeeping Partnership, the term applied to the military, government and non-government agencies dealing with humanitarian assistance, refugees, and displaced persons; elections monitors and media; and civilian police personnel as they work together to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

<u>APRIL 1995 - MARCH 1996</u> COURSE ANNOUNCEMENT

- C01 INTERDISCIPLINARY COOPERATION: THE NEW PEACE-KEEPING PARTNERSHIP IN ACTION
- C02 CREATING COMMON GROUND: PEACEKEEPING NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION
- C03 MYTHS AND REALITY: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF MODERN PEACEKEEPING
- C04 REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS: THE HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGE
- C05 MODERN PEACEKEEPING LOGISTICS
- C08 THE PERSONAL DIMENSION OF PEACEKEEPING: STRESS MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT FOR PEACEKEEPERS
- C16 THE MARITIME DIMENSION OF PEACEKEEPING
- C24 THE MILITARY TRAINING ASSISTANCE PLAN SENIOR OFFICER COURSE

Tuition Cost: CDN\$2000 / two week course. (includes tuition, reference material, accommodation and meals)

C99 The PEACEKEEPING MANAGEMENT, COMMAND & STAFF COURSE. This capstone program will be conducted during the September to November period. The aim of the course is to prepare an international, multi-disciplinary group of intermediate and senior leaders to fill key positions in peacekeeping missions or within organizations of the New Peacekeeping Partnership.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT:

Alex Morrison, President, The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre Cornwallis Park, PO Box 100, Clementsport, NS CANADA BOS 1E0 Telephone: (902) 638-8808 Facsimile: (902) 638-8888

The Centre, established by the Government of Canada in 1994, is funded, in part, by the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade and the Department of National Defence of Canada.

Le centre à été établi par le Gouvernement de Canada en 1994. Le soutien financier de Centre provient, en partie, des

ministères des affairs extérieures et commerce extérieur et de la défense nationale de Canada.

The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies

President, Don Macnamara, OMM, CD, MA Executive Director, Alex Morrison, MSC, CD, MA

The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS) provides the forum and is the vehicle to stimulate the research, study, analysis and discussion of the strategic implications of major national and international issues, events and trends as they affect Canada and Canadians.

The CISS is currently working independently or in conjunction with related organizations in a number of fields, including Canadian security and sovereignty; arms control and disarmament; Canada-US security cooperation; Maritime and Arctic security; Asia-Pacific security studies; social issues such as drugs, poverty and justice; national and international environmental issues; and regional and global trade issues.

CISS publications include:

Free with membership:

The CISS Bulletin

The Canadian Strategic Forecast Seminar Proceedings Strategic Datalinks Strategic Profile Canada By Subscription:


The McNaughton Papers (<u>The</u> Canadian Journal of Strategic Studies -- 2 issues per year)

Peacekeeping and International Relations -- 6 issues per year

The CISS is a non-profit, non-partisan voluntary organization which maintains an independent posture and does not advocate any particular interest.

For membership, seminar and publications information, please contact:

The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies 76 St. Clair Avenue West, Suite 502 Toronto, ON M4V 1N2 Tel: (416) 964-6632 Fax: (416) 964-5833



THE NEW PEACEKEEPING PARTNERSHIP

"This book heightens the awareness of the public to the radical changes in world security policy, as we move closer to the determination and resolution of disputes by the United Nations."

The Honourable David Collenette Minister of National Defence

"With the end of the Cold War, the world community was suddenly awakened to the anomaly inherent in the fact that for 40 years it had been bleeding with compassion for the victims of famine, floods, earthquakes, and tornados while turning its back on vastly greater death and destruction wrought by small wars.

"We should look at the various tasks of peacekeeping as matters that can and should involve the world for a long time -- indeed, for as long as it takes to build a global equivalent to the kind of peace, law, and mutual respect we enjoy within our own borders."

The Honourable Elliot Richardson Co-Chairman of the National Council of the UN Association of the USA

The New Peacekeeping Partnership is the term applied to the military, government and non-government agencies dealing with humanitarian assistance, refugees, and displaced persons; election monitors and media; and civilian police personnel as they work together to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

This book contains the complete texts of all papers presented at "Peacekeeping '94: An Exhibition and Seminar" held in Washington, DC, in the autumn of 1994. Also included are the names of, and product/service description for each of the firms/organizations represented at the exhibition. It provides valuable information for those who wish to understand more about the complexities of modern peacekeeping in all its aspects.

ISBN: 1-896551-00-9 (1995)







